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Executive Compensation and Corporate Investment in China: What 
Determines Them and Are They Related?  
Abstract 
This thesis mainly examines three empirical studies. Firstly, it examines the relation 
between company ownership attribute and the executive compensation gap between 
market level and actual level. Secondly, it examines the relation between company 
ownership attribute and firms’ inefficient investment behaviors. Finally, it examines 
the relation between executive compensation gap, between market level and actual 
level, and firms’ inefficient investment behaviors. Based on Chinese listed companies 
with data from 2005 to 2012, the thesis finds that: 1) SOE attribute (whether central or 
local) increases the gap between executives’ actual compensation and market 
determined compensation levels. 2) SOE attribute has a significantly positive 
influence on a firm’s unexpected investment. With other conditions controlled, SOEs 
invest more than non-SOEs; furthermore, SOE attribute drives firms to make more 
investments. Meanwhile, although local SOEs invest more than other firms, central 
SOE attribute does not have a significant relationship to a firm’s level of unexpected 
investment. 3) A significant and positive relation between the extent of compensation 
regulation and the degree of a listed SOE’s overinvestment. These findings reveal that 
compensation regulation will cause severe agency problems in SOEs. The 
underpayment of executives in SOEs will not only cause overinvestments but also 
will devalue firm value of Chinese listed SOEs finally. This thesis contributes to 
existing literatures by providing a new way to study the correlation between executive 
compensation and firm investment behaviors. It also provides solid evidence that 
helps us to understand the consequences of distorted incentive mechanisms in Chinese 
listed SOEs experiencing government intervention, an issue that has been neglected in 
previous researches. The implications of this thesis’s findings are important to both 
corporate governance practitioners and policy makers as well. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Why this research is important 
For many years, the executive compensation of Chinese state-owned enterprises 
(Hereafter SOEs) has attracted attention from both the authorities and the public.  
 
Some people argue that executives in Chinese SOEs receive compensation that is too 
high, which is unfair both to other employers and to society as a whole (Gao and Wei, 
2014). Since 2010, the Chinese Institute of Economic System Reform has been 
conducting research on salary and compensation systems in 183 countries and regions. 
The report concludes that in every country in the world (except for China), 
government-financed enterprises adopt a public servant compensation standard, and 
executives at state-financed enterprises receive compensation that is comparable to 
that received by the country’s senior public servants. However, the report also reveals 
that the average executive compensation in Chinese SOEs is 98 times higher than the 
Chinese minimum wage; this level of compensation is far higher than the average 
worldwide compensation of 5 times the minimum wage. Meanwhile, in China such 
wage difference among different industries is as high as 3000%, far higher than the 
world’s average value of 70%. However, some other scholars argue that if compare 
the absolute compensation level, executives in Chinese listed firms have much lower 
compensation than their counterparts in developed economies. For example, Wan et al. 
(2008) compared executive compensation of publicly listed firms on the Chinese and 
American stock exchanges and find that in terms of absolute value, executive 
compensation in American listed firms is about 300 times higher than that in Chinese 
listed firms.  
 
Since the beginning of the economic reforms in 1978, China’s central and local 
governments have initiated and driven reforms in SOE executive compensation. 
12 
 
Before the economic reforms, Chinese SOEs generally used a rank-based 
compensation system in which non-managerial employees and plant supervisors are 
entitled to a particular compensation level based on their technical or administrative 
rank. The SOE compensation system evolved after the Chinese economic reform. In 
1986, the government allowed SOEs to introduce a variety of wage types other than 
rank-based wages. In the early 1990s, to break the so-called “iron wage and iron bowl” 
and to motivate SOE employees, the functional wage was introduced. In 1994, an 
annual compensation package for SOE executives was approved by the government. 
Before 2001, executive compensation at SOEs was (in general) relatively low; 
therefore, the government encouraged SOEs to increase executive compensation. 
Since 2007, however, an increasing number of people have argued that SOE executive 
compensation is much too high. In 2009, the Chinese government began to take 
actions to regulate executive compensation in SOEs. Both the central and local 
governments have released many regulations in the past several years. The most 
recent compensation regulation pertains to central SOEs and has been valid since 
January 1, 2015; it will affect the compensation of senior executives in 72 central 
SOEs. The regulation provides that the total compensation of executives in central 
SOEs cannot be more than 5 times the average total income of company employees; 
in addition, it is mandatory to disclose executive compensation.  
 
Another topic that has attracted a great deal of academic attention is that of inefficient 
investments by Chinese SOEs. Some scholars argue that the imperfect corporate 
governance of Chinese SOEs leads to inefficient overinvestment. For example, in the 
past decade, ownership structure (Yuan and Zheng, 1999; He, 2002), management 
ownership (Liao and Fang, 2004), and blockholder ownership (Ouyang et al., 2005; 
An et al., 2008) have been extensively discussed. Many other authors focus on the 
relationship between a firm’s financial condition and its investments. For instance, 
Feng (1999) reports financing constraints in Chinese listed firms; He (2002) studies 
the relationship between free cash flow and firm investment; and Tong and Lu (2005) 
reveal a negative relationship between short-term debt and firm investment.  
13 
 
In general, studies on inefficient investments by Chinese firms primarily focus on 
agency problems and firms’ financial conditions—furthermore, they primarily focus 
on intrinsic factors. Moreover, most studies merely verify theories that are based on 
developed economies; they do not consider China’s unique political and economic 
situation.  
 
Chinese SOEs are legally owned by all of China’s people. However, because the 
people have no proper representative, China’s central government and its local 
affiliates are empowered to manage SOEs. From the government’s perspective, 
executive compensation of SOEs is an issue not only of business administration but 
also (and more importantly) of politics. Because SOE executives normally occupy an 
administrative rank that corresponds to that of a governor, their compensation is 
always compared with that of governors.   
 
There have been very limited studies on the relationship between compensation 
regulation and Chinese firms’ inefficient investment. This paper both investigates that 
relationship and fills the literature gap. The study connects firms’ investment behavior 
and external intervention, and it provides empirical evidence of how firms’ 
investment decisions are influenced not only by corporate governance and financing 
conditions but also by compensation.  
 
By considering the efficiency of firms’ investments, this research also provides a 
good reference for policy makers when they are crafting compensation policies for 
executives in SOEs. This paper’s findings and recommendations may influence a 
reform of Chinese SOEs, thus impacting the Chinese economy over the long term.  
 
1.2 Summary: Key findings and contributions 
This paper studies the relationship between compensation regulation and the 
inefficient investment of Chinese listed SOEs.  
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In the first part of this research, the paper studied the determinants of executive 
compensation in Chinese listed firms. This paper finds that firm size remains the most 
important factor in setting executive compensation. ROA is positively but not 
significantly in all firms related to executive compensation, whereas gross margin is 
significantly and positively related to executive compensation. This finding shows 
that to some degree, firm performance influences compensation decisions, but 
short-term measures (e.g., gross margins) play a more important role in compensation 
settlement than relatively long-term measures do (e.g., ROA). Corporate governance 
remains weak in Chinese listed companies. Independent directors are not playing an 
effective monitoring role in all firms, and CEO duality remains prevalent, which 
influences executive compensation decisions and causes higher overall compensation. 
Ownership structure has a significant impact on executive compensation. Consistent 
with substitute effect theory, the result shows a negative, yet insignificant, relation 
between management ownership and executive compensation, supporting the 
argument that management ownership has a substitutive effect on compensation thus 
the management may accept relatively lower cash compensation. This finding is 
consistent with some previous studies (e.g., Cordeiro and Veliyath, 2003; Hu et al., 
2012) but not with other studies (e.g., Sanders, 2001a; Peng 2006; Zhang, 2010) 
whose findings support the agency theory and argue that management ownership 
helps managers influence compensation decisions more effectively so that managers 
with higher ownership will receive higher compensation. However such relation is not 
significant in this research which may because management ownership in Chinese 
listed companies is not prevalent yet. Ownership concentration is significantly and 
negatively related to executive compensation according to my study and those of 
other authors (e.g., Ke and Qiu, 2009; Conyon and He, 2011; Zhou, 2013), thus 
showing that blockholders in Chinese listed companies play an effective role in both 
monitoring management and controlling executive cash compensation. Another 
important finding related to executive compensation is the relation between SOE 
attribute and executive compensation. The paper finds that SOE attribute (whether a 
company is a central or local SOE) increases the gap between executives’ actual 
15 
 
compensation and the market-determined compensation level.   
 
In the second part of this research, the paper investigates firms’ inefficient 
investments. This paper finds that SOE attribute has a significantly positive influence 
on firms’ unexpected investments. The result reveals that under controlled conditions, 
SOEs make more investments than other firms; furthermore, SOE attribute drives 
firms to increase their investment. This study also shows that although local SOEs 
invest more than other firms, central SOE attribute does not have a significant 
relationship to a firm’s unexpected-investment level. The result of empirical study 
supports the hypothesis that Chinese listed SOEs engage in overinvestment in general. 
Furthermore, it reveals that although local SOEs engage in overinvestment, central 
SOEs may not, namely local SOEs may be the primary factor that causes 
overinvestment in Chinese listed SOEs. This finding is consistent with regression 
outputs that verify the first Hypothesis in chapter 3 of this thesis, in which the thesis 
finds that local SOE attribute—not central SOE attribute—can cause a firm to engage 
in positive, unexpected investments.  
 
The relation between compensation regulation and a firm’s inefficient investment is 
investigated in the third part of this research. The thesis finds a significant and 
positive relation between the extent of compensation regulation and the degree of 
overinvestment by Chinese listed SOEs. For those SOEs that do not engage in 
overinvestment, this thesis finds that compensation regulation decreases a firm’s 
investment. These findings reveal that compensation regulation causes SOEs to 
experience agency problems. Unlike some other studies (e.g., Xin et al., 2007), this 
thesis finds a similar relation between compensation regulation and firm investment 
behavior in both local and central SOEs. Unlike SOEs, non-SOE firms present 
another relation between compensation regulation and firm investment. In the context 
of compensation regulation, executives of non-SOE firms choose shirking, whereas 
executives of SOEs pursue their own interests through overinvestment. This 
difference reflects the different external political and economic conditions 
16 
 
experienced by SOEs versus non-SOEs, and it provides good support for previous 
findings that SOEs have much weaker financing constraints than non-SOEs do (e.g., 
Wang, 2009; Shen et al., 2010).  
 
The thesis introduces a new method to study the correlation between executive 
compensation and firm investment behaviors which is new to the existing literatures. 
In the study, the thesis first builds a quantitative model to describe the gap between 
actual executive compensation and market-determined compensation. Second, the 
thesis calculates the gap between the two as the measurement of the degree of 
compensation regulation. Third, the thesis obtains the difference between a firm's 
actual investment level and its normal investment level, which is the measurement of 
a firm's inefficient investment. Finally, this thesis checks the correlation between the 
two gaps mentioned above, finding a significant and positive correlation. This method 
contributes to the literature on corporate governance and firm investment. Although 
there have been some related studies on either executive compensation or firm 
investment, this thesis is among very limited researches (e.g.: Xin et al., 2007) to link 
executive compensation and firm investment from a compensation regulation 
perspective in the Chinese political and economic context. Furthermore, this thesis 
introduces a dynamic panel data model to calculate an executive's market-determined 
compensation level, an innovation that is novel in the literature.  
 
This study also contributes to the current literature related to compensation 
management and firms’ investment behaviors.  
 
First, the study proves that executive compensation in Chinese listed companies, on 
certain extent, is below market determined level. Many literatures argue that 
executive compensations in Chinese listed companies, especially Chinese listed state 
owned enterprises, are high because of poor corporate governance, government 
intervene or company ownership structure. For example, Shi (2010) attempts to prove 
that because in the corporate governance structure of listed SOEs, controlling 
17 
 
shareholders are interlaced with the insiders control and because conflicts between 
administrative logic and market determining logic in the regulation of executive 
compensation, the executive compensations in SOEs are out of control and 
regulations on SOEs’ executive compensation are dysfunctional. Jiang (2008) argues 
that executive compensations in Chinese listed SOEs are much higher than those in 
private companies, and the growth rate of executive compensation in China is among 
the highest in the world. Jiang (2008) also claims that regulations on Chinese listed 
SOEs are generally out of control and distorted. Shen and Li (2010) make arguments 
based on an empirical study that “pay-for-luck” is pervasive among public firms, and 
is more severe in SOEs than non-SOEs. The “Pay Ceiling Order”, which is originally 
designed to regulate CEO pay, fails to mitigate the “pay without performance” 
problem. Based on the background of executive compensation of Chinese listed 
companies consisting of astronomical salaries and zero pay
1
, Yang and Zhao(2012) 
find that media plays a role in monitoring executive compensation because there are 
more negative press coverage in the lists of astronomical salaries and zero pay than 
other lists．The authors further investigate the mechanism under which the media 
shape its governance role in China, however Yang and Zhao (2012) argue that the 
media role of monitoring can’t improve corporate governance because other 
surveillance mechanism and reputation system have lapsed so government should 
release more orders and rules to regulate executive compensations in Chinese listed 
companies. Although these arguments reveal some problems in executive 
compensation of Chinese listed companies, they are not the key. Since unique 
ownership of Chinese public listed companies, especially listed SOEs, there are 
severe agency problems between executives of Chinese listed SOEs and SOEs’ 
administrative authorities in the government. Due to asymmetrical information, it is 
very difficult for government to judge executives’ behavior, meanwhile, although 
SOEs introduced independent directors, they are not real “independent” (e.g. Tang et 
al., 2005; Gao et al., 2006) to monitor executives including compensation setting. 
                                                             
1 Zero pay refers to the phenomena that in China, some chairmen or top executives of Chinese listed firms give up 
their wages or only receive a very low compensation from the companies. Ding (2007) gives a deep study on this.  
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Thus to keep a “fair” compensation for executives in SOEs, government merely 
issued many “Pay ceiling order” and all kinds of regulations. This study, however, 
shows that underpayment is prevailing among Chinese listed companies, particularly 
listed SOEs. The study finds that 48.37% of executives in Chinese listed SOEs are 
underpaid when use all listed companies as the benchmark of market compensation 
level; 51.83% of executives are underpaid when use all non-SOEs as the same 
benchmark. This finding is valuable. It clearly shows that although some executives 
are overpaid in SOEs, many more are underpaid. So scholars and administrative 
authorities should focus more on how to motivate executives in Chinese listed SOEs 
rather than merely regulate executives’ compensation to cater to public’s appeal of 
fairness.  
 
Second, this study provides solid evidence that helps us to understand the 
consequences of distorted incentive mechanisms in Chinese listed SOEs experiencing 
government intervention, an issue that has been neglected in previous researches. The 
study reveals that executive compensation (and the regulation of such compensation) 
can influence firms’ investment behaviors under the Chinese political and economic 
context. Only very few literatures studied relation between executive compensation 
and firm’s investment. For instance, Chen and Sun (2014) studied correlation between 
executive compensation and firm investment behavior of Chinese listed companies 
from 2009 and 2011. They argue that there is a significant relation between executive 
compensation and firm investment, furthermore they point out that such relation 
varies with different company ownership: no significant relation is found between 
executive compensation and firm investment in listed SOEs whereas such relation still 
remains significantly positive among non-SOEs. Based on dynamic panel data model, 
Xia and Yu (2012) studied Chinese listed companies from 2004 to 2010 and find that 
improper pricing of executive compensations and stocks have influence to firm’s 
investment. Xin et al. (2007) argue that low executive compensation in local Chinese 
SOEs will cause overinvestment but compensation contract failure does not cause 
agency problems in central SOEs and non-SOEs. Xu and Liu (2014) studied executive 
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compensation and firm investment from an endogeneity perspective. They find that 
higher level of corporate investment leads to a significant reduction of executive 
compensation. Executive compensation contracts based on accounting performance 
can not improve the level of long-term investment thus executive compensation has 
negative effect on the corporate investment. They argue that executive incentives of 
Chinese listed companies have no effect to solve the agent problem of corporate 
investment. In summary, previous literatures haven’t reached a well-accepted 
conclusion of relation between executive compensation and firm investment under 
Chinese political and economic context. This vagueness brings obstacles to 
innumerable previous researches and future studies as well. Almost all existing 
researches did not consider the impact from executive compensation when study 
firm’s investment behavior. This thesis aims to bring more knowledge to this filed by 
answering the relation between executive compensation and firm investment in a 
more quantitative and structural way. The thesis finds that there is compensation 
regulation in listed SOEs, which results in actual executive compensation that is lower 
than the market-determined level. Due to the compensation regulations, there is 
overinvestment in Chinese listed SOEs. The thesis also reveals the different agency 
problems in SOEs and non-SOEs. When underpaid, executives in SOEs will make 
overinvestment so as to gain additional benefits while executives in non-SOEs will 
choose underinvestment with shirking. This thesis not only enriches the existing 
literatures about executive compensation and firm investment, it also provides strong 
empirical evidences to support agency theory in corporate finance field. Meanwhile, 
the thesis indicates that the investment models adopted by the previous literature are 
insufficient in that they ignore the influence of compensation incentives. Therefore, 
this study provides a new understanding of the investment behaviors of Chinese listed 
firms which will bring valuable hints to future researches in the field related to 
executive compensation and firm investment.  
 
This research also presents a good reference for business administration practitioners 
and provides authority for the creation of executive compensation schemes. Chinese 
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government released several compensation regulations in the past years. The latest 
order was launched at the beginning of 2015
2
. The press release on the Chinese 
government website states the purpose of this order that “From China's basic national 
conditions, adapt to the process of State-owned assets management system and the 
reform of State-owned enterprises, gradually standardized enterprise income 
distribution in order to achieve appropriate levels of pay, reasonable structure, 
management, oversight and effective, and make adjustments to the unreasonably 
growing higher and higher incomes…to realize rational income distribution 
relationship between executives and employees, properly regulate the industry pay 
gap between business leaders and promote social equity and justice; adhere to 
combination of government regulation and corporate self-discipline, improve 
supervision of central compensation system, regulate the order of income distribution.” 
The new release shows that China government believes executive compensation in 
central SOEs is abnormally high which has already hurt social fairness and justice. 
Thus in some extent, the executive compensation regulation released by China 
government is more for political reasons rather than considerations from corporate 
governance perspective. This thesis brings evidences to China government that their 
regulations to executive compensation in SOEs may not be correct and will bring 
negative consequences to SOEs’ corporate values. As said, the thesis has three key 
findings: firstly, there is compensation regulation in Chinese listed SOEs; secondly, in 
general, Chinese listed SOEs have overinvestment; and thirdly, compensation 
regulations in Chinese listed SOEs cause overinvestment while in listed non-SOEs 
cause underinvestment. The findings reveal that regulations on executives’ 
compensation in SOEs cause firm’s overinvestment, and the over investment 
consequently leads negative impact to firms’ value (e.g. Morgado and Pindado, 2003; 
Jiang, 2011; Du et al., 2011; Khieu et al., 2012). This study indicates that 
compensation regulations in Chinese listed SOEs bring severe side effects and will 
                                                             
2 Please refer to: 
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-08/29/content_2742373.htm 
http://www.cssn.cn/dzyx/dzyx_jlyhz/201501/t20150104_1464858.shtml  
http://gd.sina.com.cn/fs/2016-04-27/city-fs-ifxrpvcy4534238.shtml  
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furtherly diminish state-owned assets. This implication is critical: it may influence 
China government to reconsider future reform actions in Chinese SOEs and will 
ultimately impact China’s political and economic ecology in a long term.  
1.3 Theoretical framework and literature review  
Because executive compensation in Chinese SOEs is regulated, the executive 
compensation of SOE managers is below market level. Moreover, SOE executives 
normally either do not receive equity-based incentives or receive only very weak 
equity-based incentives, which cannot offset the gap between their compensation and 
executive compensation in private companies (Wang and Tang, 2014).   
 
Underpayment of executive compensation causes serious agency problems in Chinese 
listed SOEs. According to classic agency theory, agency issues appear when the 
interests of a firm's managers are different from those of the firm's owners. In those 
situations, managers will demonstrate a preference for on-the-job perquisites, shirking, 
or making self-interested and entrenched decisions that reduce shareholder wealth 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997) also argue that 
agents behave to maximize their own interests and that agents’ interests are normally 
different from principals’ interests. Because SOE executives are underpaid, they will 
find ways to offset their losses, thus causing agency problems.  
 
Additionally, asymmetric information between principals and agents in Chinese SOEs 
aggravates agency problems. Absentee ownership is a prominent problem in Chinese 
SOEs. Legally, SOEs are owned by the state. In practice, however, central 
government departments and local governments are entrusted to supervise SOE 
management. Currently, these supervisors are the SASACs (State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council) of governments at 
various levels. The problem is that SASACs are not the true owners, and therefore, 
their officials do not have adequate incentives to supervise SOE management. In such 
situations, SOE employees who conduct the SOE’s day-to-day management hold 
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much more information than the government does. This inside information enables 
SOE executives to make managerial decisions that serve their own interests.  
 
That notwithstanding, a firm’s investment policy is highly dependent on both its 
growth opportunities and its financial condition. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 
(1988) (FHP) find that higher investment sensitivity to cash flow availability is found 
in companies with lower dividend payment ratios; the authors interpret this finding as 
an evidence of financing constraints. Follow FHP (1988)’s study, many scholars (e.g. 
(Hubbard et al., 1998；Degryse and Jong, 2001; Gelos and Werner, 2002) introduced 
different methods to measure financing constraint and proved investment sensitivity 
under financing constraint. Luo et al. (2012) argue that although bank credit 
significantly boosts firms’ overinvestment in Chinese SOEs, it does not have a 
significant influence on private firms’ investment decisions. This finding reveals 
variations in the efficiency of financing among enterprises with different types of 
ownership. Although some scholars (e.g.: Lin and Bo, 2012; Firth et al., 2012) argue 
that state ownership does not necessarily help in reducing the firm’s financing 
constraints on investment and that state ownership does not lead to more borrowing 
from the Chinese banking sector, they do not partition Chinese SOEs into central 
SOEs and local SOEs in the study which causes their conclusion questionable. 
Meanwhile, many other scholars report that Chinese central SOEs and local SOEs do 
not rely on the same financing channel. For example, Ju (2013) finds that Chinese 
central SOEs more rely on loans from banking sector to support their innovation 
investments while local SOEs and non-SOEs do not rely on external financing too 
much for the same investments. He and Yang (2012) study the different effect of 
accessibility of funds on productivity between state owned and private owned firms. 
The authors find that the productivity of listed firms as a whole is not influenced by 
the internal finance; if the firms are split into two subsamples by state-owned and 
private-owned ones, only private-owned firms suffer from financial constraint. Fang 
et al. (2014) document that SOEs normally have higher ratio of debt and actually 
Chinese SOEs have very weak financing constraints compared with private 
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companies. Some scholars have investigated firm overinvestment behavior related to 
the influence of government intervention. Xiang et al. (2014) find that at the initial 
stage of a local governor’s incumbency, intervention in local SOEs is small, and 
therefore, local SOEs’ overinvestment is also weak; the longer that a local governor is 
incumbent, the higher the level of intervention in local SOEs is, which results in a 
more severe overinvestment. However when a local governor is going to step down 
from the position, the magnitude of overinvestment drops dramatically. Wu and Yu 
(2009) report that overinvestment is much more serious in local SOEs than that in 
local private companies and argue that local government intervention aggravates firms’ 
overinvestment. Zhang et al. (2014) also document the positive relation between 
government intervention and firm overinvestment and further note that diversification 
is one important type of overinvestment in firms, especially in SOEs. 
 
SOE investment inefficiencies arising out of conflicts of interest and asymmetric 
information cannot be thoroughly resolved under the current system. Because of 
agency problems caused by executive compensation regulations and weaker financing 
constraints in Chinese SOEs, overinvestment is a common choice made by SOE 
executives that allows them to advance their own interests. On the one hand, 
executives can obtain additional benefits from investment projects. At the same time, 
overinvestment normally increases firm size, which will bring executives more power 
and higher compensation because firm size is the one of the most important 
determinants of executive compensation (Robert, 1956; Ciscel and Carroll, 1980; Tosi, 
Werner et al., 2000).  
 
In summary, this thesis would argue that executive compensation regulation causes 
severe agency problems in Chinese SOEs. In addition, because Chinese SOEs 
normally do not have financing constraints, executives of Chinese SOEs choose to 
overinvest to serve their own interest in compensating themselves for the income loss 
caused by compensation regulations.  
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1.4 Research design 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the correlation between compensation 
regulation and Chinese listed SOEs’ inefficient investment. The study is divided into 
three steps.  
 
The first step investigates compensation regulation in Chinese listed firms. In this step, 
this thesis constructs a market-oriented compensation model as the benchmark. Based 
on this benchmark model, the thesis then predicts each firm’s market-level executive 
compensation. The difference between market-level compensation and actual 
compensation can be obtained. A regression containing this difference and an SOE 
attribute dummy variable are conducted to check whether there is an SOE 
compensation regulation.  
 
The second step examines firms’ investment behaviors. The thesis refers to Vogt’s 
(1994) model to check the sensitivity between a firm’s investment and its free cash 
flow to verify whether there is overinvestment by Chinese SOEs. This thesis also 
calculates the extent of the firm’s inefficient investment. Based on a model similar to 
Richardson’s (2006) method, the thesis builds a model to describe the firm’s expected 
and unexpected investment levels. The sign of the unexpected investment level 
denotes whether the firm is overinvested (i.e., the sign is positive) or underinvested 
(i.e., the sign is negative); the absolute value of the unexpected investment reflects the 
extent of over- or underinvestment. A regression containing both unexpected 
investment and the SOE dummy variable is performed to check whether the SOE 
attribute drives a firm to invest more.  
 
In the third step, the thesis investigates the relation between compensation regulation 
and firms’ overinvestment. In the first step, this thesis has obtained the difference 
between market-oriented compensation levels and actual compensation levels; in the 
second step, the thesis has uncovered the amount of firms’ unexpected investment. In 
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the third step, the thesis checks the correlations between the findings from the first 
two steps. To do so, a regression composed of the compensation gap and firms’ 
unexpected investment is conducted, and a positive relation between a compensation 
gap and firms’ unexpected investment is expected. 
 
1.5 Thesis structure 
There are five chapters in this thesis. In the first chapter, this thesis introduces the 
research background, a brief research framework, and the research design. In the 
second chapter, the thesis discusses compensation regulation in Chinese listed SOEs. 
The third chapter focuses on firms’ investment behaviors and determines whether 
SOEs engage in more investment than private firms. In the fourth chapter, this thesis 
closely investigates the relation between compensation regulation and firms’ 
overinvestment. In addition, the fifth chapter provides a conclusion and a discussion 
of future studies. 
 
1.6 Introduction on Sample Data-setting  
As mentioned in section 1.5 above, there are 3 empirical studies in this thesis. The 
first empirical study is conducted in chapter 2 focusing on relation between firm 
attribute and executive compensation gap. The second empirical study is deployed in 
chapter 3 investigating the relation between firm attribute and firm’s inefficient 
investment. The third empirical study is in chapter 4, trying to figure out the relation 
between firm inefficient investment and executive compensation gap. 
 
Three empirical studies use the same data set in sequence. The detailed description of 
data setting is as follows.  
1.6.1 Data set of Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 aims to investigate the relation between firm attribute and executive 
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compensation gap between market-determined executive compensation level and 
actual compensation level. To deploy the study, the thesis first constructs a market 
compensation model to determine executive compensation level. The samples include 
non-financial companies listed on both the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Financial companies are excluded from the sample 
because the executive compensation characteristics of financial organizations are very 
different from those of non-financial companies given the stricter compensation 
regulations that apply to financial organizations (Firth et al., 2007). The thesis 
chooses A-share data only because B-share stocks are traded in USD by qualified 
foreign investors and their total market value is small. The data of this thesis are from 
2005 to 2012. The starting year is the year of China’s official launch of split-share 
reform (Zheng et al., 2007). The “Split Share Structure Reform” in China enables 
state shareholders of listed companies to trade their restricted shares. This renders the 
wealth of state shareholders more related to share price movements and this reform 
will create remuneration arrangements that increase the relationship between Chinese 
firms’ executive pay and stock market performance (Hou et al., 2013). Furthermore 
split share reform motives state-controlled firms and especially those where dominant 
shareholders to have greater incentives to improve share return performance and 
corporate governance (Liao et al., 2008). That said split share reform significantly 
influences corporate governance (Wang et al., 2010) and agency problems (Tseng, 
2012) which also largely influences firms’ investment behaviors (e.g.: Li, 2008; 
Huang et al., 2011; Qiang, 2012). To eliminate split ownership impact to executive 
compensation and firm investment behaviors, this thesis chooses data after 2005 when 
split share reform was implemented. The thesis also deletes all firm-year observations 
with negative operating income per share or negative total assets from the sample to 
remove firms who do not have normal business operations or who are in bankruptcy.  
 
Executive compensation information can be obtained from listed companies’ annual 
reports, as the Chinese CSRC has required all listed companies to disclose 
information about top management’s compensation since 1998.  
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In the first research, the dependent variable is total cash compensation of all of the 
executives disclosed in each firm’s annual reports. The independent variables are 
accounting items, corporate governance-related data, and basic company information 
such as company age, industry attributes, etc. All of these data can be obtained from 
CSMAR data. Because some items are missing from the CSMAR data, the size of the 
total samples is somewhat reduced from original amount. Following a necessary data 
trim, the samples for the executive compensation regulation study contain data from 
1,481 companies and include 12,260 firm-year observations. The panel data is 
unbalanced. The number of observations in each year varies from 1177 in 2005 to 
2220 in 2012.  
1.6.2 Data set of Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 discusses the determinants of firm’s investments and checks the relation 
between firm attribute and firm’s inefficient investments. There are two empirical 
studies in Chapter 3 to check two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is to check whether 
firm attribute is related to firm’s inefficient investments and the second hypothesis 
checks whether Chinese SOEs are, in general, overinvested.  
 
As in the previous study, the samples in Chapter 3 include non-financial companies of 
A shares listed on both the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange from 2005 to 2012. Financial companies are excluded from the sample 
because their assets and financing situations are very different from those of 
non-financial companies. Again, the thesis also deletes all firm-year observations with 
negative operating income per share or negative total assets from the sample to 
remove firms who do not have normal business operations or who are in bankruptcy. 
 
To check the hypotheses in this chapter, the thesis uses many accounting items such 
as Tobin’s Q, cash flow, fixed assets, cash stock, annual revenue, and financial 
leverage etc. All of these data can be obtained from the CSMAR database. One year 
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lagged data are required in the regression to check hypotheses. So although the raw 
data in chapter 3 is from 2005 to 2012 with the same number as that in chapter 2, the 
number of data in the regressions is much less due to one year lagged variables are 
required, namely one year data are lost.  
 
Thus, the number of samples (firm-year observations) for the first empirical study in 
Chapter3 becomes 9897. To check the second hypothesis in chapter 3, this thesis 
conducts fours regressions. The first regression is conducted on the samples including 
all firms, the second regression is conducted on the subsamples including all SOEs, 
the third regression is conducted on the subsamples including all local SOEs and the 
fourth regression is conducted on the subsamples including only central SOEs. 
Obviously, the number of samples for these regressions becomes smaller and smaller. 
Sample number of the first regression is 9897, that of the second regression is 5297; 
the third regression contains 4622 samples while the last regression only has 675 
samples.  
1.6.3 Data set of Chapter 4 
In this section, the thesis examines the relation between compensation regulation and 
firms’ overinvestment. The study begins based on previous sections of this thesis. In 
Chapter 2, this thesis finds that because of compensation regulation, executive 
compensation in Chinese listed SOEs is below the market level. The thesis obtains the 
gap between the market-determined compensation level and actual executive 
compensation in Chapter 2. Meanwhile, the thesis investigates firms’ investments in 
Chapter 3 and finds that, in general, Chinese listed SOEs are overinvested; the degree 
of overinvestment is obtained, which represents the unexpected part of a firm’s 
investment. The unexpected part of firms’ investment will be dependent variables of 
the regressions in this chapter. So the number of samples in this chapter is same as 
that in chapter which is 9897.  
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To check the relation between compensation regulation and firms’ overinvestment in 
details, besides all firms with 9897 observations, the thesis partitions the samples into 
several subgroups as non-SOEs, all SOEs, local SOEs and central SOEs. The number 
of these subsamples are 4597, 5297, 4622 and 675 respectively.    
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Chapter 2: Executive Compensation in Chinese Listed State-Owned 
Enterprises 
2.1 Abstract 
This chapter examines compensation regulations in Chinese listed firms. The thesis 
finds that firm size, ROA, and gross margin are positively related to executive 
compensation. Ownership structure has a significant impact on executive 
compensation, with ownership concentration significantly and negatively related to 
executive compensation. An important finding related to executive compensation is 
the relation between SOE attribute and executive compensation. This thesis finds that 
SOE attribute (whether central or local) increases the gap between executives’ actual 
compensation and market-determined compensation levels, which reveals the 
existence of compensation regulation in both central SOEs and local SOEs.  
 
2.2 Introduction               
2.2.1 Background and rationale 
This chapter investigates whether the regulation of executive compensation exists in 
Chinese public companies. The thesis first constructs a market-oriented executive 
model based on all listed companies and then uses that model to create expectations 
about the executive compensation paid by each company. To verify whether there is 
compensation regulation at listed companies, the thesis calculates the gap between 
each company’s expected compensation level and real executive compensation. If the 
gap is positive, there is compensation regulation, whereas if the gap is negative, 
executive compensation is higher than market level, indicating that the company does 
not have compensation regulation. Although the gap indicates the presence of 
compensation regulation, the absolute value of the gap can also show the degree of 
compensation regulation or overly high compensation.  
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The study in this chapter checks the compensation regulation status of listed 
companies while providing the necessary data for the study that will be described in 
Chapter 4. The thesis investigates the relationship between executive regulation and 
firm overinvestment; to do so, it uses the executive compensation gap obtained in this 
chapter.               
2.2.2 Specific purpose   
This chapter’s goal is to identify executive compensation regulation in Chinese public 
companies.  
 
Specifically, this chapter does the following: 
 It builds a market-determined executive compensation model; 
 It creates expectations about executive compensation based on a market-oriented 
executive compensation model; 
 It calculates the gap between expected executive compensation and real executive 
compensation from the CSMAR database; and 
 It identifies whether there is a positive relationship between SOEs and executive 
pay gaps. 
 
2.2.3 Definitions and units of analysis  
In this chapter, the thesis investigates executive compensation in Chinese listed 
companies. The definitions of executive and compensation are illustrated below.  
 
-The definition of executive 
Many empirical studies of executive compensation use CEOs to represent executives 
and assume that the design and consequences of a company’s compensation scheme 
have the same effect on CEOs as they do on other high-level executives (Carpenter 
and Sander, 2002). However, Chinese SOEs have a unique ownership structure in 
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which the board chairmen normally do not own the company but instead work for the 
state as do CEOs. Additionally, Liu (2015) reports that the average rate of CEO 
duality in Chinese listed companies is 24%, which is considerable, and SOEs are 
more likely to have CEO duality. Therefore, it is questionable to use CEO 
compensation as a proxy for executive compensation generally. In this research, the 
thesis uses the compensation of all of the top executives disclosed in a firm’s annual 
report; the thesis does not include the compensation of outside directors and members 
of the board of supervisors.  
 
-The definition of compensation 
In practice, there are four components of executive compensation (Conyon, 2006): 
base salary, annual bonus, stock options, and additional compensation such as 
long-term incentives and retirement plans. Some scholars (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 
1990a, 1990b) categorize executive compensation as salary, bonus, deferred 
remuneration, stock options, and total compensation. Among these four components 
of compensation, salary, bonus, and deferred remuneration are cash compensation and 
normally short term, whereas stock options are equity based and long-term. Although 
equity-based compensation has recently become more important, it is very difficult 
for us to evaluate the market value of stock options in the Chinese market. 
Additionally, Li et al. (2013) have analyzed 228 executive compensation contracts 
from Chinese listed companies between 2004 and 2010 and find that cash-based 
payments remain the primary form of executive compensation and that equity-based 
payment is seldom adopted by Chinese listed companies. Another finding of this 
research is that normal compensation consists of basic salary and performance-based 
payments; few companies have introduced stock-based compensation.  
 
For the above reasons, in this research, the thesis uses only executives’ cash 
compensation as the dependent variable. According to Chinese Securities Regulatory 
Committee (CSRC) requirements, Chinese listed companies must disclose cash 
compensation, including base salary, bonus, benefits, allowances, and all types of 
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subsidies. This thesis creates a logarithm of total cash compensation from firms’ 
annual reports as our data for the research.  
2.2.4 Key findings 
In the section, the thesis finds that SOE attribute (whether central or local) increases 
the gap between executives’ actual compensation and market-determined 
compensation levels. The finding supports the hypothesis that executive compensation 
in SOEs is regulated and is lower than market level.  
 
2.3 Literature review                         
2.3.1 Theoretical perspective  
Over the past 50 years, there have been numerous academic studies on executive 
compensation. In those studies, approximately 16 theories have been discussed, which 
can be categorized into 3 theoretical approaches (see, e.g., Gomez-Mejia, 1994; 
Balsam, 2002).  
 
The first approach is value matching, which focuses on the question of how much to 
pay executives. Theories that adopt this approach attempt to argue that executives’ 
compensation is determined by their value; furthermore, executive compensation is 
equal to the market value of an executive’s services to the firm.  
 
The second approach is agency, which considers how to pay executives in a manner 
that mitigates agency problems. This approach studies the structure and level of 
compensation as an instrument in agency problems.  
 
The third approach is symbolic reflection, which considers compensation as a 
reflection of executives’ status, achievement, or esteem. According to this approach, 
status is reflected by compensation level, which motivates executives to perform 
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better. 
 
2.3.1.1 The value-matching approach  
The value-matching theories generally regard compensation as the market value of an 
executive’s services. The fundamental principle of value matching is the economic 
law of supply and demand, which determines the factors that contribute to executive 
compensation. 
 
Marginal productivity theory is considered the most basic value-matching argument. 
Executives’ services are treated as one of the input factors of a firm’s production 
(Robert, 1956). The valuation of this input is determined by supply and demand in the 
labor market. Simultaneously, compensation is equal to the executive’s marginal 
revenue contribution, which can be described as the gap between the firm’s measured 
current performance and its best possible future performance if it is led by alternative 
executives (Gomez-Mejia, 1994). One prerequisite of the above rule is that the labor 
market should be free and effective with respect to both executives and firms. 
Executives can find and work for potential employers in the labor market, and firms 
can find appropriate executives from the labor market when needed (Robert, 1956). 
Based on that assumption, executive compensation can be treated as the equivalent of 
executives’ marginal revenue contributions to their firms.  
 
Other theories, such as human capital theory, argue that an executive’s revenue 
contribution is influenced by his or her personal capabilities, including knowledge, 
skills, and experiences. Personal capabilities can also be called human capital. This 
theory argues that the more knowledge, skills, and experiences—furthermore, the 
more human capital—that an executive has, the better his or her job performance is 
and, consequently, the higher his or her compensation is. An executive’s human 
capital is valued in the manager market, and this value is typically equal to the 
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executive’s compensation (Agarwal, 1981; Harris and Helfat, 1997; Combs and Skill, 
2003).  
 
Some scholars (e.g., Lazear, 1995; Prendergast, 1999) extend human capital theories 
to argue that if an executive is given or promised above-market compensation, he or 
she will make an extra effort to improve his/her personal performance and, thus, the 
firm’s performance. This relatively higher compensation level not only encourages 
executives to pursue better performance but also attracts executives to serve their 
firms longer, thus decreasing turnover and increasing firm productivity (Balsam, 
2002). In this situation, an executive’s compensation equals the sum of his/her 
marginal revenue contribution and a compensation surplus over the average 
compensation level in the market.  
 
Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997) and Thomas (2002) argue that if there is an 
effective and free labor market for managers, an executive will have the ability to find 
a potential employer and change his/her job. To retain their executives, firms should 
provide compensation that is at least equal to the highest compensation that 
alternative employers in the market are willing to offer.  
 
The distribution of executive compensation is skewed (Rosen, 1981), an observation 
that can be explained by superstar theory. Rosen (1981) argues that less-talented 
executives cannot substitute for more-talented executives in terms of job performance, 
and therefore firms’ demand for more-talented executives increases disproportionately 
in the labor market for managers. Because the supply-and-demand relationship is 
different for more-talented versus less-talented executives, firms are willing to pay 
disproportionately higher compensation to more-talented executives. This result 
subsequently changes the distribution of executive compensation in the manager labor 
market and shows that more-talented executives receive higher compensation.  
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2.3.1.2 The agency-problem approach 
According to classic agency theory, agency issues appear when the interests of a 
firm's managers (agents) are not in line with those of the firm's owners (principals). 
Therefore, the managers will form a preference for on-the-job perquisites, shirking, or 
making self-interested, entrenched decisions that reduce shareholder wealth (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). The severity of the agency issue can be limited by how well 
owners and other delegated third parties—i.e., banks or creditors—either monitor the 
actions of outside managers or motivate those managers, thus aligning managers’ 
benefits with company interests. 
 
In a simple agency model, three basic assumptions are adopted, as posited by 
Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997). The first assumption defines agents as risk averse, 
the second assumption states that agents behave to maximize their own interests, and 
the third assumption indicates that agents’ interests are typically not in line with the 
interests of their principals.  
 
Based on the above assumptions, it is necessary to further discuss two conditions. In 
the first scenario, we assume that there is no information hidden from either agents or 
principals. In this case, both agents and principals are exposed to equal and 
transparent information, which means that principals know their agents’ actions and 
the results of those actions; moreover, agents understand their principals’ attitudes 
toward their actions. Because both sides possess symmetric and equal information, it 
is unnecessary to provide agents with additional incentive schemes to motivate them 
to consider their principals’ interests. In the second scenario, however, the 
information available to principals and agents is not equal and asymmetric. In this 
case, because principals’ information is incomplete and they are not fully aware of 
whether their agents are deviating from their interests, agency problems may occur. 
There are several possible reasons for this result, including the following: (1) hidden 
information, i.e., the adverse selection problem, and (2) hidden actions, i.e., the moral 
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hazard problem, which refers to a situation in which an agent pursues his/her own 
interests while neglecting or even acting contrary to the principal’s interests.  
 
Adverse selection describes situations in which executives have intentionally hidden 
useful information when their firms design compensation contracts so that those 
executives can obtain personal advantages in the future. This hidden information can 
be generated in the following situations: (1) situations involving privileged 
information about a firm’s environment; and (2) situations in which executives are 
market and industry experts and shareholders cannot evaluate their capabilities or 
motivations. In general, hidden information refers to situations in which the price that 
shareholders have to pay to obtain information is higher than the information’s 
possible benefits.   
 
Hidden actions are normally referred to as a moral hazard, i.e., the situation in which 
the agent performs actions that influence another party (namely, the principal), but the 
principal cannot observe the agent’s actions (Katz and Rose, 1998).  
 
For example, agents can drive a company to expand revenue instead of increasing 
profits or declining to take action when there is a good investment opportunity (we 
can identify these opportunities because NPV is positive) solely because they want to 
remain secure in their current positions. Principals have two options for solving this 
asymmetric information problem. One option is to obtain more information about 
agents’ behaviors, actions, and efforts through controlling and monitoring. Another 
option is to motivate agents to align their interests with those of their principals. 
Because agents are risk averse, when incentives are deployed, they are going to 
compare their alternatives based on their own maximum potential payback. If the 
incentive is sufficiently large to exceed the possible gain realized when an agent 
chooses to serve only his own interests, then agents will choose to benefit from the 
incentive scheme to realize the relatively larger incentives. Simultaneously, principals’ 
interests are well served because the results of incentive schemes and the principals’ 
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interests are normally bound together when an incentive scheme is designed. However, 
when executive compensation is designed, a conflict is often created when attempting 
to optimize incentives from the principal’s side and risks from the agents’ side 
(Rajagopalan, 1997). If executives have information that shareholders do not have, 
then shareholders bear the risk that the executives will not inform them (or will only 
partially inform them); this risk will influence executive compensation (Goldberg and 
Idson, 1995). 
 
The moral hazard problem can also be described as a double moral hazard problem. 
Gupta and Romano (1998) argue that in a production process involving two parties, 
because those two parties cooperate to complete the process, it is difficult to evaluate 
what contribution is made by each party, and each party has the ability to engage in 
some actions that are not observed by the other party.  
 
A significant number of methods have been identified to reduce agency problems 
between executives and shareholders. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) note that useful 
tools for combating agency problems include the existence of institutional investors or 
a large number of block holders, the presence of outside directors on the board, firm 
debts, an effective managerial market and a market for corporate control. Burns and 
Kedia (2006) argue that the use of stock options is also a good way of aligning the 
interests of executives and shareholders. Some other scholars, including Ang et al. 
(2000), have discussed the relationship between agency costs and various types of 
ownership and management structures.  
 
One important mechanism to reduce agency costs, as mentioned above, is the 
existence of institutional investors or block holders. Institutional investors and block 
holders will be more effective than individual shareholders when protecting their own 
interests because their ownership stake is larger. Therefore, they have a more 
powerful motivation to monitor executives’ behavior; in addition, they have more 
power to conduct such monitoring. Such investors will also exercise more control 
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over executives’ actions and attempt to avoid increasing executive compensation. 
Furthermore, institutional investors are more likely to choose companies in which the 
relationship between executive pay and firm performance is strong (Hartzell and 
Starks, 2003). 
 
Another mechanism that reduces agency costs is the introduction of outside directors 
to the board. Many theories argue that executives who serve on either the board or the 
compensation committee will attempt to extract personal benefits in terms of their 
compensation. Anderson and Bizjak (2003) argue that executives who serve on the 
compensation committee will not experience decreased personal compensation, even 
if they leave the committee. Hallock (1997) reports that if executives serve on two 
boards simultaneously, they can not only positively influence their personal 
compensation level but also obtain relatively more compensation than executives who 
do not serve on two boards simultaneously. Therefore, some scholars such as 
Borokhovich et al. (1997) argue that one way to decrease agency costs is to have more 
outside than inside board members.  
 
Many authors also consider debts such as bank loans to be an option for reducing 
agency costs (e.g., Almazan and Suarez, 2003; Elston and Goldberg, 2003). Almazan 
and Suarez (2003) argue that executive compensation should be defined by three 
essential factors—firm performance, bank loans, and incentive levels—that can 
effectively motivate executives. When a bank offers a loan, it frequently monitors 
executives’ actions to guarantee both that the firm is properly using the loan and that 
the firm has sufficient money to repay the loan. In addition, to ensure that the firm has 
the money to make repayment, the bank will insist that the firm’s executives not 
receive high compensation.  
 
Osano (2002) has also studied the relationship between executive compensation and 
bank loans. This author argues that one interesting way to decrease bank loans while 
increasing the bank’s market value is to grant executives stock options because they 
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will attempt to increase the bank’s market value and exercise their stock options to 
extract personal benefits.  
 
The managerial labor market provides another way to reduce agency costs related to 
executive compensation. Executive compensation should reflect knowledge, 
capability, and experience, and it should be benchmarked by the workers who hold 
the same status in the market. If many workers in the labor market have similar levels 
of knowledge, capability, and experience, a firm’s executives normally ask for 
relatively lower compensation because they know that many outside managers want 
their jobs and can replace them. If executives have unique skills shared by few people 
in the market, they are more likely to require higher compensation because of the low 
risk of being replaced by outside managers. Murphy (2003) argues that if large 
companies compete for high-caliber executives, their executive compensation 
contracts will force competitors to offer similar compensation contracts so that they 
can attract the best candidates.  
 
The market for corporate control is also defended as a mechanism that both aligns 
executives’ and shareholders’ interests and reduces agency problems. Agrwal and 
Knoeber (1996) argue that if executives are not monitored by the external 
corporate-control market, they probably will extract higher-than-normal compensation. 
Rajan and Wulf (2006) show that high external monitoring and fear of takeover by 
external buyers will drive shareholders to manage executive compensation and 
on-the-job perks to avoid the acquisition and replacement of both shareholders and 
incumbent executives.     
 
The use of stock options has reportedly reduced agency costs because it forces 
executives to report firm’s performance to investors properly (Kedia, 2006). If 
executives receive a considerable portion of their compensation from stock options, 
they will make their best efforts to increase company market value so they can extract 
their personal interests from the price of company stock. However, Ofek and Yermack 
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(2000) argue that if executives are given too many stock options that exceed what 
they want, shareholders will diversify their personal investment portfolio by selling 
stock options they already owned to the level in order to motivate executives to 
increase firm performance.  
 
The problem with stock options relates to how executives can increase the stock price 
to the level at which they can exercise their options. Executives occasionally 
manipulate a firm’s accounting to influence stock price by releasing positive 
information; these situations are more common when CEO compensation is based on 
stock price (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). Many authors (e.g., Narayanan, 1999; 
Hu and Noe, 2001; Povel et al. 2007) also report that executives intentionally choose 
the time at which they send positive information to the market; this happens more 
frequently when the market situation is good. Lowry and Murphy (2007) show that 
executives can influence the offer price and the timing of a firm’s IPO.  
 
Some scholars (e.g., Bernardo, Cai and Luo, 2001; Bernardo, 2004) focus their 
attention on the agency problems associated with division managers. Division 
managers sometimes push CEOs to increase their future compensation when their 
projects exceed the firm’s expectations. Barron and Waddell (2003) note that senior 
executives receive more performance-based compensation than middle level 
managers do; moreover, senior executives also have a greater influence on the stock 
price. Goldman (2004) argues that agency problems will happen when the budget is 
defined by senior executives and cascades down to firm departments and middle and 
front-line managers. The possible reason for this argument is that because CEOs’ 
personal interests are closely intertwined with stock price, when CEOs distribute 
budget monies to various departments, they will favor those departments that can 
guarantee improved firm performance and thus increase the firm’s stock price.  
 
Based on the asymmetric information problem, Aboody and Lev (2000) argue that the 
R&D department is one of the biggest sources of agency problems. These authors 
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argue that because of the complexity and professionalism of R&D, researchers have 
more information than anyone else in the company, occasionally even including 
CEOs. Moreover, they know the impact that ongoing projects have on the firm’s 
performance, so they can buy firm stock in advance if they believe that their projects 
will increase the firm’s future stock price.  
 
Some theories that adopt this approach, including the contracting theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), consider executive compensation to be a solution to mitigate agency 
problems. Other theories consider executive compensation to be related to executives’ 
bargaining power in the principal/agent relationship. They argue that executives have 
favorable positions from which to set their own compensation (Bratton, 2005) 
 
Contract theory dominates the executive-compensation literature (Bebchuk and Fried, 
2004). Gomea-Mejia and Wiseman (1997) argue that the central issue in contract 
problems involves balancing the weight of insurance versus incentives in 
compensation design, thus reflecting the tradeoff between the cost of monitoring 
agent behavior on the principal side and the cost of transferring risk to the agent. 
Essentially, contract theory treats executive compensation as an instrument to align 
the interests of executives with those of company shareholders. Based on a contract 
between the principal and the agent, incentives are designed to transfer risks back to 
the risk-averse executives. In a simple model of this contract, executive compensation 
should be equal to the amount that motivates risk-averse executives to behave based 
on their own interests, whereas executives’ behavioral outcomes are in line with 
shareholders’ interests. In such situations, the contract is typically made between the 
board of directors, which represents the shareholders, and the management team. 
Compensation is based on the market value of the executives’ services and the costs 
of various types of monitoring. Theoretically, the compensation amount is the 
optimized amount that enables shareholders to bear the minimum residual loss, 
considering all agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).       
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Prospect theory is another theory that is related to the agency problem. Unlike 
contract theory, which is based on the risk-aversion assumption, prospect theory is 
built on the loss-aversion assumption (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Wiseman and 
Gomez-Mejia (1998) have created an agency model based on a combination of 
contract and prospect theory. This model argues that contract theory and prospect 
theory complement each other, thus helping explain executive risk-taking behaviors. 
Prospect theory claims that executives are willing to take risks under certain 
conditions, for instance, when they are afraid of losing pay or missing business targets 
that they believe are achievable. Executives are unwilling to take risks once the 
additional incentive offered if a pre-established performance target is achieved cannot 
offset the potential benefit loss if the performance goal is not achieved (Balsam, 2002). 
Prospect theory tells us that when executives make decisions, they prefer minimum 
losses to maximum wealth. Corporate governance mechanisms, strategic decision 
making, and predefined business goals influence executive risk taking and 
consequently affect executives’ risk perception related to their wealth. Therefore, the 
compensation of loss-averse executives is the product of the amount of risk taken and 
corporate-governance arrangements (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998).  
 
The separation of ownership and control is common in modern companies. This 
separation leads to divergence between owners’ and executives’ interests. According 
to the abovementioned contract theory, the balance of power between owners 
(principals) and executives (agents) will influence the business goal that is the result 
of the contract, consequently influencing the level and structure of executive 
compensation.  
 
That said, managerial power theory does not view executive compensation solely as 
an instrument that mitigates the agency problem. Instead, the theory argues that agents 
(executives) are likely to use their discretionary power to establish their own pay 
because of the relationship between principals and agents. From this perspective, 
executive compensation is no longer a solution to the agency problem; rather, 
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executive compensation itself is part of the agency problem (Bebchuk et al., 2002). 
Executives have the ability to use their power to influence a company’s decision 
makers (Fama and Jense, 1983). From the perspective of a perfect contract, the use of 
discretion is ruled out because executives will comply with their contracts’ 
restrictions so they can obtain the incentives provided by those contracts. Under such 
conditions, discretion is merely a cost associated with the principal-agent problem. 
Unlike the complete contracting theory, the relationship between principals and 
agents and the use of discretion are considered as possible behaviors (Grabke-Rundell 
and Gomez-Meijia, 2002) by the managerial power theory, which argues that if 
executive compensation is the outcome of a principal-agent relationship, both sides 
will exercise discretion in the compensation-setting process.  
 
Class hegemony theory extends managerial power theory, arguing that executives 
inside and outside of a company have the same interests, thus extending managerial 
views beyond the company’s boundaries (Gomez-Mejia, 1994). Executives’ common 
interests and shared objectives across companies create bonds that go beyond a single 
organization. These bonds create a close relationship among executives in different 
companies and naturally build a class across different organizations. As members of a 
single class, executives can protect both their own privileges and the benefits 
associated with their class. Gomez-Meijia (1994) notes that although most executives 
only fight to retain their own relatively high compensation, the behavior is a token of 
executives’ power to protect their class’s shared interests. Thus, setting executive 
compensation shows the power of the managerial class to protect managers’ common 
interests and benefits against threats.  
2.3.1.3 The symbolic-reflecting approach  
The third approach to executive compensation includes theories that consider 
compensation to be a social symbol that reflects executives’ expectations, status, or 
roles in a firm or organization. Compensation also plays a role, though it is a less 
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important one, in executive motivation. Arguments for this approach focus on 
executives’ roles and the appropriate level of pay to reflect their status. Several 
theories will be mentioned in the paragraphs below, including tournament theory, 
figurehead theory, implicit contract theory, stewardship theory, and crowding-out 
theory.  
 
Tournament theory treats executive compensation as a contest prize (Lazear and 
Rosen, 1981). The CEO, who holds the highest position in the organization, normally 
receives the highest pay in the tournament. The highest-paid CEO sets visible 
incentives to other people in lower positions and motivates them to climb up through 
company hierarchies; this motivation also increases the productivity of lower-ranked 
people (Rosen, 1986; Balsam, 2002). Balsam (2002) further argues that although CEO 
compensation provides the CEO himself with incentives, it plays a more important 
role in motivating subordinates who are lower in the company hierarchy. The top 
prize in the company is often set at a disproportionately high level, which lengthens 
the career path of high-ranking managers (O’reilly et al., 1988). Highly varying pay 
levels at different levels of the managerial hierarchy are required as symbols to keep 
the tournament operating properly. A disproportionately high pay level for the top 
rank should be established to attract lower-ranked managers that struggle to move to 
the upper levels.  
 
According to figurehead theory, behaviors are assumed to be based on the actor’s 
intentions and purposes, whereas in a company, a diversity of goals and interests 
co-exist (Ungson and Steers, 1984). Because a firm encompasses various conflicting 
goals and interests, actions and decisions are made in the context of bargaining and 
compromises. Those with the most power will receive the largest rewards based on 
their interactions with firm politics. Ungson and Steers (1984) argue that three 
perspectives can be identified from executive roles. The first role is that of a lateral 
communicator for shareholders, authorities, employees, and the general public. In this 
role, executives play the roles of symbolic or political figureheads when 
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communicating either within or outside the company. The second role involves 
maintaining a company’s internal and external political alliances and acting as a 
strategist. In the third role, executives also act as internal politicians in the 
relationships among board members, especially when new directors and executives 
are recruited and their compensation is set. Because executive managers play multiple 
roles in the company, Weick (1979) argues that the appropriate role for a manager 
might be that of a missionary. Because of these multiple roles, executive 
compensation is established both to reflect executives’ capability to manage this 
complexity of symbolic roles and to reflect their authorization in the company. 
Gomez-Mejia (1994) argues that executive compensation itself is an aspect of 
executives’ status both within and outside the company, and it is a way to reinforce 
their figurehead images. The design of a firm’s executive compensation structure 
depends on the complexity of symbolic roles and adapts the company’s internal 
process to protect the company’s best interests.  
 
Stewardship theory is another well-known theory in the symbolic approach. Although 
stewardship does not construct a clear hypothesis on either executive compensation 
levels or compensation structures, people may argue that it is unsuitable for 
discussion on executive compensation. However, stewardship theory provides another 
perspective from which to study executive compensation and it does not necessarily 
need to measure firm financial performance (e.g., Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 
1997). From a sociological and psychological point of view, stewardship theory—as 
opposed to agency theory—envisions employees as supporters and collectivists. 
Stewardship theory argues that subordinates are collectivistic and trustworthy, 
whereas agency theory assumes that subordinates are opportunistic, selfish, and 
individualistic (Donaldson, 1995). Some scholars (e.g., Donaldson and Davis, 1991; 
Davis et. al., 1997) argue that employees’ (stewards’) motivations are in line with the 
interests of their principals and firms and that even when the interests of employees 
and principals diverge, employees still tend to cooperate. Stewardship theory assumes 
a strong link between the firm’s success and the principal’s satisfaction and denies 
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that companies have general motivation problems. Donaldson et al. (1991) argue that 
executive compensation plays a less important role in executive motivation because 
spiritual and non-financial rewards are more essential. According to stewardship 
theory, executives are intrinsically motivated by others’ achievements and recognition. 
According to this argument, executive compensation makes only a minor contribution 
to executive motivation and is a less important part of the recognition that executives 
receive for being stewards of the firm.   
 
Crowding-out theory extends the above discussion on intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation. This theory argues that financial or monetary incentives can crowd out 
both intrinsic motivation and positive intentions (Frey, 1997a 1997b). Although 
compensation plays a role in executive motivation, intrinsic motivation is relatively 
more important in the pursuit of a company’s organizational goals. That said, it is 
important to maintain a proper balance between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. If 
executives receive too much compensation or extrinsic incentives, their intrinsic 
motivation could be extinguished, resulting in decreased effort. Frey and Osterloh 
(2005) argue that if executive compensation is too high, intrinsic motivation is driven 
out, and therefore, executives may pursue goals that do not align with the firm’s best 
interests. Thus, executive compensation provides executives with secondary 
motivation; a relatively higher level of intrinsic motivation requires a lower level of 
extrinsic motivation, which itself requires a lower executive compensation level and 
fewer financial incentives.   
 
Implicit contract or psychological contract theory (e.g., Rosen, 1985; Baker, Gibbons 
and Murphy, 2002) is the fifth symbolic-approach theory that this thesis discusses. 
Psychological contract theory argues that a contract between an individual and his or 
her counterpart comprises, perhaps implicitly, beliefs about a natural exchange 
agreement. A psychological contract is a set of individual personal expectations about 
his obligations and entitlements, about which the other contractor may agree (Kidder 
and Buchholtz, 2002). Baker et al. (2002) use the term “relational contract” to 
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describe the above situation and argue that a relational contract may be composed of 
either informal agreements or unwritten items that are recognized by one of the 
contractors and that influence his behaviors. The relationship contract is based on the 
contractors’ common understandings and beliefs about fairness and justice. The 
nature of an executive’s job and status in the company forms a relational contract, and 
therefore, executive compensation is seen as a symbol that reflects achievements, 
appreciation and esteem (Kidder and Buchholtz, 2002).  
 
The sixth symbolic-approach theory is social comparison theory. The foundation of 
this theory is comparison of a firm’s top-level executives with the executives of other 
companies. Many scholars (e.g., O’Reilly, Main and Crystal, 1998; Goodman, 1974; 
Festinger, 1954) argue that when executive compensation is being set, executives tend 
to compare their own compensation level with that of other executives. This theory 
arises out of the argument that people like to appraise their own capabilities against 
those of other people. When making such comparisons, people also tend to select as 
reference points individuals whose performance is similar to their own, and it is 
preferable to choose others who may perform slightly better or at a higher level of 
professionalism. When setting compensation levels, executives make judgments based 
on their own and other executives’ experience and pay level (O’Reilly, Main and 
Crystal, 1988; Gomez-Mejia, 1994). Therefore, executive compensation not only 
plays a symbolic role but also indicates a judgment of other executives.  
 
Taking exception to the several theories set forth above, Simon (1957) argues that 
compensation is defined by a company’s internal salary scale. Because of the 
introduction of authority relations, a hierarchical structure (normally a pyramid shape), 
is formed in large organizations. It is common sense and a matter of wide social 
acceptance that executives receive higher compensation than their direct subordinates. 
Following this logic shows both that people who hold entry-level positions normally 
receive the lowest compensation in the company and that this compensation is 
benchmarked by compensation levels in an open labor market. The theory argues that 
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there is a socially enacted compensation gap between higher levels and their 
immediate subordinates. Therefore, executive compensation can be defined by 
hierarchical levels in the company and market-based pay at the lowest level.  
2.3.1.4 Summary of theoretical approaches to compensation  
The thesis has reviewed several major theoretical approaches to executive 
compensation. However, these theories are contradictory and somewhat overlapping. 
Each standalone theory may not explain how executive compensation is set, but in the 
aggregate, these theories focus on the issue of how much to pay, how to pay, and what 
pay should be represented. Later in this study, the thesis uses these theories to 
construct research hypothesis. 
             
2.3.2 The relationship perspective  
In this section, the thesis reviews major previous studies on the relationship between 
executive compensation and several important issues involving firm operations, 
including firm performance, dividend policy, and mergers and acquisitions. 
2.3.2.1 Executive compensation and firm performance 
The relationship between executive compensation and firm performance has been a 
popular topic in academic publications. Most studies on this topic compare executive 
compensation with various accounting indices, but relatively few studies have focused 
on stock price (e.g., Murphy, 1999; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Dever et al., 2007).  
 
It has been argued (Dow and Raposo, 2005) that firms that implement executive 
compensation schemes based on firm performance typically execute more difficult 
strategies than do firms that do not link executive compensation to firm performance. 
In most cases, when firms announce an executive compensation scheme based on firm 
performance, their stock price will go up (Morgan and Poulsen, 2001) because the 
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market believes that executives attempt to improve firm performance—and thus, the 
firm’s market value—to secure their own benefits according to their compensation 
scheme. 
 
Some scholars (e.g., Deckop et al., 2006) argue that firm performance is negatively 
related to short-term aspects of executive compensation but positively related to 
long-term executive compensation. However, other authors (e.g., Sanders, 2001a) 
report that compared to firms that adopt only predefined long-term compensation 
schemes, such as stock options or restricted stock, firms that adopt year-end 
readjustments of executive compensation will demonstrate better firm performance. 
This finding indicates that executives, especially CEOs, will maintain better firm 
performance if they know that the firm will readjust their compensation at the end of 
each fiscal year based on firm performance; moreover, firm performance will be 
relatively poor if executive compensation is solely based only on long-term firm 
performance. Better performance can also be achieved if the CEO serves as the 
chairman of the board of directors (Baliga et al., 1996). 
 
Firm governance and ownership structure also influence both executive compensation 
and firm performance. One interesting finding is that if owners either control or work 
as managers in the company, there is a much closer relationship between executive 
compensation and company performance than in any other cases (Wener et al., 2005). 
CEOs in firms in which a family holds block ownership, or who are family members 
in family-controlled firms, receive relatively less total compensation than outside 
CEOs. Total CEO compensation increases with the proportion of a family’s total firm 
ownership (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003). However, the total compensation gap between 
inside and outside CEOs remains even if firm performance increases (Coombs and 
Gilley, 2005).  
 
Firm operational strategies are reported to influence both executive compensation and 
firm performance. Carpenter (2000) argues that when firm performance is low, the 
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relationship between firm strategy and a change in CEO compensation is positive, 
whereas this relationship is negative when firm performance is high. Tuschke and 
Sanders (2003) further argue that firms are more likely to achieve better performance 
when they use defensive strategies and pay their executives in cash and bonuses and 
when they evaluate executives’ performance based on accounting items. When firms 
use aggressive or prospective strategies and pay their executives either in stock 
options or in stock—and when they evaluate executives’ performance based on 
market valuation—they are more likely to achieve better performance. In general, 
firms tend to pay executives more when agency problems are more severe than when 
agency problems are less severe (e.g., Core et al., 1999; Adams et al., 2005). If 
executives’ behaviors are not monitored sufficiently, they will attempt to take higher 
compensation from the firm—i.e., from shareholders—than when their behaviors are 
monitored effectively.  
 
Some scholars argue that performance-based compensation plans are more 
appropriate for the highest executives, such as CEOs, than for other executives (e.g., 
Ang et al., 2002; Aggarwall and Samwick, 2003) because CEOs have more power and 
influence than lower-level executives to affect firm performance. Although the 
amount of compensation is important, many authors (Mehran, 1995; Kole, 1997) 
argue that the compensation structure—especially stock options as a percentage of 
total compensation—is more important. To motivate major executives (except for 
CEOs), it is necessary to offer significant long-term incentives such as stock options 
or restricted stocks. Although CEOs play a critical role in firm performance, 
Carpenter and Sander (2002, 2004) argue that a firm’s long-term performance is 
related not only to the amount of total CEO compensation or the percentage of 
long-term incentives in total compensation but also to the amount of compensation 
provided to lower-level executives. This argument suggests that if the CEO receives 
compensation that is too much higher than that received by other executives on the 
top management team, those other executives may not make an active effort to 
increase firm performance, instead acting as “free riders” who rely on CEOs for better 
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performance. Henderson and Fredrickson (2001) note that the compensation gap 
between CEOs and other high-level executives is a type of predictor of firm 
performance. When there is a change in a firm’s executive team, the gap between the 
CEO and other executives is positively related to the number of executives in the 
tournament, which means that having more executives on the executive team results 
in a larger compensation gap. That said, the amount of any change to executive pay 
has only a weak influence on firm performance (Conyon et al., 2001). Furthermore, 
although it is essential to have a considerable compensation gap between CEOs and 
other executives, to motivate all executives to pursue the best firm performance, that 
difference should not be too significant.  A firm’s hierarchical structure influences 
not only the design of its executive-compensation scheme but also (and more 
importantly) the interactions of the firm’s executives (Boyd and Salamin, 2001). 
Consequently, top executives will receive more total compensation than lower-level 
executives, and top executives have more power to influence the firm’s strategic 
decisions. Carpenter and Sander (2004) argue that the total compensation and 
long-term compensation of top executives—as opposed to CEOs only—have a 
positive relationship to firm performance.  
     
An executive’s status can influence his or her compensation. Milbourn (2003) reports 
that top executives with a strong professional background and reputation will receive 
higher total compensation because shareholders believe that those executives’ 
decisions will directly increase the firm’s stock price and, thus, their wealth. Top 
executives with a strong background will also receive higher total compensation than 
non-certified CEOs when firm performance is high but lower total compensation 
when firm performance is low (Wade et al., 2006). This is because, as Hayward et al. 
(2004) argue, star CEOs tend to be overconfident about both their past experience and 
their future ability to affect firm performance.  
 
Stock options have become a compensation component that is accepted by many 
firms. Stock options allow shareholders to know that if they lose money because a 
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firm’s stock price drops, the same thing will happen to top executives that have been 
granted stock options. When executives are paid exclusively in cash, they will choose 
to make fewer than the optimal number of investments. Conversely, when executives 
are paid primarily in stock options, they will ultimately make more than the optimal 
number of investments (Narayanan, 1996). Therefore, the ideal way to motivate 
executives to make appropriate long-term investments is to combine an appropriate 
ratio of cash and restricted stocks as components of executive compensation.  
 
The primary purpose of granting stock options to executives is to motivate them to be 
concerned about the firm’s stock price so that they can exercise their stock options at 
a higher price while securing benefits for the firm’s shareholders. However, there are 
additional reasons that drive firms to provide executives with stock options. Core and 
Guay (2001) argue that if firms have financing constraints or capital shortages, they 
are more likely to provide stock options than cash incentives because the provision of 
stock options is a rational way to offer executives compensation while spending less 
cash. Similarly, when firms have higher expectations of future growth, they will tend 
to offer their executives stock options (Kato et al., 2005). The reasons for this 
situation are not only a possible lack of cash but also an intention to motivate 
executives with expectations of future growth so that both the firm and its executives 
can be rewarded. The above arguments are supported by the fact that most 
high-technology startups are willing to adopt stock options as a key compensation 
component.   
 
One inevitable question about stock options is as follows: if firms grant stock options 
to executives but firm performance does not meet predefined expectations within a 
certain time frame, how should previously granted stock options be treated? To retain 
executives, firms whose performance is lower than expected will typically re-price 
previously granted stock options rather than simply recalling the options. This process 
is referred to as “resetting” a stock-option plan (Brenner et al., 2000; Chen, 2002). 
Resetting the stock options will decrease the actual exercise price of stock options to a 
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total value that is sufficiently attractive to executives whose future likelihood of 
exercising the options is both reasonable and, compared with previous conditions, 
higher. The purpose of stock-option resetting is to motivate executives to renew their 
efforts to increase the firm’s stock price and, consequently, shareholders’ wealth. 
Stock option re-pricing happens more often in companies that are startups (that is, 
new high-technology firms of relatively small size) and companies that have low 
performance levels (Brenner et al., 2000; Carter and Lynch, 2001; Chen, 2002). 
Chance et al. (2000) also report that firms whose boards are dominated by insiders are 
more likely than other firms to implement stock option re-pricing. Those authors note 
that some firms re-price repeatedly. In such situations, firm performance is quite poor 
at the time of the first re-pricing, but at the time of the second re-pricing, the option 
prices are generally in-the-money. If firms have to re-price more than once, the effort 
encouraged by the original stock options is diluted. To make it feasible to execute 
stock options, firms need to reset the options’ price close to the stock’s market price; 
this requirement explains why stock options are typically in-the-money within two 
years. Some scholars (e.g., Pollock et al., 2002) argue that the higher the percentage 
of a notable CEO’s firm ownership, the less influence the CEO has to negotiate an 
exercise price of stock options that deviates from market value because the market 
worries that the CEO will use such a price deviation to advance his/her self-interest. 
According to this logic, if a CEO has a considerable ownership stake in a firm, over 
the years, he/she tends to keep his/her incentive plans based on fixed compensation 
but does not re-price based on yearly performance and market conditions (Grossman 
and Cannella, 2006). If the firm’s stock market price is much lower than the price 
level at which executives can exercise their stock options, and the supposedly positive 
incentives of the stock options have disappeared, Chen (2002) argues that to keep 
their executives, firms will redo their stock option plans and adjust their exercise 
prices to an attractive level.  
 
Although stock-option resetting has been widely adopted by industries for years, some 
scholars criticize the practice, arguing that firms are retaining unqualified executives 
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and that providing executives with a “second chance” forces shareholders to pay 
unnecessary and undeserved remuneration to executives. Garvey and Milbourn (2006) 
argue that executives are not always paid for firm performance; sometimes, their pay 
is based on the luck of the overall market situation. In a mature market situation and 
with an effective manager market, when a firm experiences unsatisfactory 
performance, shareholders typically find a way (for example, resetting stock-option 
plans) to retain the firm’s executives. However, in emerging markets, executives from 
firms with poor performance have fewer opportunities to obtain similar jobs (Gibson, 
2003). Therefore, in an emerging market, an incumbent CEO’s term can be decided 
by firm performance, business risks, and firm ownership type, namely, whether the 
firm is family-owned (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001). The debate about whether 
re-pricing is an effective method of motivating executives to deliver good firm 
performance is ongoing. Some argue that there are many outside factors that may 
cause bad (or worse) firm performance and that are beyond executives’ control. For 
this reason, Acharya et al. (2000) argue it is necessary to retain re-pricing as a 
component of executive compensation contracts.     
 
One interesting study of the relationship between compensation and performance has 
been conducted in the context of mutual funds. Because fund managers’ 
compensation is partially tied to fund performance, managers tend to make 
speculative investments to achieve above-average fund performance and, 
consequently, to obtain additional compensation (Golec and Starks, 2004).   
 
Many studies have focused on executive compensation in relation to a firm’s 
relative—as opposed to its absolute—performance. Unlike a firm’s relative 
performance, which compares its present operational situation with its previous 
situation, a firm’s relative performance compares its performance with the 
performance of similar firms in the market. In an absolute performance-based 
compensation plan, executives are offered additional compensation if the firm’s 
current performance is better than its performance in previous years, based on a group 
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of accounting items (Hermalin and Wallace, 2001). However, in a relative 
performance-based approach, firms are compared not with their own past 
performance but instead with the performance of their primary competitors. Relative 
performance compensation requires a more complex, demanding methodology than 
traditional compensation based on absolute firm performance. Executives can only 
receive additional compensation when their firms deliver better performance than 
other firms in the market; however, this goal can be very difficult to achieve, 
especially when a firm’s market competitors are strong. Therefore, relatively poor 
performance in a market may influence executive compensation, as argued by 
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999). However, some authors, such as Garvey and 
Milbourn (2004), argue that relative performance compensation is a way to remove 
the influence of the overall market situation because if the market situation is much 
better than in the past, firms may enjoy rapid growth that is not organic but is instead 
caused by the market situation.  
 
On-the-job perquisites also have an important influence on the relationship between 
executive compensation and a firm’s relative performance. Yermack (2006) reports 
that on average, firms that allow their CEOs to use company airplanes for their 
personal travel have firm performance that is 4% lower than the market average.  
 
Some interesting studies report that top executives that attempt to improve firm 
performance by reducing human resource costs receive more compensation than other 
executives. Brookman et al. (2007) also report that the executives of firms that 
announce layoff plans receive an average of approximately 20% more compensation 
than do the executives of firms that do not announce such plans. Brickley et al. (1999) 
report that an effective way to motivate CEOs to improve firm performance is to ask 
them to serve on the board of directors after they retire. 
 
Innovation and R&D investment are reported as important components in determining 
executive compensation. Balkin et al. (2000) find that after controlling for firm size, 
57 
 
performance, and other factors, short-term CEO compensation is strongly related to a 
firm’s degree of innovation, as measured by patent quantity and R&D spending; in 
non-high-technology companies, this relationship does not exist. Makri et al. (2006) 
also note that as a firm’s technological intensity increases, its total CEO compensation 
will be more closely connected with firm spending on R&D activities and the 
contribution of the firm’s inventions to R&D activities, whereas the CEO’s bonus will 
be more closely connected to the firm’s financial results.      
 
Although it is widely accepted in theory, executive compensation based on firm 
performance remains questionable to many scholars and firms in practice. Tosi, 
Werner, et al. (2000) argue that firm performance is not the biggest factor in 
determining executive compensation. Unlike firm size, which has an influence of 
approximately 40% on executive compensation, firm performance variables explain 
only 5% of executive compensation. Some firms, as reported by Beer et al. (2004), do 
not adopt performance-based compensation, instead believing that the benefits from 
such plans are outweighed by the potential costs of administering them. Such firms 
introduce different methodologies, such as the balanced scorecard, management by 
objectives (MBO), and coaching and training, which they believe are more relevant 
and cost-effective.  
 
In summary, people can argue that performance-based pay is one of the best methods 
to increase shareholder wealth because it mitigates agency costs (at least to some 
extent), in reality, such compensation arrangements do not perform as expected. For 
example, most of the fraudulent bankruptcy cases in the United States since the 
collapse of the NASDAQ have been implicitly related to executive stock options. 
Because a large portion of some executives’ compensation is related to stock price, 
those executives have created fraudulent accounting records and cheated the market to 
increase the firm’s stock price to the level at which they can exercise their stock 
options, reaping tremendous benefits in the process. Because of these problems, the 
use of stock options is declining while some other long-term compensation 
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arrangements have become prevalent, including restricted stock. Restricted stock is 
different from stock options in that it can only be sold on a long-term basis, and 
executives do not risk losing everything if they cannot raise the stock price higher 
than the exercise price level required by a stock-option arrangement.  
2.3.2.2 Executive compensation and dividend policy 
There is little research on the relationship between executive compensation and 
dividend policy. Some studies focus on the relationship among executive 
compensation, dividends, and firm growth. The impact of the use of stock options on 
dividend policies in the US and Japan is also discussed in previous studies.  
 
Smith and Watts (1992) report a general finding that large companies normally pay 
their executives both higher dividends and higher compensation than smaller 
companies.  
 
When a firm announces that it will pay a higher dividend than in previous years, the 
market normally responds positively, and the firm’s stock price will increase. Lippert 
et al. (2000) report that in the above context, companies whose executives receive a 
considerable portion of their compensation from stock options will experience lower 
stock price increases than companies whose executives are not paid in stock options. 
These authors provide two possible explanations for this phenomenon. The first 
explanation argues that both pay-for-performance and higher dividends are effective 
methods of controlling executives’ opportunistic behaviors, and thus, the stock market 
believes that higher dividends will improve firm performance. The second 
explanation is derived from behavior finance theory; it holds that when executives 
make a higher financial and psychological investment in a project, they are likely to 
be overly optimistic in their belief the project will be successful, and thus, they release 
incorrect information to the market. If the market interprets higher dividends as an 
incorrect message from executives, it will influence the stock price to decrease.  
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Kato, Lemmon, et al. (2005) examine the relationship between the use of stock 
options and dividend polices in the Japanese market. However, they do not find that 
the adoption of stock options changes firm dividend policy, as reported above by 
Lippert et al. (2000).   
 
In a company in which the executives have significant ownership and there are 
significant agency problems, Fenn and Liang (2001) argue that executives are 
motivated to increase dividend payments. If executives both have significant 
ownership and lack monitoring from the shareholders and other external parties, they 
can extract more compensation from higher dividend payments. Brown et al. (2007) 
also report that American executives with higher levels of company ownership have 
been more likely to increase dividend payments since the 2003 implementation of tax 
cuts. 
2.3.2.3 Executive compensation and mergers and acquisitions 
Over the past few years, mergers and acquisitions have been increasing. The existing 
literature primarily addresses the use of compensation plans to defend against outside 
takeovers (e.g., Pagano and Volpin, 2005). Stock options can be an effective way to 
defend outside takeovers because if top executives have significant stock options, 
when they learn about a potential takeover they will defend their organizations and 
positions in an effort to protect their future remuneration.  
 
Datta et al. (2001) argue that when executives receive stock options, they choose 
those companies that are well-run and that have a significant capacity for growth. 
These companies are able to guarantee an increased stock price, and executives can 
exercise their stock options when the price reaches a particular level. If executives 
choose bad companies, they cannot exercise their stock options because their stock 
price will not have increased to the designated level. Therefore, the best way to 
motivate executives and improve shareholder value is to grant stock or stock options 
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to both executives and directors (Deutsch et al., 2007).  
 
What will happen when a company acquires another company? In most cases, when 
top executives make a successful acquisition, they will receive additional 
compensation in the form of cash or a bonus (Bliss and Rosen, 2001; Wright et al., 
2002; Hartzell et al., 2004). The amount of such additional compensation is related to 
the executive’s power in the company (Grinstein and Hribar, 2004). Executives with 
more power will receive more compensation than will executives with less power 
(Coombs and Skill, 2003); such premiums are negatively related to the degree of 
external monitoring activities (Wright et al., 2002).  
 
When a company is acquired, if its executives chose to remain, they typically will 
receive increased compensation. However, most of these executives will leave during 
the next three years, having received a severance payment. Most executives that leave 
the company during acquisition retire, with only a few accepting executive positions 
at other companies (Hartzell et al., 2004).  
 
The threat of external mergers and acquisitions is also regarded as a method of 
controlling executive compensation (Aggrawal and Knoeber, 1998). Chakraborty and 
Arnott (2001) argue that this threat can also drive employees to abandon productive 
activities in favor of defensive activities. When top executives fear that they will lose 
their jobs because their company is purchased, they will not attempt to increase their 
compensation by very much. However, as Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) argue, 
mid-level managers and clerks will ask for higher compensation in such situations.  
 
Executives’ fear of a takeover can be managed by the introduction of anti-takeover 
mechanisms such as golden parachutes (Borokhovich et al., 1997; Field and Karpoff, 
2002). Golden parachutes increase the possibility of a successful acquisition by 
offering top executives not only the firm’s value but also a significant amount of 
money as compensation for agreeing to leave.  
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Many authors (e.g., Borokhovich et al., 1997; Field and Karpoff, 2002) argue that the 
use of golden parachutes is a positive development in executive compensation 
because executives that have golden parachutes receive more compensation than 
executives that do not. When a company adopts a golden parachute plan, if the 
compensation committee has more insiders, the market will react negatively and the 
stock price will decrease. Conversely, if the compensation committee has more 
outsiders, the market will react positively and the stock price will increase (Davison, 
Pilger and Szakmary, 1998). A lack of significant firm ownership among executives is 
negatively related to the adoption of anti-takeover mechanisms, whereas when 
executives do have significant firm ownership, the firm normally adopts more 
anti-takeover provisions to enable the executives to protect their wealth in the event of 
a successful acquisition (Boyle et al., 1998).  
 
Borokhovich et al. (1997) report that the use of golden parachutes is negatively 
related to the firm’s stock price because golden parachute adoption is interpreted by 
the market as a signal that the firm is acting to protect low-performance executives. 
Evans et al. (1997) support this argument; their study shows that on average, banks 
that adopt golden parachutes have lower performance compared to banks of the same 
size that do not adopt golden parachutes. Executives who have golden parachutes do 
not fear either low performance or takeover. If they have poor performance and 
shareholders want to terminate them, they will receive compensation because of the 
golden parachute plan, with the same result in the event of a takeover. 
 
In a spin-off context that does not involve an external merger and acquisition, the act 
of selecting a new CEO and the design of executive compensation are not strongly 
related to positive reactions to a spin-off announcement (Seward and Walsh, 1996). 
 
In management-controlled firms that lack a single block owner, the primary 
compensation policy is to maximize CEO pay. In contrast, in companies with a major 
outside owner, the primary compensation policy is to minimize CEO pay (Hambrick 
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and Finkelstein, 1995). 
2.3.2.4 Executive compensation and firm capital structure 
The literature on firms’ capital structure and executive compensation concentrate on 
the influence of executive ownership on the firm’s debt structure, the firm’s capital 
structure, and how the market acts as a mechanism to control executives and 
maximize firm value.  
 
Datta et al. (2005) report that firms whose executives have significant ownership 
normally choose short-term debts, whereas firms whose executives do not have 
significant ownership normally choose long-term debts. More specifically, if a 
considerable portion of executive compensation is related to future stock price, the 
firm’s executives are more likely to choose short-term debts because they are afraid 
that long-term debts will negatively impact the firm’s stock price in the long run, thus 
decreasing their personal wealth.  
 
Kato et al. (2005) report that in Japan, firms that provide stock options to their 
executives generally have lower levels of debt than firms that do not provide stock 
options to their executives. These authors find only weak evidence that firms choose 
stock options to improve firm performance. Other authors (e.g., Calcagno and 
Renneboog, 2007) argue that when a firm has risky debts, the best way to minimize 
risk is to offer executives stock options based on firm performance because those 
executives will attempt to improve the firm’s performance so they can exercise their 
stock options and rebalance the firm’s capital structure. Cadenillas et al. (2004) 
discuss the function of granting stock and stock options to executives and argue that 
the most effective way to motivate executives to maximize firm value is to grant 
high-leverage stock options to good managers while granting low-leverage stock 
options to less-good (i.e., ordinary) managers. The authors reason that good managers 
have capabilities and will make efforts to increase stock price, but ordinary managers 
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may not have such competence, and therefore, it is better to motivate them to make 
their best efforts to increase stock price to a certain level so that they can exercise 
their stock options. Lewellen (2006) notes that firm leverage can increase stock 
volatility but that higher stock option ownership is more likely to increase the 
volatility costs of debt.  
 
The corporate finance literature has regarded optimized capital structure as a way to 
maximize stock price. When a firm signals the market that it is changing its capital 
structure, the market generally interprets that change as a positive indicator of the 
firm’s future performance. Firm performance is observed to decrease when the firm 
changes equity to debt over time (Born and McWilliams, 1997). Berger et al. (1997) 
report that executives that lack monitoring from external parties (e.g., the market) are 
less likely to choose an optimal capital structure that increases firm value. Coles et al. 
(2006) argue that if CEO wealth is more sensitive to stock volatility, CEOs will 
increase firm leverage to extract personal benefits. The likelihood that a misstated or 
fraudulent financial statement will be made to protect executives’ wealth also 
increases considerably when CEOs incur new debts (Efendi et al., 2007).   
 
Sundaram and Yermack (2007) argue that executives with high debt incentives will 
manage more conservatively. Cumming, Fleming, and Suchard (2005) report that in 
Australia, top executives are more highly remunerated than venture capitalists, which 
indicates that these venture capitalists extract wealth from the manner in which they 
invest capital in the company. 
2.3.2.5 Executive compensation and risk aversion 
One important topic related to executive compensation is risk aversion (e.g., Ross, 
2004). The most valuable study on this topic relates executive compensation to risk 
that coexists with the grant of either stock options or restricted stock. The most 
common question about this relationship focuses on how much of a link between 
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compensation and stock price shareholders should grant to motivate executives to 
improve the firm’s value and increase its stock price.  
 
When shareholders provide executives with stock options—whether small or 
significant—based on the firm’s stock price, it is not guaranteed that the executives 
will receive the compensation. Instead, the executives are compensated only when 
they increase the firm’s value and drive the stock price to the level at which they can 
exercise the options, converting those (risky) options to real personal wealth.  
 
Restricted stock is another compensation component that is related to risk. Restricted 
stock cannot be sold until a certain amount of time—normally between 3 to 10 
years—has passed. The difference between stock options and restricted stock is that 
stock options require executives to increase the firm’s stock price to a certain level 
before they can exercise their options and receive real compensation. Restricted stock 
requires executives to stay with the company long enough (i.e., longer than the 
restriction period) to sell their unlocked stock and receive compensation. The 
common feature of these two types of compensation is that the amount of 
compensation received by executives depends on the stock price when they sell either 
the stock or the option. Some argue that stock options are riskier than restricted stock 
because executives can only sell their options when the stock price has increased to a 
certain level; otherwise, they cannot exercise the options and they become 
meaningless. Conversely, executives that have received restricted stock can always 
get something—regardless of the stock price—merely by remaining with the company 
longer than the restriction period.  
 
Some scholars (e.g., Tian, 2004) argue that stock options can motivate executives to 
increase the firm’s stock price to a certain level to exercise their stock options; 
however, when that level is exceeded, the incentive effect will decrease. Garvey and 
Milbourn (2004) note that if executives are young or have only a small amount of 
stock ownership, they are normally immune to the risk to their personal compensation 
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that is imposed by the market through their stock options. Jin (2002) also notes that 
CEO incentives will decrease if risk is associated with the firm instead of the market.  
 
The previous literature proposes several solutions to manage the relationship between 
granting stock options to executives and the risks that executives can assume. Brisley 
(2006) argues that a possible solution for balancing the risks that executives assume is 
to grant executives so-called “progressive performance vesting” stock options instead 
of traditional stock options. Progressive performance vesting stock options allow a 
predefined numbers of options to vest periodically in a manner that is not linked to 
stock price performance. This means that progressive performance vesting stock 
options guarantee that executives can exercise a certain number of stock options 
within a certain period of time, not only at the end, as required by traditional stock 
options. Johnson and Tian (2000) propose another solution in which a stock option 
pricing model is developed with a strike price that is indexed to a benchmark. These 
authors argue that this model has the ability to filter out common risks that are beyond 
executives’ control, and thus, it can increase the efficiency of the incentive function of 
stock option plans. Calvet and Rahman (2006) argue that the best way to manage risk 
is to grant executives stock options that are indexed to the Capital Asset Price Model, 
thus preventing executives from engaging the firm in high-risk investment projects.  
 
The empirical studies analyzing the relationship between risk and incentive have not 
succeeded (Prendergast, 2002) because their results are not consistent: some of their 
tests are positive and others are negative. Prendergast argues that the reason the 
previous literature on this relationship fails is because these studies have ignored 
employee responsibility when considering the uncertainty of incentives. When 
companies operate in a context of certainty, they will give workers clear requirements 
about what to do and they monitor those workers’ actions. Conversely, when 
companies operate in a context of uncertainty, their responsibility is to reduce 
opportunistic actions taken by employees to index their compensation to firm 
performance.  
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Some scholars (Miller, Wiseman and Gomez-Meija, 2002) study unsystematic and 
systematic firm risks, reporting that pay based on performance and potential earnings 
is highest when executives can control firm performance. Larraza-Kintana et al. (2007) 
document that employment risk and variability in compensation correspond to higher 
risk taking, whereas the intrinsic value of stock options and downside risks 
correspond to lower risk taking.  
 
Tufano (1996) studies compensation and risk in the gold mining industry. This author 
reports that if executives hold a significant number of stock options, they will not 
manage gold price risk well; however, if they hold a significant amount of firm stock, 
they will manage gold price risk much better. This finding suggests that compensation 
structure influences executives’ risk aversion and that executives’ risk aversion affects 
the policies that executives will adopt to manage company risk. 
2.3.3 The determinants of executive compensation 
How to identify the determinants of executive compensation is always a hot topic 
among both academics and practitioners. Human resources practitioners are eager to 
understand key determinants of executive compensation so that they can design a 
better compensation scheme, whereas academics attempt to glean insight into the 
determinants of executive compensation because this knowledge will help them 
construct a better research model for describing executive compensation.  
 
Company size has long been considered an important determinant of executive 
compensation. Robert (1956) studied more than 1,400 firms and reported that 
executive compensation is more closely related to firm size than to firm performance. 
Based on Robert’s study, Simon (1957) argues that executive rewards are related to 
organizational size and the executive’s position in the organization. Many scholars 
have conducted similar studies that follow Robert and Simon; these studies find that 
executive compensation is more closely related to sales revenue than to profitability, 
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thus supporting Robert and Simon’s findings (McGuire et al., 1962; Baumol, 1967; 
Williamson, 1963; Galbraith, 1973). Baumol (1967) also argues that the reason that 
sales revenue is more closely related to executive compensation than operating profit 
is that the directors fail to monitor firm performance effectively. The above findings 
can be understood to mean that managers in a larger company will assume more 
responsibilities so that they deserve better compensation. This logic can lead to a 
situation in which managers chase better compensation by growing company size, 
while potentially damaging shareholders’ interests when such growth is not beneficial 
and causing the firm’s stock price to drop (Hayes and Abernathy, 1980). Ciscel and 
Carroll (1980) also examine the relationship among compensation, sales revenue, and 
profitability. Using a residual-profit approach, those authors argue that either firm size 
or sales revenue is the primary determinant of CEO compensation.  
 
Some recent studies also have similar findings. Agrawal and Walking (1994) create a 
model to define executive compensation that includes firm size, growth capability, 
and firm performance. Based on an analysis of 2,009 listed companies in the US, 
Baber et al. (1998) report a strong positive relation between persistent firm earnings 
and executive compensation. Jones and Kato (1996) study panel data from Bulgaria, a 
transitional economy, and find that CEO pay is positively related to size and 
productivity but not to profitability. Based on data from 549 Chinese listed companies 
between 1998 and 2000, Firth et al. (2006) report a positive relation between CEO 
pay and the log of the book value of the firm’s assets. This finding is consistent with 
research from other countries indicating that firm size is a key factor in defining CEO 
compensation. Wan et al. (2008) compare executive compensation of publicly listed 
companies on the Chinese and American stock exchanges and find that in both 
countries, market company size (defined as sales revenue and total assets) is strongly 
related to executive compensation; moreover, firm size’s explanatory ability with 
respect to executive compensation is 5 times higher in the US than in China. Gabaix 
and Landier (2008) construct a model that can be calibrated to analyze CEO 
compensation, finding that a CEO’s compensation increased both with the size of the 
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CEO’s firm and the size of the average firm in the economy. Focusing on 
high-technology companies in the S&P 1500, Faria et al. (2014) find that firm size 
(measured by the natural log of asset or sales) is strongly and positively related to 
CEO compensation. These authors also report that asset growth has a positive 
influence on CEO pay but that earnings per share has a strongly negative influence on 
long-term CEO pay. 
 
Many other studies report that profitability has a dominant, positive influence on 
executive compensation. Lewellen and Huntsman (1970) argue that profitability is 
more closely related to CEO pay than sales. Smyth et al. (1975) report that sales 
efficiency—namely, sales per dollar of assets—and profitability are significantly 
related to CEO compensation. However, Deckop and Mahoney (1982) argue that the 
authors’ methodology is problematic and that their argument is flawed. Kato and 
Kubo (2006) study the relation between accounting measures and CEO pay in 51 
Japanese companies and report that the most robust relationship link for Japanese 
CEO compensation is the positive relationship between ROA (return on assets, a 
common measure of firm profitability) and CEO pay. However, many studies reveal 
that a firm’s performance ratio measured by ROA has a negative influence on CEO 
compensation (e.g., Core, Guay, and Verrecchia, 2003a; Young and Jing, 2011). These 
contradictory findings show that there is no common, acceptable conclusion on how 
to measure firm performance and executive compensation. The variety of economic 
systems, human resources practices, corporate governance models, and cultures 
among various countries may explain this situation.  
 
Ownership structure is another key factor that influences executive compensation. 
Some people argue that because boards of directors are more likely to evaluate firm 
performance based on changes in stock price, it is understandable that there is no 
significant relation between accounting-based firm performance and executive 
compensation (e.g., Bentson, 1985; Coughalan and Schmidt, 1985). Furthermore, 
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salary and bonus awards will compensate executives’ human capital and are not 
directly linked to firm performance.  
 
One reason that might explain the above finding is that most executives do not hold a 
significant portion of ownership in their firms. McComas (1986) reports that in 
“Fortune 1000” firms, 9% of CEOs do not own stock in their firms and 61% of 
managers hold stock valued at less than one year’s compensation. Morck et al. (1988) 
notes that in 371 large firms disclosed in Fortune, the board members’ average 
ownership ratio is 10.6%. Han (2014) investigates 298 Chinese listed companies from 
2012, finding that the average management ownership ratio is only 8.3241%, far 
below that reported by Morck approximately 25 years ago, thus indicating that 
management’s share of ownership in Chinese companies is very small.  
 
Previous studies have shown that management ownership does not have a clear 
relationship to firm performance either in China or in other countries (see, e.g., Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Himmelberg Hubbard and Palia, 1999; Bentson, 1985; Smith and 
Watts, 1992; Liu and Tan, 2005; Wei, 2000; Sun and Zhang, 2006; Xu et. al, 2005). 
There are two major theories of management ownership and executive compensation. 
The first theory argues that management ownership has a substitutive effect on 
compensation. When managers hold significant ownership, they will have decreased 
sensitivity to their compensation, and therefore, in that context, there is a negative 
relationship between management ownership and executive compensation. The 
second theory argues that management ownership helps managers influence 
compensation decisions more easily and that managers with higher ownership will 
thus be offered higher compensation. However, the previous literature has shown that 
management ownership does not have a consistent relationship with executive 
compensation. Sanders (2001a, 2001b) reports a positive relationship between 
management ownership and executive compensation, whereas Cordeiro and Veliyath 
(2003) report a negative relationship.  
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Similar to management ownership, concentrated ownership attracts a great deal of 
attention (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999), especially in Asia (Claessens et al., 2000). 
However, few studies have focused on the relationship between concentrated 
ownership and executive compensation, and those that do have such a focus report 
different findings. Several studies report that top executives who are blockholders 
generally receive higher compensation (Holderness and Sheehan, 1988; Cheung et al., 
2005) because executives with significant ownership will have a greater ability to 
influence their own compensation. Other studies indicate that a higher concentration 
of ownership will lead to lower compensation (e.g., Dyl, 1988; Goldberg and Idson, 
1995; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Haid and Yurtoglu, 2006; Ozkan, 2007). The 
argument is that concentrated ownership will increase blockholders’ activism and 
manifest agency costs, whereas high executive compensation can be regarded as one 
type of agency cost. The possible explanation to interpret this conflicting evidence is 
that the research does not distinguish among blockholders with voting ownership and 
those with equity ownership (Amoako-Adu et al., 2011). Further, these studies may 
incorrectly conflate management ownership with investor blockholders.  
 
Board structure is often discussed in the literature of corporate governance. Directors 
are believed to be a very important factor in monitoring management behaviors to 
mitigate agency costs. Outside directors who are not full-time company employees 
typically play a more important role in monitoring company management (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). The literature on the relationship between independent directors and 
executive compensation is mixed. Ghosh and Sirmans (2005) argue that if the process 
of electing directors is influenced by the CEO, the board’s independence will be 
destroyed and CEOs will give themselves above-market compensation. Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) summarize corporate governance codes from 46 countries and 
find that the majority of codes recommend a balance between executive and 
independent, non-executive directors. Some scholars (e.g.: Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1989; Conyon and Peck, 1998) note that compensation does not have a significant 
relation with the proportion of outside directors. However, some studies make the 
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opposite argument. Mehran (1995) empirically shows that as the proportion of 
independent directors decreases, CEO compensation decreases. Franks et al. (2001) 
argue that independent directors consider their role to be advisory, not disciplinary. 
Ozkan (2007) studies 414 UK companies and reports that a higher proportion of 
independent directors results in higher CEO compensation, thus indicating that 
independent directors are less effective than executive directors at monitoring 
management. Ozdemir and Upneja (2012) study the American lodging industry and 
report a strong and positive relation between outside directors and CEO (cash and 
total) compensation. Du and Zhai (2005) report a weak positive relation between the 
proportion of outside directors and CEO cash compensation in Chinese listed 
companies.  
 
It is generally considered that if the CEO also serves as the chairman of the board 
(namely, if CEO duality exists), that CEO is more likely not only to intervene in the 
employment of directors but also to influence board decisions (Crystal, 1991). Boyd 
(1994) studies the correction between board control and CEO compensation based on 
data from 193 firms in 12 industry groups, reporting a negative relation between CEO 
duality and board control and finding that board control is negatively related to CEO 
compensation. Boyd’s research reveals a positive relationship between CEO duality 
and CEO compensation. Du and Zhai (2005) check Chinese listed companies and 
report an insignificant relation between CEO duality and CEO compensation based on 
panel data from 2002. Wang and Hu’s (2011) research focuses on the abnormally high 
compensation of the top 3 executives at Chinese listed companies; they report that 
CEO duality is significantly and positively related to executive compensation. Based 
on data from Chinese listed public companies, many studies report similar findings 
(e.g., Wei and Sun, 2010; Xu and Li, 2011).  
 
Many authors continue to devote attention to the relationship between executive 
compensation and various other factors. Liu and Mauer (2011) note that CEO 
risk-taking compensation is positively related to cash holdings but is negatively 
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related to the value of cash to shareholders. A few authors, including Lam et al. (2013) 
and Elkinawy and Stater (2011), report that female CEOs in both China and the 
United States generally receive less compensation than male CEOs. Ortiz-Molina 
(2007) highlights CEO pay and capital structure by arguing that financial leverage 
decreases CEO pay-performance sensitivity. Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia (2002) 
propose that executives’ structural power, ownership power, expert power, and 
prestige power should have a positive relationship with their overall compensation. 
Based on their empirical study, Chen et al. (2011) argue that in China, an executive’s 
educational background, political status (Executive/Party Secretary duality), and 
ownership are positively related to executive compensation. Some authors also argue 
that CEO tenure is positively related to CEO compensation (e.g.: Platt and McCarthy, 
1985; Attaway, 2000).  
2.3.4 A brief review of executive compensation in China 
The study of executive compensation in China began this past decade and remains in 
an early stage. Most of the Chinese executive compensation literature can be 
categorized according to three aspects: (1) discussion of the factors that influence 
executive compensation; (2) empirical studies to test all types of relationships 
between executive compensation and firms’ accounting items; and (3) general advice 
or suggestions related to executive compensation reform in SOEs.  
 
Cao and Zhan (2003) discuss incentive theory and note that incentives can be 
introduced to motivate employees’ proactivity and enthusiasm by considering 
people’s needs, purposes, and motivation.  
 
Some Chinese scholars attempt to determine which factors can affect executive 
compensation in the context of the Chinese market. Based on empirical studies, Yang 
(2004) and Luo (2009) report a positive relationship between executive compensation 
and company size. Corporate governance is also a very important factor that 
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influences executive compensation. Although they come to slightly different 
conclusions, many authors have noted that the largest shareholder’s ownership ratio is 
negatively related to executive compensation (e.g., Fan, 2006; Luo, 2009), thus 
indicating that block shareholders can effectively monitor executives’ behavior. 
Personal competence is also reported as a key factor that influences executive 
compensation. Luo (2009) finds a positive relationship between an executive’s age 
and his or her compensation.  
 
Factors outside the company may also influence executive compensation. Zhang 
(2007) and Luo (2009) study data from the transportation and information technology 
industries, respectively, and find that differences in area and industry are major factors 
that can influence executive compensation.  
 
There are a relatively large number of studies on the relationship between executive 
compensation and firm performance. For example, Fang and Pan (2008) study data 
from 2006 on A-share companies listed on the Shanghai exchanges and report that 
compensation is positively related to firm performance, which supports Murphy’s 
(1985) argument. However, some other authors (e.g.: Li, 2000; Chen and Liu, 2003, 
Yang, 2004) document a negative or a very weak relationship between executive 
compensation and firm performance. Du and Wang (2007) argue that the 
compensation of top executives is positively related to changes in firm and 
shareholder wealth between this period and the previous period; however, it is 
negatively related to the change in Tobin’s Q during this period and positively related 
to the change in Tobin’s Q during the previous period. This finding supports the 
proposition that executive compensation has the ability to motivate executives to 
improve firm performance. Gu and Zhou (2007) study the effect of stock options on 
publicly listed companies and find that when such companies control their industry, 
stock options do not generally provide an effective incentive function in the long term. 
However, because this study only contains 56 samples, its conclusion has weak 
explanatory value. Zhou and Wang (2007) also report that there is no relation between 
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executive compensation and firm performance, and they argue that executive 
compensation is defined by company size instead of firm performance.  
 
Several authors have studied the asymmetry of executive compensation. Liu et al. 
(2003) argues that to some extent, increasing executive compensation can improve 
firm performance and increase shareholder wealth, but decreasing executive 
compensation does not have same effect and will instead have a negative influence on 
firm performance. Fang (2009) reports a viscosity effect of executive compensation, 
namely, that the scale of increase is larger when a firm’s performance is improving 
than the scale of decrease when a firm’s performance is declining.  
 
Lin (2003) investigates the relation between a firm’s future performance and 
compensation variations among executives. This study reports that companies with a 
bigger compensation gap among executives are more likely to achieve better firm 
performance in the future; it also reports that the compensation gap is small in SOEs.  
 
Some Chinese scholars study executive compensation from the perspective of control 
power. Zhang and Guo (2007) study publicly listed companies that experienced 
mergers and acquisitions between 2002 and 2004, finding that executives will 
increase their compensation through mergers and acquisitions, which result in a larger 
company size and an increased number of employees. Wang and Wang (2007) argue 
that there is a positive relation between executive compensation and surplus 
management; however, when either the general manager is an inside controlling 
shareholder or the general manager and the chairman of the board is the same person, 
executive compensation will increase and surplus management will be weakened. 
This finding indicates the existence of management infringement in China.  
 
A few authors have conducted studies that consider China’s unique market and 
systemic context. Based on an empirical study of listed SOEs on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, Liu et al. (2009) argue that compensation regulation of executives in SOEs 
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is effective, and such regulation leads to on-the-job perks and corruption, which 
increase agency costs and damage firm performance. Liu et al. (2007) studies data 
from listed companies and argues that the lower the degree of local government 
intervention is or the more competitive the company’s market is, the stronger the 
relation between executive compensation and firm performance is. This finding 
suggests that political influence needs to be considered when studying executive 
compensation in the context of the Chinese market.  
 
Finally, numerous authors (e.g., Wang, 2010; Yang and Yang, 2010; Guo, 2010) offer 
recommendations to optimize executive compensation from both inside and outside 
the company, and in general, most suggest reinforcing the relation between executive 
compensation and firm performance. 
2.4 Research Context and Institutional Background 
One popular research field in corporate governance involves how to address agency 
issues in management, especially when those issues are related to the executive team. 
Based on previous academic studies, an increasing number of firms have opted to 
encourage top managers by adopting incentive schemes for their management teams, 
including higher salaries, performance bonuses, or stock options. To some extent, all 
of these practices alleviate agency issues between shareholders and the management 
team.  
 
Although incentive schemes have proven to be a realistic method to solve agency 
issue worldwide, such schemes are restricted in China when deployed in state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). Before the 1978 reform of the Chinese economy, all of China’s 
companies were fully owned and operated by the government. At that time, top 
managers of SOEs were directly designated by the government, not recruited by the 
board of directors. Indeed, before the 1990s, SOEs did not have directors because they 
were solely owned by the government, which for ideological reasons refused to 
introduce modern corporate governance structures.  
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In the early 1990s, China built stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen, indicating 
that China was beginning to introduce a modern corporate system. Since then, an 
increasing number of companies have been listed on these exchanges, including many 
SOEs. To list SOEs on the stock exchange, the Chinese government made reforms by 
selling a portion of those SOEs to individual investors, private firms, mutual funds, or 
other institutional investors. However, this reform is not complete because these 
companies only have a small portion of privatized ownership; the government’s 
ownership continues to dominate.  
 
The abovementioned reform brought an interesting corporate-governance practice to 
Chinese listed SOEs. On the one hand, these listed SOEs have built corporate 
governance structures such as boards of directors and independent directors, and they 
have the ability to recruit most of their employees as needed. On the other hand, the 
Chinese central government and local authorities typically nominate and designate 
SOEs’ top executives, including the chairman and general manager, which shows that 
various levels of the Chinese government maintain strong, controlling power over 
SOEs (Liu, 2001).  
 
Because the government designates SOEs’ top executives, senior managers normally 
enjoy (either implicitly or explicitly) certain administrative ranks according to each 
SOE’s reporting hierarchy (Huang et. al, 2011). However, as a system, the 
administrative ranking of executives was abandoned in 2000. This arrangement 
distorts the mechanism of executive compensation in listed SOEs, which should be 
defined by executives’ performance and contribution and not their administrative 
rank.  
 
To address issues related to corruption and political reputation, many authorities 
including the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCCCP) and the 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council 
officially released papers to regulate SOE executive compensation. Some local 
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governments, such as that of Chongqing municipality, even required that SOE 
executive annual income cannot exceed 10 times the average annual income of the 
SOE’s other employees.   
 
2.5 Hypothesis Development 
A few scholars have investigated executive compensation regulation in Chinese SOEs. 
Chen et al. (2005) argue that because the government does not have sufficient 
information to monitor every SOE and the number of SOEs in China is tremendous, 
the simple way to decrease administrative costs is to define a unified compensation 
contract. Huang and Cao (2008) note that SOE executive compensation regulation is 
caused by the ambiguous status of executives. Indeed, SOE top executives are not 
only managers but also (and perhaps more importantly) governors with administrative 
ranks that represent the government’s jurisdiction over SOEs.  
 
Although the above research reveals some reasons for the regulation of SOE 
compensation, I believe that the government must consider the influence of public 
opinion. SOEs have existed in China since the 1950s. In the past, there was no 
criticism of their executives’ high compensation because the difference between the 
pay given to a factory director and a front-line worker was not large. However, in the 
past decade, this gap has become tremendous, causing widespread objection from the 
public. Some authors (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) argue that the government has 
the power to intervene in company operations to realize its political or social goals. 
The Chinese government attempts to both regulate SOE executive compensation and 
to harmonize society in a manner that promotes deeper economic and political reform.  
 
Accordingly, this thesis formulates the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The SOE attribute of a firm is positively related to the compensation 
gap between the market-determined executive compensation level and actual 
executive compensation.             
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2.6 Research Methodology              
2.6.1 Samples 
The samples include non-financial companies listed on both the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Financial companies are excluded from 
the sample because the executive compensation characteristics of financial 
organizations are very different from those of non-financial companies given the 
stricter compensation regulations that apply to financial organizations (Firth et al., 
2007). The thesis chooses A-share data only because B-share stocks are traded in 
USD by qualified foreign investors and their total market value is small. The data of 
this thesis are from 2005 to 2012. The starting year is the year of China’s official 
launch of split-share reform (Zheng et al., 2007). The “Split Share Structure Reform” 
in China enables state shareholders of listed companies to trade their restricted shares. 
This renders the wealth of state shareholders more related to share price movements 
and this reform will create remuneration arrangements that increase the relationship 
between Chinese firms’ executive pay and stock market performance (Hou et al., 
2013). Furthermore split share reform motives state-controlled firms and especially 
those where dominant shareholders to have greater incentives to improve share return 
performance and corporate governance (Liao et al., 2008). That said split share reform 
significantly influences corporate governance (Wang et al., 2010) and agency 
problems (Tseng, 2012) which also largely influences firms’ investment behaviors 
(e.g.: Li, 2008; Huang et al., 2011; Qiang, 2012). To eliminate split ownership impact 
to executive compensation and firm investment behaviors, this thesis chooses data 
after 2005 when split share reform was implemented.  
 
Executive compensation information can be obtained from listed companies’ annual 
reports, as the Chinese CSRC has required all listed companies to disclose 
information about top management’s compensation since 1998.  
 
In this research, the dependent variable is total cash compensation of all of the 
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executives disclosed in each firm’s annual reports. Lagged values of executive 
compensation from year t-1 are used in the regression. The independent variables are 
accounting items, corporate governance-related data, and basic company information 
such as number of employees, industry attributes, etc. All of these data can be 
obtained from CSMAR data. Because some items are missing from the CSMAR data, 
the size of the total samples is somewhat reduced. Following a necessary data trim, 
the samples for the executive compensation regulation study contain data from 1,481 
companies and include 12,260 firm-year observations.  
               
2.6.2 Research methods    
The hypothesis of this study is that the SOE attribute has a positive relation to the gap 
between market-determined executive compensation and actual executive 
compensation. The study is divided into four steps. The first step is to construct a 
market-determined executive compensation model based on all Chinese listed 
companies. The second step is to predict expected executive compensation for each 
firm based on the model constructed in the first step. The third step is to calculate the 
gap between expected executive compensation and actual executive compensation for 
each firm. The fourth step involves checking the correction between each firm’s SOE 
status and the executive compensation gap based on a regression. A detailed 
description of my method is provided below. 
 
The first step is to define the market-determined executive compensation level. This 
research intends to prove that SOE executive compensation is regulated, resulting in 
the actual compensation granted to SOE executives falling below a benchmark. 
According to the basic manager-market theory (e.g.: Robert, 1956; Gomez-Mejia, 
1994) and human capital theory (e.g.: Agarwal, 1981; Harris and Helfat, 1997; Combs 
and Skill, 2003), executive compensation is determined by the market, this thesis uses 
the market level as the benchmark. The ideal market level should be defined by all of 
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the companies in the market. However, because the compensation data for private 
companies are normally unobtainable and because executive compensation in publicly 
listed companies and in private companies may be slightly different, this research 
selects all non-financial listed companies as a substitute for the market as a proxy to 
study executive compensation of publicly listed companies. This study also uses all 
non-state listed companies as the proxy for the market level in its comparison. In step 
one, the thesis constructs a model using a regression equation to describe executive 
compensation by considering variables related to various aspects, including company 
size, accounting performance, corporate governance, and industry attributes. A 
detailed variable description is given in section 2.6.3.   
 
In the first step, a market-determined executive compensation model based on all 
listed companies is built. In the second step, this thesis predicts each firm’s executive 
compensation from the model obtained in the first step. The output of the second step 
is the prediction of each firm’s executive compensation, which is marked as 
COMPENmarket. The thesis marks the actual executive compensation extracted from 
the CSMAR database as COMPENactual.  
 
The predicted compensation level based on the market-determined compensation 
model is obtained in the second step. To determine whether executives are underpaid 
or overpaid, the thesis calculates the difference between market-determined 
compensation, namely, COMPENmarket, and actual compensation, COMPENactual. This 
thesis denotes the difference between the two as COMPENgap:         
 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑃 = 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇 − 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑈𝐴𝐿 
 
Because executives may be either underpaid or overpaid, COMPENgap can be either 
positive or negative. If a firm’s COMPENgap is positive, then its executive 
compensation is below market level, whereas if a firm’s COMPENgap is below zero, 
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then its executive compensation is above market level, that is, its executives are 
overpaid.  
 
COMPENgap has the ability not only to indicate whether executive compensation is 
above or below the market level but also to reveal, through its absolute value, the 
degree of underpayment or overpayment. When I investigate the relation between 
compensation regulation and a firm’s overinvestment, the value of COMPENgap is a 
key measurement in the regression.  
 
To prove the hypothesis formulated in section 2.5, this thesis checks the correlation 
between the SOE attribute and the executive compensation gap between the 
market-determined level and the actual level, namely, COMPENgap; a positive and 
significant correlation between the two is expected.  
 
From the CSMAR database, a company-attribute code can be obtained, which 
indicates the ownership attribute. By relying on this code, the thesis then creates a 
dummy variable, SOETAG. If the firm belongs to central government, local 
government, another SOE, or a state controlled organization, SOETAG is 1; otherwise, 
SOETAG is 0.  
 
As mentioned above, COMPENgap can be either positive or negative. To verify the 
hypothesis, this thesis makes two regressions for all values of COMPENgap, including 
both positive and negative values and the values when COMPENgap is positive only. 
The rationale for such tests is that the set of full values of COMPENgap represents all 
sample companies, regardless of whether their executives are underpaid or overpaid, 
whereas the set of positive values of COMPENgap only contains companies whose 
executives are actually underpaid.  
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2.6.3 Variables 
The dependent variable of this study is total cash compensation of executives in 
A-share listed firms. Cash compensation includes base salary, bonus, commissions, 
and allowances. However, because the CSMAR data do not show this breakdown, the 
thesis only uses cash compensation in the regression. To eliminate dimensions of both 
the dependent variable and the independent variables, this thesis uses the natural log 
of executive compensation and marks it as LNEXECOM. 
 
To depict the characteristics of all listed companies’ executive compensation based on 
previous studies (e.g.: Ciscel and Carroll, 1980; Agrawal and Walking, 1994; Bentson, 
1985; Yang, 2004; Fan, 2006; Luo, 2009; Zhang, 2007; Firth et al., 2006; Wan et al., 
2008; Young & Jing, 2011; Haid and Yurtoglu, 2006; Ozkan, 2007; Ozdemir and 
Upneja, 2012; Xu and Li, 2011), the thesis includes in the regression equation 
variables that reflect firm operating characteristics, firm performance, corporate 
governance characteristics, and industry attributes. Because this thesis uses a natural 
log of executive compensation as dependent variable, the thesis also uses a natural log 
for independent variables that have units; accordingly, the left and right sides of the 
regression equation lack dimensions.  
 
The thesis uses a natural log of total assets as measure of company size (Firth et al., 
2006; Brookman and Thistle, 2013), which is marked as LNSIZE. Many previous 
literatures report a significant and positive relation between company size and 
executive compensation (e.g., Jones and Kato, 1996; Firth et al., 2006; Yang, 2004; 
Wan at al., 2008; Luo, 2009). The results of standard agency models suggest that the 
level of pay is an increasing function of firm performance (Core et al., 1999). Some 
scholars argue that the firms with higher operational margin or higher return on assets 
will grant their executives higher compensation (He et al., 2013; Luo and Pang, 2014). 
To consider the relation between executive compensation and firm’s operational 
performance, the thesis tries two variables to measure firm performance: (1) 
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operational gross margin, written as GROSSM; and (2) return on total assets (ROA) 
(Conyon and He, 2011; Du and Wang, 2009). Chen et al. (2007) argue that because of 
asymmetric information, to avoid moral hazard the shareholders keen to sign a 
compensation growth opportunity contract with firm’s executives, under such 
contracts, executives will obtain higher compensation if higher growth opportunity 
occurs in a firm. Thus it is reported that firm’s growth opportunity is positively 
relative to executive compensation (Ma and Duan, 2010). In the regression, the thesis 
uses the P/E ratio and market-to-book ratio (Core et al., 1999) as measurements of 
firm growth opportunities. Those two variables are called PERATIO and MBRATIO, 
respectively. However, since in China stock market, smaller companies normally have 
higher P/E ratio, so this thesis predicates that there is a negative relation between P/E 
ratio and executive compensation. Capital structure is reported as an important factor 
in the determination of executive compensation. Chemmanur et al. (2013) argue that 
in the optimal labor contract between firms and employee, a firm with higher leverage 
pays a higher wage to its employee to compensate him or her for the expected 
bankruptcy costs that will be borne by the employee, because the employee is unable 
to fully insure his or her human capital risk. In this study, the thesis uses the 
debt-asset ratio as the measure and names this variable LEVER.  
 
In this study, management ownership, block holders, board structure, and CEO 
duality are considered as reflections of corporate-governance characteristics. 
Ownership structure is reported an important factor in determining executive 
compensation in previous literatures (e.g.: Holderness and Sheehan, 1988; Lambert et 
al., 1993; Core, 2000; Zhang, 2010). The management ownership ratio equals 
executive ownership divided by total ownership, and the variable is named 
EXESHARE which is expected positive to executive compensation. To measure 
block holder ownership, this thesis uses the biggest shareholder ownership ratio as a 
proxy to measure the ownership concentration and marks the variable SHARECON. 
Because block holders have higher motivation to monitor executive compensation, 
this thesis predicts a negative relation between executive compensation and block 
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holder ownership. Boards of directors are ineffective in setting appropriate levels of 
compensation because directors are essentially hired by the CEO and can be removed 
by the CEO (Crystal 1991). As such, board members may be unwilling to take 
positions adversarial to the CEO, especially concerning the CEO’s compensation. 
Moreover, boards usually rely on the compensation consultants hired by the CEO, and 
this may lead to compensation contracts that have been optimized not for the firm, but 
for the CEO (Core et al., 1999). Thus the independent-director ratio, a key factor of 
board structure, is used to represent board structure and the variable is called 
IDRATIO in this thesis and is expected a positive relation to executive compensation. 
CEO duality is also considered in the research because CEO duality is prevent in 
Chinese listed firms and impacts corporate governance (Wei and Sun, 2010; Hu et 
al.2012) thus increase executive compensation lever, accordingly, the thesis 
introduced the dummy variable CEODUALITY into the regression.  
 
Some studies argue that CEO tenure is positively related to compensation level (e.g., 
Platt and McCarthy, 1985; Attaway, 2000); however, it is quite difficult to extract 
tenure data because the thesis is using the compensation for all executives, not 
individual executives, as the independent variable. Therefore, to proxy the tenure 
characteristic, the thesis uses the firm’s duration as a publicly listed company as the 
substitute and call the variable COMPANYAGE.  
 
Finally, the thesis also introduces industry dummy variables to check whether the type 
of industry influences executive compensation when other conditions are controlled.  
 
Same as many previous literatures (e.g.: Du and Zhai, 2005; Wan et al. 2008), this 
thesis does not include provincial dummy in determining executive compensation. 
The first reason why provincial dummies are excluded is that SOEs are now managed 
by SASAC directly; the executive compensations in SOEs are more related to firm 
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size, industry and SOEs’ administrative ranking3. Another reason is that in this 
research, the thesis studies compensation of all executives in the firm, normally 
Chinese listed firms have many branches and subsidiaries across the China or even 
outside of China. Executives of the firm may not locate in the same city or province. 
Thus it is not reasonable to determine executive compensation based on firms’ 
registered province. 
  
The table 2.1 below summarizes the variables to be used in the regression.  
 
[Table 2.1] 
 
Because this thesis checks the relationship between the executive compensation gap 
and SOE attribute in the fourth step of this study, Boolean variables are needed to 
formulate to describe the state-owned attribute of each firm based on each firm’s 
actual controller information. The thesis finds each firm’s actual controller 
information in segment “S0702b” of the CSMAR database. A detailed description can 
be obtained from the “User’s manual of the Shareholder Research Database of 
Chinese Listed Companies—2013 Edition” (GTA, 2013). The thesis creates three 
variables, as set forth below in Table 2.2  
[Table 2.2] 
2.6.4 Models and Methodology 
The model used in step 1 relies on the regression to generate the market-determined 
executive compensation. The initial and general model is as follows: 
                                                             
3 Detailed information about SOEs’ administration ranking can be found from 
http://finance.ifeng.com/news/special/gqybs/ 
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𝐿𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖,𝑡
= α + 𝛽1𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑀𝐵𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐼𝐷𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐴𝑁𝑌𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
                                                      (2-1) 
This thesis initially estimates a fixed-effects panel data model for 2-1 equation. Where 
i indexes firms, t indexes years. Industry-specific effect is accounted for by including 
industry (INDUSTRY) in all specification. μi is a firm-specific time-invariant effect, 
and εi,t is an idiosyncratic error term. 
 
In step 2, the thesis uses equation 2-1 to predict the market-determined executive 
compensation level for each company as follows: 
 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇 = 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛{𝐿𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑀}     (2-2) 
 
In step 3, the thesis calculates the difference between the market-determined 
compensation level and each firm’s actual compensation level: 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑃 = 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇 − 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑈𝐴𝐿 (2-3) 
 
The study checks the relation between COMPENgap and SOE attribute in step 4 using 
three regressions. First, the thesis conducts a regression between COMPENgap and 
SOETAG to investigate whether SOE attribute causes compensation regulation in all 
samples that have an increased COMPENgap. In the regressions, the study also adds 
COMPANYAGE, SHARECON, IDRATIO and CEODUAL as control variables to 
the models reflecting firm’s attributes of corporate governance. 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑃 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑇𝐴𝐺 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀 (2-4) 
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Next, this thesis redoes the above regression for the observations when COMPENgap 
is NOT negative to check whether SOE attribute continues to have a positive relation 
with the compensation gap.  
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑃 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑇𝐴𝐺 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀 
where 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑃 ≥ 0 and 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑃 < 0 respectively            
(2-5) 
 
To further investigate the relation between various types of SOE and executive 
compensation, the thesis uses CENTRALSOE and LOCALTAY as independent 
variables in the regression, the coefficient of CENTRALSOE (that is β1), and the 
coefficient of LOCALTAG (namely β2), which tells us what type of SOE may cause 
severe compensation regulation.  
 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑃
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑂𝐸 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿𝑇𝐴𝐺
+ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀 
where 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑃 ≥ 0 and 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑃 < 0 respectively       
(2-6) 
Again, in equation 2-5 and 2-6, COMPANYAGE, SHARECON, IDRATIO and 
CEODUAL are added to the models as control variables reflecting firm’s corporate 
governance attributes. 
2.6.5 Statistical methods 
This thesis uses STATA 12.1 Special Edition to perform all of the statistical analyses. 
Major data processes and regression are programmed in STATA’s script language. 
The STATA program and this thesis’s raw data are available for checking. 
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2.7 Empirical results                
2.7.1 Variable descriptive statistics 
Table 2.3 presents descriptive statistics of the variables in the regression. To promote 
better understanding, the thesis presents the original data for executive compensation, 
company size (value of total assets), and revenue per share instead of their natural 
logarithm types.  
 
[Table 2.3] 
 
The mean executive compensation grew consistently and roughly tripled from 2005 to 
2012. However, executive compensation in Chinese listed companies is far below that 
of companies listed in other countries, such as the US and Japan (Su, 2013). Gross 
margin started to grow since 2008 till 2012 with a peak in 2012 at 0.267, which might 
be caused by China’s 4 trillion RMB stimulus plan that began at the end of 2008 and 
has continued throughout the global economic recession since the period.  
 
The accounting performance measures (e.g., ROA) are very poor compared with 
American listed companies (Hu and Huang, 2012) and do not show a growth trend. 
This indicates that overall, the performance of Chinese listed companies is low. 
Conversely, Chinese companies’ P/E ratios are much higher than in the exchange 
markets of other developed countries (Ma, 2004; Wang and Cai, 2007). One possible 
explanation for the high P/E ratio in China post-2005 is that China launched a Small 
and Medium Enterprises board and a Growth Enterprises Market (GEM) board at the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2004 and 2009, respectively, which drives the P/E ratio 
of all of the companies listed on Chinese stock market.  
 
Although it remains very small, management ownership increased from 0.0289% in 
2005 to 12% in 2012, which shows that Chinese listed companies have adopted more 
equity-based executive compensation. This trend is consistent with that shown in the 
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previous literature (e.g., Li et al., 2013).  
 
The average ownership of the largest shareholder showed a small decrease, from 40.8% 
in 2005 to approximately 36% in later years. This decrease may be because of the 
2005 split-share reform. However, further study (which this thesis does not report 
here) shows that SOE companies’ average single largest shareholder’s ownership is 
dominant (Firth et al., 2007) and higher than that for all listed companies, as the 
biggest shareholder of listed SOEs is typically the government. This finding indicates 
that government continues to exercise tight control over publicly listed companies.  
 
Independent directors play a very important role in corporate governance. In 2001, the 
CSRC released “Guidelines for establishing an independent director policy in publicly 
listed companies,” which required that by the end of June 30, 2003, independent 
directors should comprise at least two thirds of the boards of all listed companies. 
IDRATIO increased very slowly from 0.3475 in 2005 to 0.3691 in 2012; moreover, 
the values of IDRATIO in all years are very close to 0.333, which is CSRC’s 
minimum required independent-director ratio. This value is lower than the 
independent-director ratio in other markets, such as the US (Core et al., 1999), Great 
Britain (Ezzamel and Watson, 1997), and Hong Kong (Firth et al., 1999). This result 
may reveal that the major reason that listed Chinese companies have increased the 
number of independent directors is to comply with the CSRC’s regulation, not to 
improve corporate governance (Fang and Zhang, 2013).  
 
In general, CEO duality increased from 2005 to 2012, especially between 2006 and 
2007. Because CEO duality enables more effective control of the board (Jensen, 1993) 
and helps build a clear strategy and mission (Anderson and Anthony, 1986), one 
possible explanation for the increased CEO duality ratio is that shareholders 
attempted to increase their control after split-share reform.  
 
Below, Table 2.4 shows the variance inflation factors of independent variables. None 
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of these VIF is bigger than 2. So this indicates that multicollinearity is not significant 
and that it is unnecessary to provide special treatment.  
 
 
[Table 2.4] 
 
2.7.2 Results  
2.7.2.1 Result: The market-determined compensation model  
In step 1, the thesis conducted three regressions based on fixed-effects data panel 
models
4
. The independent variables in the first regression are LNSIZE, ROA, 
PERATIO, EXESHARE, IDRATIO, and CEODUAL as proxies to reflect the 
characteristics of firm size, accounting firm performance, and corporate governance.  
 
In the second regression, this thesis added GROSSM, MBRATIO, LEVER, 
SHARECON, COMPANYAGE (substitution of executive tenure), and industry 
dummy variables (DUMIND*). The thesis finds that PERATIO and EXESHARE are 
not significant. IDRATIO is positive related to executive compensation. The reasons 
that the independent-director ratio is positively related to executive compensation 
might be that the average independent-director ratio is close to the minimum 
requirement of the CSRC regulation and that the director-election process is 
influenced by the CEO (Ghosh and Sirmans, 2005); thus, independent directors do not 
perform the necessary monitoring of CEO compensation or even support to offer 
executives higher compensation. This finding is consistent with the previous literature 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; Conyon and Peck, 1998; Du and Zhai, 2005).  
 
The thesis then removed variable PERATIO and EXESHARE from model 3, which is 
                                                             
4 A Hausman test is conducted to check whether fixed effect model or random effect model should be deployed. 
H0: difference in coefficients between fixed effect and random effect model is not systematic 
Chi2(9)=802.51;  Prob>chi2 = 0.0000. So fixed effect model should be selected. 
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not significant in model 2 but includes these two variables in model 4 because models 
is conducted in Non-SOEs in which the companies may have different relation 
between executive compensation and firm’s financial indexes or corporate 
governance attributes.  
 
In the fourth regression, this thesis retained observations only if SOETAG does not 
equal 1, namely, observations from non-SOE solely. The significance of this model is 
that the thesis uses executive compensation in non-SOE listed companies as a 
benchmark to build a market-determined compensation model, which this thesis then 
uses to predict listed SOE executive compensation. Note that the number of 
observations in regression four is much smaller than in the first three regressions 
because in regression 4, only non-state companies are left as samples. Because most 
of the coefficients of regressions 3 and 4 are similar except for industry dummy 
variables, the thesis does not provide a detailed description of the coefficients of 
regression 4.  
 
Below table 2.5 shows the results of above mentioned regressions. 
 
[Table 2.5] 
 
This thesis uses the outputs of model 3 to perform the following steps of the study. 
The thesis also uses model 4 to verify the results based on model 3 in the robustness 
test.  
 
The coefficient of LNSIZE is significantly and positively related to executive 
compensation. This finding supports the argument that executives who manage larger 
companies generally have higher compensation, a conclusion that is consistent with 
many previous studies (e.g., Galbraith, 1973; Agrawal and Walking, 1994; Jones and 
Kato, 1996; Firth et al., 2006; Yang, 2004; Wan at al., 2008; Luo, 2009).  
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Return of Assets (ROA), as a proxy of firm performance, has significant relation with 
executive compensation. Gross margin (GROSSM) is another proxy of firm 
performance that focuses on profitability: the coefficient is 0.65, and the t value is 
13.25. This result shows that gross margin is significantly and positively related to 
executive compensation and that its influence is strong. In General, firm performance 
has a positive relation to executive compensation in my regression. This result 
supports the argument on the positive relation between firm performance and 
executive compensation in many recent studies of Chinese listed companies (Conyon 
and He, 2011; He et al., 2013; Luo and Pang, 2014) 
 
Not consistent with the predication that there is a negative relation between P/E ratio 
and executive compensation, the P/E ratio is positively related to executive 
compensation in this regression, however its coefficient is insignificant. The result 
indicates that executives generally have higher compensation in companies that have 
a relatively higher P/E ratio. The P/E ratio reflects a firm’s long-term growth 
capability (Zarrowin, 1990; Kim and Koveos, 1994; Ramcharran, 2002), and 
companies listed on the SME and GEM boards generally have much higher P/E ratios 
than those of companies on the main board (Chen and Zhang, 2011). To grow the 
business, these SMEs may offer higher compensation to attract top managers. This 
observation may explain the positive relation between P/E ratio and executive 
compensation that is revealed by the regression.  
 
Coefficient of market-to-book ratio (MBRATIO) is significantly and negatively 
related to executive compensation in model 2, 3 and 4 which is opposite to the 
prediction. Market-to-book ratio is considered as the best proxy variable to indicate 
firm’s investment opportunity (Adam and Vidhan, 2008). Some previous literatures 
argue that there is a positive relation between executive compensation and firm’s 
investment opportunity or growth opportunity (e.g.: Zhao et al., 2007; Xie and Hu, 
2011), however the result of this study does not support the argument. Although it is 
not the focused field of this thesis and thus it is not reported completely, two 
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separated regressions for all SOEs and all Non-SOEs have been conducted to 
investigate above relation within different sample sets. The results of the two 
regressions show that there is a positive relation between market-to-book ratio and 
executive compensation in SOEs but the relation is negative in non-SOEs. Such 
relations are all significant. Considering that this study only counts cash income as 
executive compensation while does not include equity-based income in executive 
compensation, the above finding may be explained by the management ownership 
difference between SOEs and Non-SOEs. Very few executives hold ownership in 
SOEs while many more executives in Non-SOEs are granted firm’s stock or options.  
 
The asset-liability ratio (LEVER) has a positive impact on executive compensation in 
model 2 and model 3 and is significant at 99% level. Moreover asset-liability ratio 
also shows a positive and significant relation with executive compensation in 
Non-SOE firms. Consider normally Chinese listed SOE firms can not be bankrupted 
because of intervene from the government while private listed firms do not have such 
privileges.  This result is consistent with Chemmanur et al.’s (2013) empirical study 
and supports Berk et al.’s (2010) argument that companies with high leverage will 
provide higher compensation to their employees to compensate for the risk of 
bankruptcy or takeover by external investors.  
 
There are two variables that reflect ownership structure in the regression: 
EXESHARE is the proxy for management ownership, whereas SHARECON 
represents block holders’ ownership status. EXESHARE is not significant while 
SHARECON is significant at 0.01 level. In addition, and consistent with substitute 
effect theory, the result shows a negative relation between management ownership 
and executive compensation, supporting the argument that management ownership 
has a substitutive effect on compensation thus the management may accept relatively 
lower cash compensation. This finding is consistent with some previous studies (e.g., 
Cordeiro and Veliyath, 2003; Hu et al., 2012) but not with other studies (e.g., Sanders, 
2001a; Peng 2006; Zhang, 2010) whose findings support the agency theory and argue 
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that management ownership helps managers influence compensation decisions more 
effectively so that managers with higher ownership will receive higher compensation. 
The regression also presents a negative and significant relation between block holder 
ownership and executive compensation. This result complies with agency theory’s 
suggestion that block holders with higher ownership will engage in more activity to 
monitor executive behaviors and control executive compensation (e.g., Hartzell and 
Starks, 2003; Haid and Yurtoglu, 2006; Ozkan, 2007); it is also consistent with some 
recent empirical studies of Chinese listed companies (i.e., Ke and Qiu, 2009; Conyon 
and He, 2011; Zhou, 2013). 
 
As expected, CEO duality (CEODUAL) is positively related to executive 
compensation, thus supporting the argument that CEOs that hold dual positions will 
have more influence on the board of directors with respect to compensation decisions 
and that they will receive higher compensation. This result is consistent with recent 
researches (i.e., Wei and Sun, 2010; Xu and Li, 2011; Hu et al., 2012). However the 
results show that the coefficient of CEO duality is insignificant in all samples but 
significant in all NON-SOEs. The finding indicates that the compensation setting in 
SOEs may not be influenced by CEO and chairman much, compensation is more set 
by government according to the administrative ranks.  
 
The thesis uses duration after a firm’s IPO (COMPANYAGE) as a proxy for CEO 
tenure. According to some studies (e.g., Attaway, 2000; Luo, 2009), the longer a 
CEO’s tenure is, the higher his or her compensation. The results of regressions in this 
study support the argument and show that there is a positive and significant relation 
between executive compensation and the time elapsed after a company goes public.  
 
Different industries show different levels of influence on executive compensation. 
The regression result shows that the real estate and utility industries have a significant 
and negative influence on executive compensation, whereas the wholesale and retail 
industries have a significant and positive influence on executive compensation. The 
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manufacturing industry is also negatively related to executive compensation, but this 
relationship is not significant.  
 
The third regression model has an F value of 657.37 and the R-squared equals to 
0.3725. Overall, this means that the model is effective and meaningful with good 
explanatory capability to reflect executive compensation based on the selected 
independent variables in the model.  
 
The fourth regression is conducted on the samples containing non-state-owned 
companies only. It is apparent that most of the model’s coefficients have similar signs 
and significance levels as model 3, except for the industry dummy variables. This is 
understandable because observations from listed SOEs occupy more than 50% of the 
total observations, and SOEs dominate some industries, such as utilities and 
metallurgy. When all SOE observations are deleted from the sample set, the industry 
characteristics of the entire market will inevitably change.  
 
2.7.2.2 Result: Prediction of market-determined compensation and the 
compensation gap  
Based on the above regression from step 1, the thesis makes a prediction of 
market-determined executive compensation, named COMPENmarket, and this thesis 
then uses COMPENmarket to subtract COMPENactual to obtain COMPENgap, which is 
the difference between the market-determined compensation level and each 
company’s actual executive compensation. If COMPENgap > 0, then actual executive 
compensation is regulated and lower than the market level; if COMPENgap < 0, then 
actual executive compensation is higher than the market-determined compensation 
level and executives are overpaid. The thesis lists detailed information about 
COMPENgap in Table 2.6.  
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[Table 2.6]  
 
From the results of either model 3 or model 4, it can be found that underpayment 
occurs in both SOE companies and non-SOE companies. In both models, the 
underpayment ratio of SOE observations is higher than that of non-SOE observations. 
This result indicates that underpayment—i.e., compensation regulation—is more 
prevalent in SOEs than in non-SOE companies. A prominent difference between the 
outputs of model 3 and model 4 is that the underpayment ratio of SOE observations 
increases disproportionately from 48.37% in model 3 to 51.83% in model 4. Because 
the thesis uses non-SOE companies to substitute for the overall market in model 4, 
this result indicates that the market-determined compensation level based on purely 
non-SOE listed companies is higher than the level based on all listed companies. The 
result is consistent with hypothesis that executive compensation in SOE companies is 
generally below market; here, the thesis uses all listed companies and all non-SOE 
listed companies as a proxy in model 3 and model 4 respectively. 
 
2.7.2.3 Result: Verification of SOE attribute and the compensation gap 
In the previous steps, the thesis has obtained the difference in executive compensation 
between market-determined compensation and actual compensation. The thesis then 
run regressions, using both model 3 and model 4, between COMPENgap and SOETAG, 
CENTRALSOE, and LOCALTAG with firm’s corporate governance variables 
controlled. Detailed results are listed below in Tables 2.7 and 2.8, which are based on 
models 3 and 4, respectively.   
 
Table 2.7 reports six regressions. Regression 1 (GAPSOE_1) is a pooled panel data 
regression between EXECOMgap and SOETAG that intends to check whether SOE 
attribute has a positive relation with the executive compensation gap.            
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[Table 2.7] 
 
The result of regression 1 shows that SOETAG is significantly and positively related 
to EXECOMgap. This result both supports Hypothesis 1 and indicates that executives 
in listed SOEs will have a larger compensation gap between the market level and 
actual level; furthermore, SOE executive compensation is generally regulated to a 
below-market level. Regression 2 further investigates the relation between the 
compensation gap and SOE attributes, including central SOEs (CENTRALSOE) and 
local SOEs (LOCALTAG). The results show that both CENTRALSOE and 
LOCALTAG are positively related to EXECOMgap, which can be interpreted to mean 
that compensation regulation occurs in all SOE companies. Both coefficients of 
CENTRALSOE and LOCALTAG are significant at the 0.01 level. Another finding 
from regression 2 is that the coefficient of CENTRALSOE is larger than the 
coefficient of LOCALTAG. Because both coefficients are positive, this means that 
central SOEs have stricter compensation regulation than local SOEs, as 
CENTRALSOE will cause a larger and positive gap between market-determined 
compensation and actual compensation. 
 
Regression 3 and 4 are conducted among observations in which EXECOMgap>=0. The 
purpose of these two regressions is to verify SOE attribute and the 
executive-compensation gap in companies that executives are underpaid. The result of 
regression 3 shows a significant and positive relation between SOETAG and 
EXECOMgap, which indicates that in companies that practice compensation regulation, 
SOE attribute is a significant factor in both causing and increasing such regulations. 
Like regression 2, model 4 presents positive coefficients of CENTRALSOE and 
LOCALTAG, which consistently shows that both central and local SOEs practice 
compensation regulation. Similar to regression 2, the coefficient of CENTRALSOE is 
significant at the 0.01 level.   
 
The F values of regression from one to four are significant, indicating that the models 
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are both meaningful and effective.  
 
Regression 5 and 6 are conducted among observations in which EXECOMgap<=0. The 
purpose of these two regressions is to verify SOE attribute and the 
executive-compensation gap in companies that executives are overpaid. The results of 
regression 5 and regression 6 show negative relations between SOE attributes and 
EXECOMgap, however all coefficients are not significant. Meanwhile F values of 
regression 5 and regression 6 are very small. The results do not indicate any clear 
relation between SOE attributes and EXECOMgap.  
 
One point that must be highlighted is that all of the regressions’ R-squared values are 
relatively small. This could be because the executive compensation gap between 
market-determined and actual compensation is related to many factors. This thesis, 
however, only focuses on SOE attribute while omitting all other possible influences. 
Small R-squared values do not affect the conclusion about the relation between 
EXECOMgap and SOE attribute.  
 
[Table 2.8] 
 
Table 2.8 presents results based on model 4, which uses non-SOE listed companies as 
a proxy for the market. On the contrast, the results discussed above are based on 
model 3, which uses all listed companies as a proxy for the market. All outputs listed 
in Table 2.8 are similar to those listed in Table 2.7. SOETAG has a significant and 
positive relation with EXECOMgap, both CENTRALSOE and LOCALTAG positively 
impact EXECOMgap, and unlike Table 2.7, the coefficient of CENTRALSOE now 
becomes significant. Table 2.8 also reports almost the same results as Table 2.7 for 
the variable set in which the EXECOMgap>=0 and EXECOMgap=<0.  
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2.7.3 Robustness test  
This thesis performs two robustness tests to verify the results discussed above. In the 
first test, the thesis substitutes the variable of Market-to-book ratio with Tobin’s Q. 
Tobin’Q is a proxy of firm’s investment opportunities and has been used in many 
previous empirical studies (e.g., Narayanan, 1988; Vogt, 1994; Richardson, 2006). 
The thesis also substitutes the ROA with Operating Profit Ratio (OPR) to measure 
firm’s operational performance. The regression results are listed in Table 2.9. Model 1 
presents the results of original regression, and model 2 reports the results of new 
regression with Tobin’s Q and OPR as proxy for investment opportunity and 
operational performance respectively.  
 
[Table 2.9] 
 
The results show that except for industry dummy variables, all other independent 
variables retained the same coefficient signs as in model 2. In addition, model 2 has a 
higher R-squared value than model 1. This thesis then makes predictions based on this 
new model and check the relation between EXECOMgap and SOE attribute with 
corporate governance control variables. Table 2.10 shows the details.  
 
[Table 2.10] 
 
For all samples, SOETAG remains significantly and positively related to EXECOMgap, 
which again supports Hypothesis 1. The results are also same as before when 
regressions are conducted within samples in which EXECOMgap>=0 and 
EXECOMgap<=0. The coefficients of SOETAG, CENTRALSOE and LOGTAG 
remain insignificant in the regression 5 and 6. Thus the conclusions drew from two 
models are same. The results also show that the study is robust by replacing two 
important control variables.  
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Thus far, all predictions of executive compensation in this study so far are based on 
panel data fixed-effects models. It is understandable that executive compensation is 
highly influenced by its figure in previous years. So the thesis introduces a 
one-order-difference dynamic panel data model However in a dynamic panel data 
model, lagged values of dependent variable work as an independent variable in the 
regression. Thus regression residues are related to independent variables or 
explanatory variables. This is a heteroscedasticity problem. According to Arellano 
and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) a GMM (Generalized Method of 
Moments) estimator of dynamic panel data model has the ability to solve above 
mentioned heteroscedasticity problem. Meanwhile, Windmeijer (2005) argues that a 
two-step bias-corrected system GMM estimation can produce a better statistical 
inference. In the second robustness test, this thesis changes the regression model from 
a fixed effects panel data model to a two-step system GMM of dynamic panel data 
model. Table 2.11 shows a detailed comparison of the fixed effects panel data model 
and the system GMM dynamic panel data model.  
 
[Table 2.11] 
 
The thesis then uses the dynamic panel data model to make the prediction and check 
the relation between EXECOMgap and SOE attribute with firm’s corporate governance 
control variables, both in all observations and in observations in which 
EXECOMgap>=0  and EXECOMgap<=0 only. The results are shown in Table 2.12. 
 
[Table 2.12]  
 
Results show that there are no differences between the two models. Table 2.12 
indicates that all of the signs of the coefficients are the same as the results of the 
fixed-effects panel data model listed in Table 2.7. Thus, the results based on dynamic 
panel data system GMM (DPD-GMM) model fully support hypothesis 1 that the SOE 
attribute of a firm is positively related to the compensation gap between the 
market-determined executive compensation level and actual executive compensation.  
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To summarize, the results from the above two robustness tests comply with original 
findings and support the first hypothesis that SOE attribute is positively related to the 
gap between the market-determined executive compensation level and actual 
executive compensation in SOEs.             
  
2.8 Conclusion and Discussion             
Some hotly debated issues in the field of top management address whether publicly 
listed companies, especially state-owned listed companies, offer overly high 
compensation to their executives and whether such compensation is related to firm 
performance and corporate governance. These questions are important in China 
because China is still engaged in economic reforms and the Chinese government is 
encouraging Chinese SOEs to adopt modern corporate governance policies to improve 
firm performance. Both the public and the authorities are paying a great deal of 
attention to executive compensation. On the one hand, the public is arguing that 
executives in listed companies have much higher compensation than non-managerial 
employees, which is unfair both because these executives do not provide benefits to 
small shareholders and because SOE listed companies are owned by all Chinese 
people, given them natural competitive advantages and privileges. Therefore, 
executives in SOEs do not deserve high compensation. On the other hand, authorities 
believe that compensation is an incentive that motivates executives to pursue better 
firm performance and that market-level compensation will help traditional SOEs 
transition to modern firms. However, because Chinese political reform lags far behind 
economic reform, most executives in large SOEs continue to hold positions within the 
administrative hierarchy; accordingly, very high executive compensation in SOEs will 
lead to administrative problems. In addition, to build a harmonious society, the 
government needs to consider public opinion. This creates a dilemma for the Chinese 
government, which must balance SOE reforms and the conventional administrative 
structure to achieve a genuine breakthrough in political reforms.  
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This study provides some useful suggestions to solve the problems set forth above. 
According to the empirical study, firm size remains the most important factor in 
setting executive compensation. ROA is positively but not significantly related to 
executive compensation, and gross margin is significantly and positively related to 
executive compensation. This finding shows that to some degree, firm performance 
influences compensation decisions; however, short-term measures (gross margins) 
play a more important role than relatively long-term measures (ROA) in establishing 
compensation. Corporate governance remains weak in Chinese listed companies. 
Independent directors are not playing an effective monitoring role, and CEO duality 
remains prevalent, which influences executive compensation decisions and causes 
higher compensation overall. Ownership structure has a significant impact on 
executive compensation. Consistent with substitute effect theory, the result shows a 
negative relation between management ownership and executive compensation, 
supporting the argument that management ownership has a substitutive effect on 
compensation thus the management may accept relatively lower cash compensation. 
This finding is consistent with some previous studies (e.g., Cordeiro and Veliyath, 
2003; Hu et al., 2012) but not with other studies (e.g., Sanders, 2001a; Peng 2006; 
Zhang, 2010) whose findings support the agency theory and argue that management 
ownership helps managers influence compensation decisions more effectively so that 
managers with higher ownership will receive higher compensation. However such 
relation is not significant in this research which may because management ownership 
in Chinese listed companies is not prevalent yet. Ownership concentration 
(SHARECON) is significantly and negatively related to executive compensation 
according to both my study and findings from other authors (e.g., Ke and Qiu, 2009; 
Conyon and He, 2011; Zhou, 2013). This result shows that block holders in Chinese 
listed companies not only play an effective role in monitoring management but also 
control the cash compensation of executives.  
 
Another important finding of this study is the relation between SOE attribute and 
executive compensation. The thesis finds that SOE attribute (whether central or local) 
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increases the gap between executives’ actual compensation and market-determined 
compensation. This finding supports the hypothesis and shows that compensation 
regulation not only occurs in SOE listed companies but also may drive executive 
compensation lower than the market level. The implications of this finding are 
important. First, it reminds policymakers that it may not be the right decision to 
simply control executive compensation in SOEs, as the Chinese government is now 
doing, because compared to market-level compensation, executive compensation in 
SOEs is already low. Second, to motivate SOE executives, policy makers may rely 
more heavily on equity-based incentives. Perhaps one proper method of motivating 
executives in SOEs could be to keep their current cash compensation constant while 
increasing their equity-based compensation as a portion of total compensation. Third, 
because most listed SOEs are ultimately state-controlled, the state normally is the 
single biggest shareholder. This ownership structure not only causes relatively lower 
executive compensation but also distorts corporate governance, resulting in a low 
independent-director ratio, for example. One possible way to conduct further SOE 
reforms would be to dilute state ownership (Chen et al., 1998; Firth et al., 2006) so 
that the board can truly take responsibility for protecting shareholders.   
 
In this study, the thesis only analyzes executive cash compensation because although 
equity-based compensation is increasing, it currently remains a small portion of total 
compensation. Equity incentives will be an important aspect of future total 
compensation packages; therefore, future studies should focus on equity-based 
compensation. Another possible improvement on the research would be to find a 
proxy for the overall market. Because of data constraints, this thesis uses all listed 
companies as a substitute for the overall market. The thesis also attempts to use all 
non-SOE listed companies as a proxy. However, because listed companies have some 
similar features—especially under China’s current IPO policy—there might be some 
bias if the study were to use all listed companies as a proxy of the overall market. The 
best way to resolve this issue would be to rely on data from a sufficient number of 
listed and privately held companies. Finally, further research can more closely 
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examine the differences between central SOEs and local SOEs, which have different 
attributes in this study.   
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Table 2.1 Variable definitions for regression to build executive compensation 
model 
Variable Name Definition 
Executive Cash Compensation 
(Dependent Variable) 
LNEXECOM Natural log of total cash compensation of all top 
executives in the firm 
Operating Characteristics 
Company Size  
P/E Ratio 
Market-to-Assets Ratio 
Finance Leverage 
Publicly listed duration 
 
 
LNSIZE 
PERATIO 
MBRATIO 
LEVER 
COMPANYAGE 
 
Natural log of firm total assets 
(Stock price)/(Earnings per share) 
(Market value)/(Total assets) 
Debt/(Total assets) 
Natural log of total years since IPO 
Firm Performance 
Gross Margin 
Return on Assets  
 
 
GROSSM 
ROA 
 
(Gross profit)/(Operating revenue) 
(Profit)/(Total assets) 
Corporate Governance 
Management Ownership 
Blockholder 
Independent Director Ratio 
CEO Duality 
 
EXESHARE 
SHARECON 
IDRATIO 
CEODUAL 
 
(Management ownership)/(Total ownership) 
(Ownership of the largest shareholder)/(Total ownership) 
(Num. of independent directors)/(Num. of all directors) 
Dummy Variable, 1: CEO and Chairman are the same 
person; 0: CEO and Chairman are two persons 
Industry Attributes 
Industry Dummy 
 
DUMIND* 
 
Refer to below note  
This table presents dependent and independent variables for the regression to 
predicate executive compensation of Chinese listed companies. The model contains 
independent variables from four categories: firm operating characteristics, firm 
financial performance, firm corporate governance attributes and industry attributes.  
 
Below letters present the different industry for industry dummy variables.  
A: Agriculture; B: Oil and Gas; C: Manufacturing; D: Power and Utilities; E: 
Construction; F: Wholesale and Retail; G: Transportation and Logistics; H: Lodging; 
I: Information Technology; K: Real Estate; L: Commercial Services; M: R&D and 
Technical Services; N: Water and Environment; O: Residential Services; P: 
Education; Q: Health; R: Culture, Sports, Entertainment; S: Conglomerate. 
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Table 2.2 SOE attribute variables 
Variable Name Definition 
State-Owned Enterprise Attribute 1 SOETAG 1: the actual controller of the firm is state-owned 
0: the actual controller of the firm is NOT state-owned 
 
State-Owned Enterprise Attribute 2 CENTRALSOE 1: the actual controller belongs to the central government 
0: the actual controller does NOT belong to the central 
government 
 
State-Owned Enterprise Attribute 3 LOCALTAG 1: the actual controller belongs to the local government 
or anther SOE 
0: the actual controller does NOT belong to the local 
government or another SOE 
This table presents SOE attribute variables.  SOETAG refers to the firms whose 
actual controlling shareholder is state-owned. CENTRALSOE refers to the firms 
whose controlling shareholder is the central government or its affiliates such as CSRC. 
LOCALTAG refers to firms whose controlling shareholder is local government or 
another SOE.  
 
Firm’s actual controller information can be found in segment “S0702b” of the 
CSMAR database. A detailed description can be obtained from the “User’s manual of 
the Shareholder Research Database of Chinese Listed Companies—2013 Edition” 
(GTA, 2013). 
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Table 2.3 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Year No. of Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
execom All 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
12260 
1177 
1221 
1298 
1343 
1419 
1691 
1891 
2220 
2908000 
1510597 
1753130 
2273927 
2543462 
2802408 
3267095 
3765240 
3941417              
3281000 
1526498 
1817661 
2580127 
2723487 
2811675 
3309997 
4482367 
3696007 
14800 
28800 
31200 
14800 
48500 
105000 
51600 
103990 
132000 
120000000 
17500000 
19600000 
29500000 
28100000 
30300000 
37000000 
120000000 
52200000 
size 
 
All 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
12263 
1178 
1221 
1300 
1343 
1419 
1691 
1891 
2220 
7550000000 
3700000000 
4360000000 
6340000000 
7270000000 
8300000000 
8640000000 
9310000000 
9420000000 
46500000000 
17100000000 
19600000000 
36600000000 
42400000000 
49300000000 
51600000000 
56400000000 
58400000000 
51134 
39200000 
20400000 
1408532 
51133.68 
4963990 
949127.5 
6683503 
6779589 
2170000000000 
521000000000 
595000000000 
994000000000 
1190000000000 
1450000000000 
1660000000000 
1920000000000 
2170000000000 
grossm All 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
12263 
1178 
1221 
1300 
1343 
1419 
1691 
1891 
2220 
0.249 
0.2222631 
0.2285505 
0.2388038 
0.2314923 
0.2446605 
0.2651312 
0.264432 
0.2674378 
0.178 
0.1781754 
0.1658172 
0.1628257 
0.1795595 
0.1879121 
0.1744162 
0.1793176 
0.1825219 
-1.812 
-1.812309 
-0.551485 
-.42353 
-0.634729 
-1.505507 
-0.398079 
-0.515049 
-0.64943 
1 
0.999417 
0.949938 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0.963101 
ROA All 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
12263 
1178 
1221 
1300 
1343 
1419 
1691 
1891 
2220 
0.0412 
0.0061667 
0.0258768 
0.0591652 
0.0295586 
0.0345127 
0.0525797 
0.0602963 
0.0441936 
0.250 
0.1176603 
0.1035496 
0.3164631 
0.2149565 
0.1433929 
0.1812606 
0.4862971 
0.0765308 
-6.000 
-1.68061 
-1.122114 
-0.796958 
-3.774665 
-3.001192 
-5.999601 
-0.86044 
-0.857696 
20.79 
0.262006 
0.888748 
10.53025 
5.074266 
1.997056 
2.933009 
20.78764 
1.089521 
peratio All 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
12263 
1178 
1221 
1300 
1343 
1419 
104.7 
71.98406 
96.56025 
132.6126 
105.8072 
157.2704 
254.2 
128.9251 
194.8234 
278.2189 
312.5286 
345.0002 
0.722 
2.086207 
1.23115 
1.23115 
1.711297 
1.711297 
9044 
1820 
2554.545 
5903.226 
9044.118 
5721.429 
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2010 
2011 
2012 
1691 
1891 
2220 
123.1802 
82.05116 
81.39105 
297.8479 
185.4531 
214.4184 
2.656489 
0.721905 
0.721905 
5721.429 
2760.606 
3740 
mbratio All 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
12255 
1178 
1220 
1299 
1340 
1416 
1691 
1891 
2220 
3.032 
1.082188 
1.284206 
2.742254 
10.11392 
2.738943 
3.570322 
1.919788 
1.648722 
106.4 
0.5463417 
0.4966365 
13.48142 
317.6186 
10.48783 
42.21885 
4.671133 
3.989761 
0.283 
0.4012877 
0.5860191 
0.8495354 
0.5396369 
0.8404138 
0.7569003 
0.7002085 
0.2832386 
11628 
13.72947 
7.458735 
481.0005 
11627.91 
389.2565 
1736.111 
174.9169 
172.503 
lever All 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
12262 
1178 
1221 
1300 
1343 
1418 
1691 
1891 
2220 
0.551 
0.6064219 
0.5750368 
0.6872873 
0.7334589 
0.6026907 
0.4745695 
0.4447304 
0.4313642 
2.207 
1.392251 
0.5338036 
3.855987 
4.759018 
2.005252 
0.674568 
0.373839 
0.4752324 
0.00708 
0.034754 
0.020667 
0.009122 
0.018299 
0.017795 
0.010827 
0.00708 
0.011034 
142.7 
43.07538 
7.978952 
124.0223 
142.7178 
55.40864 
18.93984 
6.68446 
12.12736 
exeshare All 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
12263 
1178 
1221 
1300 
1343 
1419 
1691 
1891 
2220 
0.0529 
0.000289 
0.001982 
0.0038214 
0.0108567 
0.0297475 
0.0756116 
0.1001869 
0.1200612 
0.148 
0.0078955 
0.0216304 
0.0339075 
0.0653911 
0.110462 
0.1731342 
0.1942533 
0.2058777 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.891 
0.2708941 
0.5019231 
0.54405 
0.7476636 
0.7476636 
0.0891 
0.82125 
0.8191875 
sharecon All 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
12263 
1178 
1221 
1300 
1343 
1419 
1691 
1891 
2220 
36.46 
40.89772 
36.22892 
35.89302 
36.24719 
35.76044 
35.86677 
35.7264 
36.19621 
15.23 
16.18421 
14.72939 
14.84613 
14.94184 
15.05934 
15.15193 
15.05613 
15.33668 
0.820 
4.24 
4.54 
0.82 
3.74 
3.64 
3.5 
2.197 
2.197 
88.55 
84.98 
83.75 
86.29 
86.42 
86.2 
86.49 
86.49 
88.55 
companyage All 12257 1.76 1.147 -5.900 3.093 
idratio All 
2005 
2006 
2007 
12263 
1178 
1221 
1300 
0.362 
0.3475867 
0.3516982 
0.3579756 
0.0507 
0.0459189 
0.0447563 
0.0461477 
0.0833 
0.0833333 
0.1111111 
0.1428571 
0.714 
0.6 
0.5714286 
0.6666667 
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2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
1343 
1419 
1691 
1891 
2220 
0.3602698 
0.3627517 
0.3650047 
0.3678732 
0.3691721 
0.050318 
0.0504298 
0.0513325 
0.0534499 
0.053598 
0.1428571 
0.0909091 
0.125 
0.2 
0.2222222 
0.6 
0.5714286 
0.625 
0.7142857 
0.7142857 
CEODUAL All 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
12263 
1178 
1221 
1300 
1343 
1419 
1691 
1891 
2220 
0.192 
0.1154499 
0.1269451 
0.1546154 
0.1563663 
0.1775899 
0.211709 
0.2443152 
0.2594595 
0.394 
0.3196999 
0.3330479 
0.3616768 
0.3633376 
0.3823018 
0.4086405 
0.4297941 
0.4384368 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Note: 
a) Execom is total cash compensation of all top executives in the form. Unit is CNY.  
b) Size denotes firm size which is firm’s total assets. Unit is CNY. 
c) PERATIO is ratio of stock price and earning per share, defines as: (Stock price)/(Earnings per 
share) 
d) MBRATIO is ratio of firm’s market value and book value, defined as: (Market value)/(Total 
assets) 
e) LEVER denotes the debt ratio, namely, debt is divided by firm’s total assets  
f) Companyage is Natural log of total years since firm IPO 
g) GROSSM denotes firm’s operating margin, defined as: (Gross profit)/(Operating revenue) 
h) EXESHARE denotes executives’ ownership, calculated as: (Management ownership)/(Total 
ownership) 
i) SHARECON denotes firm’s ownership concentration percentage, defined as: (Ownership of 
the largest shareholder)/(Total ownership) *100% 
j) IDRATIO is ratio of firm’s independent directors, defined as: (Num. of independent 
directors)/(Num. of all directors) 
k) CEODUAL is dummy variable of whether CEO and Chairman is the same person in a firm 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the variables in the regression. To promote 
better understanding, the thesis presents the original data for executive compensation, 
company size (value of total assets), and revenue per share instead of their natural 
logarithm types. 
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Table 2.4 Variance Inflation Factor 
Variable      VIF 1/VIF 
lnsize 1.21 0.828075 
grossm 1.10 0.911408 
ROA 1.08 0.909236 
peratio 1.06 0.942222 
mbratio 1.62 0.616528 
lever 1.67 0.597937 
exeshare 1.44 0.695941 
sharecon 1.12 0.889075 
idratio 1.02 0.985221 
CEODUAL 1.10 0.911519 
companyage 1.48 0.675771 
Mean VIF                1.26 
Note: 
a) Execom is total cash compensation of all top executives in the form. 
b) Lnsize denotes firm size which is natural log of firm’s total assets. 
c) PERATIO is ratio of stock price and earning per share, defines as: (Stock price)/(Earnings 
per share) 
d) MBRATIO is ratio of firm’s market value and book value, defined as: (Market value)/(Total 
assets) 
e) LEVER denotes the debt ratio, namely, debt is divided by firm’s total assets  
f) Companyage is Natural log of total years since firm IPO 
g) GROSSM denotes firm’s operating margin, defined as: (Gross profit)/(Operating revenue) 
h) EXESHARE denotes executives’ ownership, calculated as: (Management ownership)/(Total 
ownership) 
i) SHARECON denotes firm’s ownership concentration, defined as: (Ownership of the largest 
shareholder)/(Total ownership) 
j) IDRATIO is ratio of firm’s independent directors, defined as: (Num. of independent 
directors)/(Num. of all directors) 
k) CEODUAL is dummy variable of whether CEO and Chairman is the same person in a firm 
 
This table presents the variance inflation factors of independent variables of regression to measure 
executive compensation. None of these VIF is bigger than 2. So this indicates that 
multicollinearity is not significant and that it is unnecessary to provide special treatment.  
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Table 2.5 Results of Fixed effects panel data regression to measure executive 
compensation 
  (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) 
 Predicated Sign Fixed effects 
Panel_1 
Fixed effects 
Panel_2 
Fixed effects 
Panel_3 
Fixed effects 
Panel_4_NON SOE 
VARIABLES  lnexecom lnexecom lnexecom lnexecom 
      
lnsize + 0.571*** 0.511*** 0.511*** 0.471*** 
  (64.87) (55.09) (55.18) (34.25) 
ROA + 0.0991*** 0.0641*** 0.0640*** 0.0346** 
  (5.930) (3.865) (3.860) (2.207) 
grossm +  0.658*** 0.657*** 0.521*** 
   (13.24) (13.25) (8.297) 
peratio - 0.0000230 0.00000413  0.0000323 
  (1.251) (0.235)  (1.370) 
mbratio +  -0.000176*** -0.000176*** -0.000166*** 
   (-3.025) (-3.029) (-3.100) 
lever +  0.0212*** 0.0212*** 0.0201*** 
   (6.561) (6.556) (6.634) 
exeshare + 0.0354 -0.0693  -0.00756 
  (0.349) (-0.718)  (-0.0847) 
sharecon -  -0.0107*** -0.0107*** -0.0105*** 
   (-15.31) (-15.35) (-9.067) 
idratio + 0.803*** 0.537*** 0.537*** 0.430** 
  (6.528) (4.575) (4.579) (2.506) 
CEODUAL + 0.0152 0.00968 0.00951 0.0549*** 
  (0.840) (0.560) (0.550) (2.595) 
companyage   0.154*** 0.154*** 0.125*** 
   (21.67) (21.69) (16.15) 
Industry effect  No Yes Yes Yes 
      
Constant  1.899*** 3.242*** 3.248*** 4.345*** 
  (9.981) (16.48) (16.55) (14.91) 
F Value  763.6 537.82 657.37 221.18 
Observations  12,260 12,246 12,246 5,945 
R-squared  0.3069 0.3725 0.3725 0.3585 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: 
a) Execom is total cash compensation of all top executives in the form. 
b) Lnsize denotes firm size which is natural log of firm’s total assets. 
c) PERATIO is ratio of stock price and earning per share, defines as: (Stock price)/(Earnings 
per share) 
d) MBRATIO is ratio of firm’s market value and book value, defined as: (Market value)/(Total 
assets) 
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e) LEVER denotes the debt ratio, namely, debt is divided by firm’s total assets  
f) Companyage is Natural log of total years since firm IPO 
g) GROSSM denotes firm’s operating margin, defined as: (Gross profit)/(Operating revenue) 
h) EXESHARE denotes executives’ ownership, calculated as: (Management ownership)/(Total 
ownership) 
i) SHARECON denotes firm’s ownership concentration, defined as: (Ownership of the largest 
shareholder)/(Total ownership) 
j) IDRATIO is ratio of firm’s independent directors, defined as: (Num. of independent 
directors)/(Num. of all directors) 
k) CEODUAL is dummy variable of whether CEO and Chairman is the same person in a firm 
l) dumind* are dummy variables of different industries 
m)  Since the regression is based on fixed-effects data panel, R-squared value reported in the 
table is within R
2
.  
 
This table presents the results of four regressions based on fixed-effects panel data 
models to measure executive compensation. The independent variables in the first 
regression are LNSIZE, ROA, PERATIO, EXESHARE, IDRATIO, and CEODUAL 
as proxies to reflect the characteristics of firm size, accounting firm performance, and 
corporate governance. In the second regression, added GROSSM, MBRATIO, 
LEVER, SHARECON, COMPANYAGE (substitution of executive tenure), and 
industry dummy variables (DUMIND*) are added to the model. The variable 
PERATIO and EXESHARE are removed from model 3, which are not significant in 
model 2. The fourth model is conducted among observations only if SOETAG does 
not equal 1, namely, observations from non-SOE solely. 
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Table 2.6 Compensation Gap Results 
Model 3 (Based on Full Obs.) Value 
Total number of obs. 12253 
Number of non-SOE obs. 5946 
Number of non-SOE obs. (COMPENgap >0) 2786 
Underpayment ratio among non-state obs. 46.85% 
Number of SOE obs. 6307 
Number of SOE obs. (COMPENgap >0) 3051 
Underpayment ratio among SOE obs. 48.37% 
  
Model 4 (Based on Obs.∈{SOETAG≠1}) 
use private firms as executive compensation  ) 
 
Total number of obs. 12253 
Number of non-SOE obs. 5946 
Number of non-SOE obs. (COMPENgap >0) 2859 
Underpayment ratio among non-state obs. 48.08% 
Number of SOE obs. 6307 
Number of SOE obs. (COMPENgap >0) 3269 
Underpayment ratio among SOE obs. 51.83% 
 
This table presents executive underpayment rate in Chinese listed companies. Model 3 
uses all data from listed companies as executive compensation market level 
benchmark while model 4 uses data from non-SOEs as executive compensation 
market level benchmark.  
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Table 2.7 Verification between executive compensation Gap (EXECOMGAP) 
and SOE attribute – Model 3 (Market-determined level based on full samples) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 GAPSOE_1 GAPSOE_2 GAPSOE_3 GAPSOE_4 GAPSOE_5 GAPSOE_6 
VARIABLES Execomgap-all Execomgap-all Execomgap>=0 Execomgap>=0 Execomgap<=0 Execomgap<=0 
       
centralsoe  979,962***  0.000001725***  -300,543 
  (5.046)  (8.436)  (-1.081) 
localtag  303,106***  133,926***  -22,347 
  (5.318)  (3.429)  (-0.253) 
companyage 424,970*** 425,523*** 245,529*** 257,168*** -15,673 -15,262 
 (16.62) (16.64) (8.253) (8.900) (-0.478) (-0.466) 
sharecon 5,490** 5,145** 20,442*** 19,518*** -4,404 -4,290 
 (2.199) (2.106) (8.358) (8.380) (-1.186) (-1.182) 
idratio 650,554 499,470 0.000002711*** 0.000002393*** -0.000001927** -0.000001858** 
 (1.004) (0.785) (3.866) (3.673) (-2.250) (-2.176) 
CEODUAL -344,122*** -334,240*** -250,326*** -213,906*** -11,112 -13,574 
 (-5.358) (-5.233) (-5.852) (-4.941) (-0.131) (-0.161) 
soetag 382,783***  313,027***  -56,667  
 (6.823)  (7.606)  (-0.667)  
Constant -0.00000167*** -0.00000161*** -0.000001043*** -929,301*** -0.000001045*** -0.000001074*** 
 (-6.271) (-6.202) (-3.690) (-3.545) (-2.908) (-3.058) 
F Value 134.96 112.42 65.85 57.16 1.47 1.25 
Observations 12,253 12,253 5,923 5,923 6,330 6,330 
R-squared 0.046 0.048 0.060 0.105 0.002 0.002 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
This table presents regression results between executive compensation gap and firm 
ownership attributes. The executive compensation market level is based on all 
Chinese listed companies as the benchmark. The table reports six regressions. 
Regression 1 (GAPSOE_1) is an OLS regression between EXECOMgap and 
SOETAG that intends to check whether SOE attribute will increase the executive 
compensation gap. Regression 2 (GAPSOE_2) further investigates the relation 
between the compensation gap and SOE attributes, including central SOEs 
(CENTRALSOE) and local SOEs (LOCALTAG). Regression 3 and 4 (GAPSOE_3 
and GAPSOE_4) are conducted among observations in which EXECOMgap>=0. The 
purpose of these two regressions is to verify SOE attribute and the 
executive-compensation gap in companies that executives are underpaid. Regression 5 
and 6 (GAPSOE_5 and GAPSOE_6) are conducted among observations in which 
115 
 
EXECOMgap<=0. The purpose of these two regressions is to verify SOE attribute 
and the executive-compensation gap in companies that executives are overpaid. 
 
Note: 
a) Companyage is Natural log of total years since firm IPO 
b) SHARECON denotes firm’s ownership concentration, defined as: (Ownership of 
the largest shareholder)/(Total ownership) 
c) IDRATIO is ratio of firm’s independent directors, defined as: (Num. of 
independent directors)/(Num. of all directors) 
d) CEODUAL is dummy variable of whether CEO and Chairman is the same person 
in a firm 
e) R-squared value reported in the table is adjusted R2.  
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Table 2.8 Verification between executive compensation Gap (EXECOMGAP) 
and SOE attribute – Model 4 (Market-determined level based on non-SOE 
samples) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 GAPSOE_1 GAPSOE_2 GAPSOE_3 GAPSOE_4 GAPSOE_5 GAPSOE_6 
VARIABLES Execomgap-all Execomgap-all Execomgap>=0 Execomgap>=0 Execomgap<=0 Execomgap<=0 
       
centralsoe  827,961***  1,363,000***  -412,557 
  (4.452)  (8.472)  (-1.262) 
localtag  308,957***  135,596***  -108,372 
  (5.445)  (3.953)  (-1.091) 
companyage 405,747*** 406,157*** 257,765*** 263,937*** -53,735 -53,204 
 (16.03) (16.05) (12.71) (13.30) (-1.481) (-1.467) 
sharecon 1,295 1,034 14,470*** 13,900*** -2,733 -2,574 
 (0.530) (0.432) (7.600) (7.591) (-0.637) (-0.619) 
idratio 205,784 90,566 1,932,000*** 1,667,000*** -2,432,000** -2,361,000** 
 (0.330) (0.147) (3.521) (3.219) (-2.515) (-2.453) 
CEODUAL -227,595*** -220,126*** -162,790*** -141,600*** 36,431 32,942 
 (-3.549) (-3.451) (-4.356) (-3.748) (0.385) (0.350) 
soetag 370,060***  274,794***  -146,288  
 (6.657)  (7.688)  (-1.533)  
Constant -1,129,000*** -1,081,000*** -522,514** -424,510** -882,527** -913,475** 
 (-4.393) (-4.307) (-2.358) (-2.038) (-2.169) (-2.305) 
F Value 125.73 104.86 92.71 79.55 3.50 2.92 
Observations 12,253 12,253 5,923 5,923 6,330 6,330 
R-squared 0.040 0.042 0.057 0.092 0.003 0.004 
 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
This table presents regression results between executive compensation gap and firm 
ownership attributes. The executive compensation market level is based on all 
non-SOEs as the benchmark. The table reports six regressions. Regression 1 
(GAPSOEM4_1) is an OLS regression between EXECOMgap and SOETAG that 
intends to check whether SOE attribute will increase the executive compensation gap. 
Regression 2 (GAPSOEM4_2) further investigates the relation between the 
compensation gap and SOE attributes, including central SOEs (CENTRALSOE) and 
local SOEs (LOCALTAG). Regression 3 and 4 (GAPSOEM4_3 and GAPSOEM4_4) 
are conducted among observations in which EXECOMgap>=0. The purpose of these 
two regressions is to verify SOE attribute and the executive-compensation gap in 
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companies that executives are underpaid. Regression 5 and 6 (GAPSOEM4_5 and 
GAPSOEM4_6) are conducted among observations in which EXECOMgap<=0. The 
purpose of these two regressions is to verify SOE attribute and the 
executive-compensation gap in companies that executives are overpaid. 
 
Note: 
a) Companyage is Natural log of total years since firm IPO 
b) SHARECON denotes firm’s ownership concentration, defined as: (Ownership of 
the largest shareholder)/(Total ownership) 
c) IDRATIO is ratio of firm’s independent directors, defined as: (Num. of 
independent directors)/(Num. of all directors) 
d) CEODUAL is dummy variable of whether CEO and Chairman is the same person 
in a firm 
e) R-squared value reported in the table is adjusted R2. 
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Table 2.9 Sales revenue as measurement of company size to measure executive 
compensation-Robustness test 
 Model 1: MBR & ROA Model 2:TobinQ & OPR 
VARIABLES lnexecom lnexecom 
lnsize 0.511*** 0.545*** 
 (55.18) (58.31) 
ROA 0.0640***  
 (3.860)  
grossm 0.657*** 0.545*** 
 (13.25) (11.08) 
mbratio -0.000176***  
 (-3.029)  
lever 0.0212*** 0.0139*** 
 (6.556) (6.229) 
sharecon -0.0107*** -0.00936*** 
 (-15.35) (-13.55) 
idratio 0.537*** 0.432*** 
 (4.579) (3.730) 
CEODUAL 0.00951 0.00406 
 (0.550) (0.238) 
companyage 0.154*** 0.159*** 
 (21.69) (22.76) 
OPR  0.0000026*** 
  (3.307) 
TobinQ  0.0557*** 
  (17.16) 
Constant 3.248*** 2.384*** 
 (16.55) (11.90) 
   
F value 657.37 706.07 
Observations 12,253 12,253 
R-squared 0.373 0.389 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: 
a) Lnrev is natural log of firm’s sales revenue 
b) Lnsize denotes firm size which is natural log of firm’s total assets. 
c) PERATIO is ratio of stock price and earning per share, defines as: (Stock price)/(Earnings 
per share) 
d) MBRATIO is ratio of firm’s market value and book value, defined as: (Market value)/(Total 
assets) 
e) LEVER denotes the debt ratio, namely, debt is divided by firm’s total assets  
f) Companyage is Natural log of total years since firm IPO 
g) GROSSM denotes firm’s operating margin, defined as: (Gross profit)/(Operating revenue) 
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h) EXESHARE denotes executives’ ownership, calculated as: (Management ownership)/(Total 
ownership) 
i) SHARECON denotes firm’s ownership concentration, defined as: (Ownership of the largest 
shareholder)/(Total ownership) 
j) IDRATIO is ratio of firm’s independent directors, defined as: (Num. of independent 
directors)/(Num. of all directors) 
k) CEODUAL is dummy variable of whether CEO and Chairman is the same person in a firm 
l) dumind* are dummy variables of different industrieS 
m)  TobinQ is Market Valus/Total assets 
n)  OPR is operating profit ratio, namely, operating profit/operating revenue 
 
This table presents comparison between regressions based on different measures to 
firm operating profit performance and firm investment opportunity. Panel 1 presents 
the results of Market-to-book ratio as a proxy for firm investment opportunity and 
ROA as a proxy for firm operating performance. Panel 2 reports the results of 
Tobin’Q as a proxy for firm investment opportunity and OPR as a proxy for firm’s 
operating performance. 
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Table 2.10 Verification between executive compensation Gap (EXECOMGAP) 
and SOE attribute – Robustness test (market-determined level based on full 
samples and Tobin’Q as firm investment opportunity and OPR for operating 
performance) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 GAPSOE_1 GAPSOE_2 GAPSOE_3 GAPSOE_4 GAPSOE_5 GAPSOE_6 
VARIABLES Execomgap-all Execomgap-all Execomgap>=0 Execomgap>=0 Execomgap<=0 Execomgap<=0 
       
centralsoe  1,170,000***  1,946,000***  -238,428 
  (5.813)  (8.431)  (-0.905) 
localtag  279,928***  116,353***  -61.12 
  (4.860)  (2.658)  (-0.000707) 
companyage 432,240*** 432,943*** 219,473*** 234,163*** -22,899 -22,522 
 (16.78) (16.80) (5.816) (6.332) (-0.707) (-0.695) 
sharecon 12,375*** 11,927*** 28,670*** 27,497*** -2,917 -2,837 
 (4.721) (4.646) (9.363) (9.381) (-0.835) (-0.827) 
idratio 516,514 318,921 2,713,000*** 2,389,000*** -1,746,000** -1,683,000** 
 (0.772) (0.487) (3.497) (3.310) (-2.065) (-1.992) 
CEODUAL -363,828*** -351,021*** -264,277*** -220,315*** -13,720 -15,564 
 (-5.635) (-5.467) (-5.398) (-4.439) (-0.165) (-0.187) 
soetag 384,714***  325,097***  -28,915  
 (6.779)  (7.156)  (-0.348)  
Constant -1,847,000*** -1,765,000*** -1,237,000*** -1,121,000*** -1,144,000*** -1,169,000*** 
 (-6.771) (-6.661) (-3.947) (-3.854) (-3.271) (-3.412) 
F Value 138.66 115.87 54.9 48.11 1.12 0.94 
Observations 12,253 12,253 5,923 5,923 6,330 6,330 
R-squared 0.048 0.053 0.068 0.113 0.001 0.002 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
This table presents regression results between executive compensation gap and firm 
ownership attributes. The executive compensation market level is based on all 
samples as the benchmark; Tobin’s Q as the proxy for investment opportunity and 
OPR as the proxy for firm’s operating profit performance. The table reports six 
pooled regressions. Regression 1 (GAPSOER_1) is an OLS regression between 
EXECOMgap and SOETAG that intends to check whether SOE attribute will increase 
the executive compensation gap. Regression 2 (GAPSOER_2) further investigates the 
relation between the compensation gap and SOE attributes, including central SOEs 
(CENTRALSOE) and local SOEs (LOCALTAG). Regression 3 and 4 (GAPSOER_3 
and GAPSOER_4) are conducted among observations in which EXECOMgap>=0. The 
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purpose of these two regressions is to verify SOE attribute and the 
executive-compensation gap in companies that executives are underpaid. Regression 5 
and 6 (GAPSOER_5 and GAPSOER_6) are conducted among observations in which 
EXECOMgap<=0. The purpose of these two regressions is to verify SOE attribute 
and the executive-compensation gap in companies that executives are overpaid. 
 
Note: 
a) Companyage is Natural log of total years since firm IPO 
b) SHARECON denotes firm’s ownership concentration, defined as: (Ownership of 
the largest shareholder)/(Total ownership) 
c) IDRATIO is ratio of firm’s independent directors, defined as: (Num. of 
independent directors)/(Num. of all directors) 
d) CEODUAL is dummy variable of whether CEO and Chairman is the same person 
in a firm 
e) R-squared value reported in the table is adjusted R2. 
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Table 2.11 Fixed-effects Panel Data Model versus the Dynamic Panel Data Model 
 Fixed effects Panel Data DPD-System GMM 
VARIABLES lnexecom lnexecom 
   
L.lnexecom  0.548*** 
  (15.06) 
exeshare -0.0693 -0.723** 
 (-0.718) (-2.103) 
grossm 0.658*** 1.847*** 
 (13.24) (6.057) 
lnsize 0.511*** 0.535*** 
 (55.09) (13.05) 
lever 0.0212*** -0.00620 
 (6.561) (-0.312) 
ROA 0.0641*** -0.142 
 (3.865) (-0.838) 
sharecon -0.0107*** -0.0133*** 
 (-15.31) (-9.368) 
peratio 0.00000413 -0.0000434* 
 (0.235) (-1.647) 
mbratio -0.000176*** 0.0107 
 (-3.025) (1.162) 
companyage 0.154*** -0.0758*** 
 (21.67) (-2.715) 
idratio 0.537*** -0.0174 
 (4.575) (-0.0878) 
CEODUAL 0.00968 0.0123 
 (0.560) (0.433) 
Constant 3.242*** -4.713*** 
 (16.48) (-7.006) 
Arellano-Bond Test  
(3 order autocorrelation. p-value ) 
Sargan Test (p-value ) 
 
 
 
0.6202 
0.105 
Observations 12,246 11,087 
R-squared 0.373  
Number of Companies 2,271 1,947 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: 
a) Lnsize denotes firm size which is natural log of firm’s total assets. 
b) PERATIO is ratio of stock price and earning per share, defines as: (Stock price)/(Earnings 
per share) 
c) MBRATIO is ratio of firm’s market value and book value, defined as: (Market value)/(Total 
assets) 
d) LEVER denotes the debt ratio, namely, debt is divided by firm’s total assets  
123 
 
e) Companyage is Natural log of total years since firm IPO 
f) GROSSM denotes firm’s operating margin, defined as: (Gross profit)/(Operating revenue) 
g) EXESHARE denotes executives’ ownership, calculated as: (Management ownership)/(Total 
ownership) 
h) SHARECON denotes firm’s ownership concentration, defined as: (Ownership of the largest 
shareholder)/(Total ownership) 
i) IDRATIO is ratio of firm’s independent directors, defined as: (Num. of independent 
directors)/(Num. of all directors) 
j) CEODUAL is dummy variable of whether CEO and Chairman is the same person in a firm 
k)  L.lnexecom is one year lagged value of dependant variable, lnexecom 
 
This table presents the comparison between fixed-effects panel data model and the 
dynamic panel data model in determining executive compensation. Estimates in 
column 1 were obtained using the fixed effects estimator. Estimates in column 2 were 
obtained using the system GMM estimator. Test statistics and standard errors (in 
parentheses) of all variables in the regressions are asymptotically robust to 
heteroscedasticity. The dependent variable is lnexecom, the difference between actual 
executive compensation level and market determined level. For the system GMM 
regression, m3 is a test for third-order serial correlation of the differenced residuals, 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan 
test of over-identifying restrictions is distributed as Chi-square under the null of 
instrument validity. We treat lever, lnsize, mbratio, ROA, exeshare and grossm as 
potentially endogenous variables. Levels of these variables dated t − 1 and further 
are used as instruments in the first-differenced equations and first-differences of these 
same variables lagged twice are used as additional instruments in the level equations.  
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Table 2.12 Verification between executive compensation Gap (EXECOMGAP) 
and SOE attribute – Robustness Test (Market-determined level based on full 
samples, dynamic panel data system GMM model) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 GAPSOE_1 GAPSOE_2 GAPSOE_3 GAPSOE_4 GAPSOE_5 GAPSOE_6 
VARIABLES Execomgap-all Execomgap-all Execomgap>=0 Execomgap>=0 Execomgap<=0 Execomgap<=0 
       
centralsoe  1,334,000***  1,998,000***  -178,329 
  (4.682)  (4.687)  (-0.796) 
localtag  397,606***  306,377***  -24,913 
  (5.443)  (2.789)  (-0.385) 
companyage 299,777*** 299,935*** 188,986** 179,343** 446.6 -157.1 
 (6.461) (6.483) (2.549) (2.417) (0.0125) (-0.00444) 
sharecon -20,117*** -20,516*** 443.9 -1,496 -11,571*** -11,641*** 
 (-4.596) (-4.808) (0.0595) (-0.214) (-3.567) (-3.500) 
idratio 2,052,000*** 1,849,000** 5,061,000*** 4,541,000*** -580,449 -561,174 
 (2.765) (2.528) (4.367) (4.001) (-1.099) (-1.072) 
CEODUAL -105,546 -92,189 34,128 52,760 29,802 27,402 
 (-1.258) (-1.103) (0.258) (0.397) (0.496) (0.462) 
soetag 502,118***  481,495***  -43,464  
 (7.344)  (4.990)  (-0.679)  
Constant 488,136 562,676* -4,456 237,441 -409,341** -411,420** 
 (1.626) (1.910) (-0.00941) (0.520) (-2.032) (-2.048) 
F Value 326.41 288.72 42.74 51.65 52.33 46.46 
Observations 12,253 12,253 5,923 5,923 6,330 6,330 
R-squared 0.101 0.105 0.018 0.028 0.086 0.086 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
This table presents regression results between executive compensation gap and firm 
ownership attributes as a Robustness Test. The executive compensation market level 
is based on all Chinese listed companies and dynamic panel data system GMM model. 
The table reports six regressions. Regression 1 (GAPSOED_1) is the regression 
between EXECOMgap and SOETAG that intends to check whether SOE attribute 
will increase the executive compensation gap. Regression 2 (GAPSOED_2) further 
investigates the relation between the compensation gap and SOE attributes, including 
central SOEs (CENTRALSOE) and local SOEs (LOCALTAG). Regression 3 and 4 
(GAPSOED_3 and GAPSOED_4) are conducted among observations in which 
EXECOMgap>=0. The purpose of these two regressions is to verify SOE attribute and 
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the executive-compensation gap in companies that executives are underpaid. 
Regression 5 and 6 (GAPSOED_5 and GAPSOED_6) are conducted among 
observations in which EXECOMgap<=0. The purpose of these two regressions is to 
verify SOE attribute and the executive-compensation gap in companies that 
executives are overpaid. 
 
Note: 
a) Companyage is Natural log of total years since firm IPO 
b) SHARECON denotes firm’s ownership concentration, defined as: (Ownership of 
the largest shareholder)/(Total ownership) 
c) IDRATIO is ratio of firm’s independent directors, defined as: (Num. of 
independent directors)/(Num. of all directors) 
d) CEODUAL is dummy variable of whether CEO and Chairman is the same person 
in a firm 
e) R-squared value reported in the table is adjusted R2. 
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Chapter 3: Overinvestment Behavior in Chinese Listed Firms 
3.1 Abstract 
This chapter studies inefficient investment by Chinese listed firms. The thesis finds 
that SOE attribute has a significantly positive influence on a firm’s unexpected 
investment. With other conditions controlled, SOEs invest more than non-SOEs; 
furthermore, SOE attribute is associated with firm’s more investments. This study 
also shows that although local SOEs invest more than other firms, central SOE 
attribute does not have a significant relationship to a firm’s level of unexpected 
investment.             
3.2 Introduction   
3.2.1 Background and rationale    
The last decade has witnessed a steady, remarkable increase in China’s investment 
rate, from 37.27% in 2001 to 49.93% in 2010
5
. During the same period, the marginal 
product of capital has undergone a dramatic decrease both relative to previous 
decades and relative to other countries at similar stages of development (such as 
Brazil, India, Malaysia, and Thailand). This macroeconomic phenomenon reveals the 
existence of severe inefficiency associated with firm investment behaviors in China’s 
micro economy. 
 
In theory, investment behaviors are closely connected to corporate governance, which 
contributes to value creation by using both managerial mechanisms (which influence 
firm management from the inside) and institutional mechanisms found in the 
competitive and transactional context (which influence how efficiently firm resources 
are allocated from the outside) (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Since the establishment 
of the M-M proposition (Modigliani and Miller, 1958), many studies have managed to 
                                                             
5 GDP data source: http://data.eastmoney.com/cjsj/gdp.html 
Investment data source: http://data.eastmoney.com/cjsj/gdzctz.html 
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incorporate investment behaviors with corporate governance into an integrated 
framework by relaxing the neo-classical assumptions of the M-M theorem to adapt to 
realistic conditions. The main findings on the causes of investment inefficiencies 
include agency conflicts, asymmetric information, and psychological bias. 
Mechanisms for mitigating various investment inefficiencies are also suggested. 
 
That said, the abovementioned findings and suggestions are primarily derived from 
and consistent with the context of the modern, mature market economy, which 
features clear property rights, a very free market, abundant information circulation, 
and efficient rules and regulations. Whereas the case of China’s transitional economy 
features a strong public sector and an imperfect market system, firms’ investment 
behaviors vary widely in many aspects, especially for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
The investment behaviors of Chinese listed companies, which are dominated by SOEs, 
can be seen as the epitome of China’s resource allocation system.  
 
From the perspective of corporate governance, Chinese SOEs are different from the 
modern corporation both in their internal managerial mechanisms and in their external 
financing and investment conditions. With respect to SOEs’ internal managerial 
mechanisms, because of the absence of the state owner and the implementation of the 
compensation regulations discussed in Chapter 2, agency problems and conflicts of 
interest in Chinese SOEs have become more serious. Thus, SOE managers have an 
incentive to balance their compensation loss through overinvestment whenever there 
is enough internal cash flow. Worse yet, the controlling shareholders—from the 
central government to local governments—have rarely claimed dividends from SOEs, 
thus increasing the agency problems associated with free cash flow.  
 
With respect to external financing and investment conditions, Chinese SOEs typically 
enjoy many advantages. First, the government may offer large tax reductions or 
subsidies to SOEs to reward those firms’ investments in national strategic sectors, 
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which can increase GDP growth or reduce unemployment. Second, Chinese SOEs can 
obtain favorable bank loans because of financial repression (Shaw，1973；McKinnon, 
1973) and ownership discrimination in credit rationing; this is especially true with 
respect to loans from the state-owned banks (Allen et al.,2005; Ge and Qiu, 2007; Lu 
et al., 2009; Brandt and Li, 2010). Third, China’s SOEs have substantially greater 
opportunities than private firms to go public because of China’s approval and (since 
2004) review system for initial public offerings (IPOs). Moreover, under capital 
accounts control and imperfect investor protection, the A-shares traded on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges have a persistent and significant price 
premium relative to globally traded shares. Accordingly, Chinese firms can raise 
funds though IPOs and SEOs (seasoned equity offerings) at the cost of public 
shareholders.  
 
In summary, Chinese listed companies, which are primarily SOEs, continue to 
experience “investment hunger syndrome” (Kornai, 1986) and enjoy favorable 
financing conditions, thus giving rise to severe investment inefficiencies, especially 
for overinvestment problems. 
         
3.2.2 Research purpose    
The goal of this chapter is to investigate inefficient investment behavior by Chinese 
listed companies. This research not only identifies investment behaviors but also 
measures the degree of any inefficient investments made by listed companies.  
 
Specifically, this chapter does the following: 
 It investigates inefficient investments by Chinese listed companies; 
 It analyzes the relationship between inefficient investment behavior and company 
ownership; and 
 It analyzes the degree to which listed companies make inefficient investments. 
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3.2.3 Key findings 
In the section, the thesis finds that SOE attribute has a significantly positive influence 
on a firm’s unexpected investment. This result reveals that with other conditions 
controlled, SOEs make more investments than non-SOEs do; furthermore, SOE 
attribute is associated with firm’s overinvestments. This thesis also finds that local 
SOEs invest more than other firms; however, central SOE attribute does not have a 
significant relationship with a firm’s unexpected investment level. The study checks 
the relation between a firm’s annual investment and the interaction of cash flow and 
Tobin’s Q (Cashflow×Q), and empirical study shows a significantly negative 
relationship between a firm’s annual investment and Cashflow×Q among all listed 
firms, SOEs and local SOEs. Regression does not find a significant relationship 
between the two among central SOEs. The results indicate that Chinese listed SOEs 
generally overinvest. Furthermore, the results also reveal that although local SOEs 
have overinvestment, central SOEs may not have overinvestment. Furthermore, local 
SOEs might be the primary factor that causes overinvestment in Chinese listed SOEs.  
        
3.3 Literature review and research context  
As early as the 1930s, Fisher (1930) noted that the principle of investment decisions is 
to select projects with the largest net present value (NPV). Furthermore, the 
acceptable discount rate to balance a project's revenue flow and cost flow should be 
no less than the market’s interest rate. According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), in 
a perfect capital market in which the cash raised exactly balances the present value of 
the liability created, the investment decision rule is as follows: take every 
positive-NPV project, regardless of whether internal or external funds are used to pay 
for it. 
 
However, in the event of agency costs, asymmetric information, psychological bias, 
etc., a firm’s management may choose to under- or over-invest, thus decreasing firm 
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value. This section intends to discuss investment inefficiencies by identifying their 
causes, determining factors, and the mechanisms of intervention; in addition, it 
intends to summarize the background of Chinese SOEs’ investment behaviors. 
 
3.3.1 The primary causes of investment inefficiencies 
According to the huge numbers of papers that have addressed investment 
inefficiencies, these inefficiencies can be caused (separately or simultaneously) not 
only by agency conflicts and information asymmetry among the primary stakeholders 
(shareholders, bondholders, and managers) but also by psychological bias that affects 
the decision making of top managers. 
3.3.1.1 Agency conflicts among the primary stakeholders 
In the modern corporation, in which ownership and management rights are separate, 
the potential conflicts among shareholders, bondholders, and managers influence 
corporate governance activities and investment policies, which in turn can give rise to 
inefficient managerial decisions and suboptimal investments that may represent either 
over- or underinvestment.  
1) Conflicts between shareholders and managers  
When a firm is defined as a “nexus of contracts” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), all of 
the stakeholders regard the firm's activities as part of the nexus of contracts that 
comprise the firm. Because these explicit and implicit contracts cannot incorporate 
everything about a firm’s investment behaviors, management—especially top 
management—can abuse its discretionary power to seek private benefits through 
over- or underinvestment. 
 
Overinvestment problems can take various forms, such as the agency costs of free 
cash flow, management entrenchment, etc. 
The agency costs of free cash flow. According to Jensen (1986), this problem is 
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defined as managers’ use of free cash flow to engage in negative-NPV projects to 
advance their own interests. Here, free cash flow is the cash in excess of that required 
to fund all of a firm’s positive-NPV projects. Murphy (1985) shows that managerial 
remuneration has a positive correlation with firm size. Baker (1987) finds that most 
firms adopt a position-based incentive structure, which encourages managers to create 
an increasing number of new jobs through business expansion. Jensen (1986) 
highlights that managers tend to overinvest because of the pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary benefits associated with a larger firm, and as a result, managers waste 
the invested funds instead of returning them to shareholders. Therefore, the conflict 
between shareholders and managers leads to overinvestment. 
 
The agency costs of free cash flow are widely documented in the literature. For 
example, Jensen (1986) notes that the oil-price increases that began in 1973 have 
generated large increases of free cash flow in the petroleum industry. Managers did 
not distribute the excess earnings to shareholders. Instead, the industry continued to 
spend heavily on exploration and development activities even though average returns 
were below the cost of capital. Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) show that some 
tender-offer mergers and acquisitions are driven by the bidder firm’s free cash flow. 
Blanchard et al. (1994) suggest that the managerial behavior after a cash windfall in 
the form of a won or settled lawsuit is consistent with the agency-conflict hypothesis. 
Lang et al. (1995) imply that the agency costs of free cash flow increase after asset 
sales. Harvey et al. (2004) highlight the high probability that firms with a large 
available cash flow, high levels of assets in place, and limited growth opportunities 
tend to overinvest. Bates (2005) provides explicit evidence to show that firms that 
retain the cash from a large asset sale systematically overinvest relative to an 
industrial benchmark. Fu (2009) shows that, firms after their SEOs tend to invest 
more heavily than their industrial benchmarks, and that there exists a negative relation 
between post-issue investment and operating performance, thus providing evidence 
that overinvestment after SEOs results in a reduction in asset productivity. 
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Richardson (2006) empirically measures the magnitude of managerial overinvestment. 
On average, for every dollar of additional free cash flow, the firm tends to overinvest 
$0.44, keep $0.40 in its financial assets, and distribute only $0.22 to the shareholders. 
 
Management entrenchment. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) argue that managers can 
entrench themselves by making manager-specific investments that make it costly for 
shareholders to replace them. By making manager-specific investments, managers can 
reduce the probability of being replaced, extract higher wages and larger perquisites 
from shareholders, and obtain broader latitude in determining corporate strategy, 
including investment decisions. 
 
According to Hirshleifer (1993) and Thakor (1993), there are other ways in which 
managers can manipulate investment decisions both to improve their reputations and 
to provide other private benefits.  
 
First, visibility bias is defined as improving what is immediately visible at the cost of 
what is not immediately visible. This action leads to an overinvestment process 
because managers can undertake investment projects with negative NPVs that 
apparently offer good results, thus increasing their reputation.  
 
Second, resolution preference refers to actions taken by managers to advance the 
arrival of news that is likely to be good and to delay the arrival of news that is likely 
to be bad, which gives rise to an overinvestment problem when managers try to 
increase the nearest cash flow at the cost of the more distant ones, changing projects’ 
NPV from positive to negative.  
 
Third, herding behavior (see more details in 3.3.1.3) means that managers in a given 
industry may all make similar choices. If investors expect a high-quality firm to 
undertake ambitious investments, firms with low-quality investment opportunities 
may overinvest so that they appear to be firms with high-quality investments. Firms 
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with high-quality investments also invest too much so that they avoid being identified 
with lower-quality firms. Consequently, many negative-NPV projects are carried out 
because there is a strong trend for managers to overinvest.  
 
Fourth, risk avoidance or excessive conservatism is defined as opting for projects 
that are safer-than-optimal for shareholders. If a manager dislikes personal risk, he 
can defer the resolution of uncertainty, which makes his lifetime income more certain 
than if his reputation and pay were to sharply increase or decrease with an immediate 
news event.  
 
Finally, over shoes over boots means that managers delay divesting money-losing 
projects to avoid conceding that failure has already occurred. 
 
It must be noted that the list above is more illustrative than exhaustive. However, 
Aggarwal and Samwick (2006) challenge the overinvestment hypothesis by proposing 
that managers may be either empire-builders or shirkers. As empire-builders, they 
pursue private benefits through overinvestment, whereas as shirkers, they choose 
underinvestment to mitigate the cost of overseeing new projects. Moreover, those 
authors provide evidence that is inconsistent with the hypothesis of overinvestment 
but is consistent with models of underinvestment. 
 
2) Conflicts between insiders and creditors  
Here, “insiders” include both shareholders and management. Debt financing generates 
a set of responsibilities and incentives in business management that can cause 
conflicts of interest between insiders and creditors. These conflicts, together with 
information asymmetries and incomplete contracting, can cause suboptimal 
investment. For the sake of the shareholders, management may undertake investments 
that maximize the firm’s equity value instead of its entire value.  
 
Fama and Miller (1972) note that an investment decision that maximizes shareholders’ 
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wealth does not necessarily maximize creditors’ wealth. The authors attribute this 
phenomenon to shareholders and creditors’ different preferences for income 
uncertainties. Generally, creditors prefer less uncertainty in project earnings than 
shareholders do. If a firm chooses projects with less uncertainty in their earnings, its 
overall risk is low because its debt value is high but its equity value is low; for 
projects with more uncertainties, the inverse is true. 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) note that insiders are motivated to undertake investment 
projects with higher returns but less opportunity to succeed. If these projects do 
succeed, the insiders take the gains; if they fail, the losses are shared among the 
insiders and creditors. When a firm’s leverage exceeds a certain limit, the insiders are 
much more likely to carry out highly risky projects that increase equity value and 
decrease debt value, thus transferring wealth from debt-holders to shareholders. The 
inclination for insiders to substitute low-risk projects for high-risk ones is named “risk 
shifting” or “asset substitution”. 
 
In contrast, Myers (1977) notes that the issuance of risky bonds will lead to 
underinvestment. When the expected returns of a particular investment do not exceed 
a firm’s debt, creditors will take all of the benefit and shareholders will get nothing. 
This means that some projects with positive but inadequate NPVs will be rejected by 
management, who acts on behalf of the shareholders. 
 
Parrino and Weisbach (1999), using numerical techniques, compute the expected 
wealth transfer between stockholders and bondholders when a firm adopts a new 
project. They confirm the existence of shareholder-creditor conflicts and show that the 
maturity structure of debt, the magnitude of cash flow, firm size, and industrial 
characteristics are all factors that influence asset substitution and underinvestment. 
 
More specifically, the problems of asset substitution and underinvestment also arise 
out of the problem of asymmetric information, which will be discussed in section 
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3.3.1.2. 
 
3) Conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders 
In many countries, corporations are run by controlling shareholders whose cash flow 
rights are substantially smaller than their control rights (La Porta et al., 1999). For 
example, controlling shareholders may acquire complete control over cash flow rights 
with significantly less than 50% ownership via dual-class shares, pyramid-ownership 
structures or cross-ownership (Bebchuk et al., 1999). This separation of ownership 
and control allows self-interested controlling shareholders to extract private benefits 
from outside minority shareholders (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Dyck and Zingales (2004), among other scholars, report large private benefits 
of control based on empirical observation that supports this conclusion.  
 
In theory, controlling shareholders may pursue private benefits through either 
tunneling or overinvestment. Holmén and Högfeldt (2005) observe that in an 
economy in which pyramid-ownership structures are transparent and the tax system 
regulates the flow of dividends within the pyramid and to shareholders, the primary 
cause of large evaluation discounts on both the pyramid holding company and the 
portfolio firms at the bottom is overinvestment, not tunneling. In addition, 
Albuquerque and Wang (2007) establish that in a situation of imperfect investor 
protection, controlling shareholders have incentives to overinvest, leading to higher 
return volatility, lower Tobin's Q, a larger risk premium, and a higher interest rate. 
 
 
3.3.1.2 Information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders   
Here, “insiders” refers to incumbent shareholders and managers, and “outsiders” 
refers to bondholders or prospective shareholders. The literature on information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders usually proposes that management acts on 
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behalf of the incumbent shareholders, thus neglecting the abovementioned agency 
problems between incumbent shareholders and management. 
 
Information asymmetry can be categorized into two classes: ex ante and ex post. Ex 
ante (pre-contract) information asymmetry between shareholders and bondholders 
result in an adverse selection problem. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) note that because 
increasing interest rates or increasing collateral requirements could attract undesirable 
investors and discourage safer investors; neither instrument will necessarily be used to 
equate the supply of loanable funds with the demand for same when there is 
pre-contractual asymmetric information between creditors and observationally 
identical borrowers. Accordingly, credit restrictions take the form of limiting the 
number of loans, i.e., some borrowers receive loans and others do not. Under those 
circumstances, some projects with positive NPVs will not be financed. 
 
In the previous scenario, shareholders have another alternative: issuing new shares. In 
this case, however, adverse selection also facilitates the conflict between incumbent 
and prospective shareholders. Myers and Majluf (1984) note that underinvestment 
may occur when firms have information that its investors do not have. According to 
their model, a firm must issue common stock to raise cash and undertake a valuable 
investment opportunity; the management knows more than the potential investors 
about the firm's value, and because the potential investors are aware of this, they 
decrease their bids for the new shares. On behalf of the current shareholders, the 
management may pass up investment opportunities when their positive NPVs do not 
balance dilution-related losses. 
 
According to the pecking order theory of corporate financing (Myers and Majluf, 
1984), in the case of asymmetric information, internal and external financing have 
different capital costs. Therefore, companies in need of funds will prefer internal 
financing, which has the lowest cost; if external financing is needed, companies will 
prefer obtaining less risky debt financing over issuing equity. In brief, the optimal 
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pecking order of corporate financing is as follows: internal financing, debt financing, 
and equity issuance.  
 
That said, Narayanan (1988) modifies the Myers-Majluf model (1984) by assuming 
that managers’ private information is more likely to concern the value of new 
investment opportunities, not the value of existing assets. In this case, the managers 
will choose to issue shares only if the new project’s NPV exceeds a certain threshold 
level. Narayan further proves that this threshold level is less than zero, namely, the 
company will invest in projects with negative NPV. Furthermore, Narayanan (1988) 
has obtained a conclusion opposite that of the Myers-Majluf model (1984). Moreover, 
Daniel and Titman (1995) argue that Myers and Majluf (1984) ignore the possibility 
of positive responses by the current shareholders in the event of devaluation of the 
newly issuing shares. If the current shareholders are willing to purchase a certain 
percentage of new shares, the market discounts associated with adverse selection can 
be effectively eliminated, and the underinvestment problem can be overcome. 
 
Ex post (post-contract) information asymmetry between shareholders and bondholders 
gives rise to a moral hazard problem. According to the literature, moral hazard 
includes both overinvestment and underinvestment. On the one hand, the risk shifting 
or asset substitution problem highlighted by Jensen and Meckling (1976) is the 
sequence of moral hazard conducted by self-interested insiders. On the other hand, 
Myers (1977) notes that shareholders might pass up positive-NPV projects whenever 
the profits will be primarily used to pay off existing bondholders, thus resulting in 
underinvestment.  
 
In addition, moral hazard, together with the problem of incomplete contracting, makes 
it crucial to allocate the residual control and claim rights associated with investment 
assets, which affects ex ante investment decisions (Hart, 1995). Because investment 
assets are usually specific (Williamson, 1985), under the proposition of limited 
rationality and opportunism, the “holdup” problem will occur and investors cannot 
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obtain all of the marginal revenue of their investment, which inevitably leads to 
underinvestment. 
 
3.3.1.3 The psychological bias of top managers       
From the behavioral-finance perspective, perception bias can influence managers’ 
decision-making. “Mental errors” such as overconfidence, biased self-attribution, 
survival bias, representative bias, conservative bias, and herding behavior can lead to 
overinvestment. 
 
Keynes (1936) has already noted that investment behaviors are driven by the "animal 
spirits" of entrepreneurs. As a group, top managers—especially CEOs—particularly 
enjoy the spotlight and applause, and they possess a high level of self-confidence. In 
addition, as Warren Buffett observes, many CEOs attain their positions partly because 
they possess an abundance of “animal spirits”. If an executive is heavily endowed 
with those qualities, reaching the top will not make them disappear. When such a 
CEO is encouraged by his advisors to make acquisition deals, he is more likely to 
engage in overinvestment. 
 
Behavioral studies have found that overconfidence is one of the most entrenched 
features of human psychology (DeBondt and Thaler, 1994). Managers, while acting 
with the goal of maximizing value for shareholders, can nevertheless either 
overestimate their own competencies or be overly optimistic about the firm's potential 
profitability by investing in projects that do not really have a positive NPV (Stein, 
2003). In the case of takeovers or mergers, overconfident CEOs overestimate their 
ability to generate returns. Consequently, they overpay for target companies and 
undertake value-destroying takeovers or mergers (Roll, 1986; Malmendier and Tate, 
2008). As observed by Kaplan (1989), the many buyouts and mergers that occurred 
during the 1980s and did not increase value for shareholders were often the result of 
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this type of overinvestment. Malmendier and Tate (2009) argue that overconfident 
managers both overestimate the returns on their investment projects and view external 
funds as unduly costly. Accordingly, they overinvest when they have abundant 
internal funds but curtail investment when they need external financing. Galasso and 
Simcoe (2011) highlight that overconfident CEOs, who underestimate the probability 
of failure, are more likely to pursue a new technological innovation; moreover, this 
effect is stronger in industries that are more competitive. 
 
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) attribute overconfidence to “biased 
self-attribution”—one is prone to attribute success to his abilities and attribute failure 
to bad luck. Moreover, “survival bias” can strengthen winners’ overconfidence, given 
that top managers are thought of as winners who have survived the jungle of furious 
competition. Thus, top managers should be much more overconfident than ordinary 
people. 
 
Barberis et al. (1998) mentions two types of perception bias with regard to external 
changes, namely, representative bias and conservative bias. A person with 
representative bias focuses too closely on recent changes and regards them as 
representing future trends; therefore, such a person overreacts to recent changes. A 
person with conservative bias pays more attention to the average state over a long 
period and regards recent changes as temporary; therefore, such a person underreacts 
to recent changes. It can be inferred that managers with a representative bias can 
overinvest in response to recent, favorable changes and that managers with a 
conservative bias can overinvest in response to recent, unfavorable changes. 
 
Herding behaviors refer to the phenomenon that without perfect information, a person 
chooses to follow others' behavior and neglects his own private information. Herding 
behaviors often give birth to boom-bust cycles. The cause of herding behavior may be 
either rational or irrational. Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992) argue that 
when investors believe themselves to be less informed than others, it is rational for 
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them to mimic others’ behavior. Bikhchandani et al. (1998) notes that to maintain 
their prestige, managers may also rationally choose to mimic their peers’ investment 
behaviors. However, there are many irrational followers who make their investment 
decisions based on sentiment, intuition, or rumors (Shleifer and Summers 1990). 
 
In addition, the stock market is affected by investors’ psychological bias. Stock prices 
have a stronger impact on investments by firms that need external equity to finance 
their marginal investments (Baker, Stein and Wurgler, 2002). Hua, Liu, and Xu (2010) 
discover a strong, positive correlation between market sentiment and overinvestment 
by public companies. Furthermore, market sentiments may either magnify 
overinvestment, which reduces efficiency, or modify underinvestment, which 
improves efficiency; in the aggregate, the former effect exceeds the latter. 
 
3.3.2 Determining factors related to investment inefficiency 
Although investment inefficiency can occur for various reasons, the magnitude is not 
monotonic among firms with different characteristics. According to the literature, the 
primary determining factors of over- and underinvestment include the availability of 
free cash flow, possibility for growth, and debt level. 
3.3.2.1 The effect of financial conditions and growth prospects 
In general, the possibility of using free cash flow allows managers to choose 
inefficient investment projects with negative NPVs. However, when considering a 
firm’s growth prospects, the management with access to free cash flow does not 
always choose to overinvest. The figure 3.1 below summarizes the relationship 
between growth prospects, financial conditions, and investment choices. 
[Figure 3.1]  
 
On the one hand, when a firm is under positive financial conditions, i.e., the firm has 
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a large amount of free cash flow, the presence of enough investment opportunities 
could prevent management from overinvesting, as an optimal investment policy will 
be the best choice for both shareholders and the management. However, the presence 
of sufficient free cash flow and the absence of good investment opportunities could 
stimulate management to either squander cash on organizational inefficiencies instead 
of returning it to the shareholders or waste it on investments that do not cover the cost 
of the capital. 
 
On the other hand, a firm under negative financial conditions that nonetheless enjoys 
good growth opportunities will choose a risk-avoidance policy, i.e., management will 
take precautions to protect its control over the firm and prevent others from taking 
advantage of the future benefits of the firm’s growth opportunities. Accordingly, a 
risk-avoidance policy can give rise to underinvestment. Conversely, for a firm 
experiencing a situation of risky debt and poor opportunities for growth, the 
incentives for risk shifting and underinvestment become dominant because, ultimately, 
the firm might not being able to obtain the value created by the investments (in that 
the value would benefit only the debtholders). Otherwise, the firm would make 
investments with both high return expectations and much more volatility than 
presented by the average risk level of the firm's activities.  
 
Additionally, Bernankel and Gertler (1989) note that a firm’s NPV level is not 
constant; instead, it varies with economic cycles. Accordingly, in a period of 
economic expansion, the firm’s NPV increases and it could have less need for 
external financing, thus mitigating the agency costs of external financing and 
encouraging more investment; in a period of economic recession, the situation is 
exactly the inverse.  
 
In brief, a firm’s investment policy is highly dependent on its growth opportunities 
and financial conditions. The initial empirical analysis of these problems can be found 
in Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) (FHP), in which higher investment 
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sensitivity to cash flow availability is found in companies with lower dividend 
payment ratios, which they interpret as evidence of financing constraints. That study 
has stimulated theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between 
investments, cash flow availability, value, and leverage. For example, Chapman et al. 
(1996), using sample data from 58 Australian companies from 1974 to 1990, arrive at 
the same conclusion as FHP (1988). However, Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Cleary 
(1999), Gomes (2001), and others challenge FHP’s conclusion by arguing not only 
that a statistically significant coefficient of correlation between investment and cash 
flow is a condition that is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of 
financing constraints but also that there is no reason to use regression coefficients to 
measure the degree of financing constraints. According to Kaplan and Zingales (1997), 
investment sensitivity to cash flow availability should instead be attributed to the 
agency costs of free cash flow proposed by Jensen (1986).  
 
Some recent researches also spot light on investment-cash flow relations. Firth et al. 
(2012) report a U-shaped investment-cash flow relation in China's listed companies. 
Such relation indicates that investment increases as internal funds increase when 
internal funds are high, but decrease as internal funds increase when internal funds are 
sufficiently low. Ding et al. (2013) use a panel of over 120,000 Chinese firms owned 
by different agents over the period 2000-2007 to analyse the linkages between 
investment in fixed and working capital and financing constraints. The authors report 
that those firms characterized by high working capital display high sensitivities of 
investment in working capital to cash flow (WKS), and low sensitivities of investment 
in fixed capital to cash flow (FKS). Furthermore, the authors argue that good working 
capital management may help firms to alleviate the effects of financing constraints on 
investment because despite severe external financing constraints, those firms with low 
FKS and high WKS exhibit the highest investment rates. Using a large panel of 
Chinese listed firms over the period 1998–2014, Guariglia and Yang (2016) 
document strong evidence of investment inefficiency caused by a combination of 
financing constraints and agency problems. The authors argue that firms with cash 
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flow below (above) their optimal level tend to under- (over-) invest as a consequence 
of financing constraints (agency costs). 
 
Additionally, Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989) find that flexibility is the most important 
factor that affects financing decisions. A survey by Graham and Harvey (2001) 
supports Pinegar and Wilbricht’s (1989) findings. Graham and Harvey (2001) 
document how American CFOs manage to maintain financial elasticity to protect their 
ability to take advantage of growth opportunities. One reason for firms to remain 
flexible is the need to minimize interest obligations so they do not need to shrink their 
businesses in the event of an economic downturn. Financial elasticity thus has value 
because a shortage of it can both damage firm value and block future optimal 
investment policies. Bo et al. (2014) argue that financial crisis also impact firm’s 
investment behaviour. The authors examine how Chinese corporate investment 
responds to the financial crisis in 2008 and document that the overall impact of the 
financial crisis on Chinese corporate investment is negative and demand channel 
dominates the real effect of financial crisis to Chinese listed firms. They also highlight 
that financial assets held by a nonfinancial firm are important in the firm’s fixed 
investment equation in Chinese listed firms. Chen and Guariglia (2013) discussed the 
linkage between finance and firm-level productivity and report that, especially for 
illiquid firms, productivity is strongly constrained by the availability of internal 
finance. Furthermore, the authors find higher sensitivities of productivity to cash flow 
for private exporters, but lower sensitivities for foreign exporters.  
 
Guariglia and Liu (2014) also studied the relation between firm’s innovation 
investment and financing constraints in Chinese unlisted firms. Based on a variety of 
specifications and estimation methods the authors document that Chinese firms' 
innovation activities are constrained by the availability of internal finance. 
Specifically, private firms suffer them most, followed by foreign firms, while 
state-owned and collective enterprises are the least constrained. 
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3.3.2.2 The effect of debt under different conditions 
Generally speaking, debt has two different effects on investment behaviors. On the 
one hand, it can create shareholder-creditor conflicts that result in asset substitution 
and underinvestment, and therefore, it is negatively correlated to growth opportunities 
(Myers, 1977). On the other hand, it can reduce management-controlled cash through 
fixed principal and interest payments, thus mitigating the agency costs of free cash 
flow, and therefore, it is positively connected to assets in place (Jensen, 1986). 
Accordingly, “firms should use relatively more debt to finance assets in place and 
relatively more equity to finance growth opportunities” (Hovakimian et al., 2001). 
 
Stultz (1990) shows that firms with poor investment opportunities are predisposed to 
incur higher debt levels so that management will control fewer resources, whereas 
firms with good investment opportunities exhibit more moderate debt levels. This 
phenomenon implies the existence of a negative relationship between growth 
opportunities and firm leverage. Among the many empirical studies conducted to 
examine this type of relationship, Smith and Watts (1992) investigate empirical 
relations at the industry level among financing policy, dividend policy, compensation 
policy, and the investment opportunity set, and their results confirm Stultz’s (1990) 
theory by not distinguishing between firms with high and low growth rates. Instead, 
McConnell and Servaes (1995) and Lang et al. (1996) obtain valuable results by 
dividing their analysis samples into two subgroups: high-growth firms (with a high 
Tobin’s Q) and low-growth firms (with a low Tobin’s Q). McConnell and Servaes 
(1995) observe a negative correlation between corporate value and leverage for 
‘high-growth’ firms, and a positive one for ‘low-growth’ firms. Lang et al. (1996) do 
not witness any relationship between the two variables for the subgroup of 
‘high-growth’ firms, whereas they observe a strong negative correlation between 
corporate value and leverage for ‘low-growth’ firms. Therefore, they confirm Jensen’s 
(1986) hypothesis that debt can enhance control of overinvestment. Furthermore, 
firms with high growth rates show low levels of leverage (Bradley et al, 1984; Titman 
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and Wessel, 1988; Smith and Watts, 1992) and prefer short-term debt to long-term 
debt (Barclay and Smith, 1995). 
3.3.3 Mechanisms for mitigating investment inefficiency 
The financial literature has suggested several mechanisms for mitigating the over- or 
underinvestment problems discussed in the previous section (Myers, 1977; Smith and 
Warner, 1979; Green, 1984; Diamond, 1989; Berkovitch and Kim, 1990; etc.). As set 
forth in Figure 3.2, this section provides a detailed illustration of each mechanism that 
corresponds to the various causes of investment inefficiency. 
 
[Figure 3.2]   
3.3.3.1 Mechanisms to mitigate shareholder-manager conflicts 
The literature has presented two types of mechanisms for mitigating overinvestment 
derived from shareholder-manager conflicts. One method is to reduce 
management-controlled cash flow (e.g., debt overhang, dividend payout, share 
repurchase), and the other is to align shareholder and manager interests through an 
incentive-based compensation policy (e.g., annual bonus, stock grants, stock-option 
grants). 
 
Debt overhang. Debt mitigates shareholder-manager conflicts in two ways. On the 
one hand, it reduces the disposable cash flow available for managers because of the 
need to return the principal and interest; on the other hand, it subjects managers to 
increased monitoring and an increased risk of bankruptcy—once the firm cannot 
repay the debt, creditors will take control, and the managers will lose all of their 
interests in the firm. 
 
As noted by Jensen (1986), placing limits on managerial decision-making power can 
be particularly effective when managing shareholder-manager conflicts that arise out 
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of the issue of how to allocate free cash flow. Moreover, a high level of recourse to 
debt capital represents a positive sign for the capital market, which results in share 
appreciation (Ross, 1977). 
 
Additionally, the introduction of debt as a means of corporate governance has positive 
effects on alleviating the insider control problem, which arises with the free-rider 
problem in the case of public companies with an atomic ownership structure 
(Grossman and Hart, 1986). 
 
That said Zweibel (1996) notes that managers do not voluntarily accept the type of 
“discipline” represented by debt. De Jong (2001) shows that in Holland, managers 
attempt to avoid using debt to prevent limitations on their decision-making power. 
Williamson (1996) argues that when debt and equity are considered as substitutable 
means of governance instead of as financing instruments, the choice between debt and 
equity depends on the specificity of investment assets. If investment assets are less 
specific, debt should be chosen because the firm’s assets retain some value even in the 
event of default. Conversely, if investment assets are highly specific, it is better to 
fund investment with equity. In the latter case, unfortunately, the mechanism’s 
efficiency depends on the level of manager entrenchment (Berger, et al., 1997). 
 
Dividend payments. There are two ways in which dividend payments can help 
alleviate agency problems between shareholders and managers. On the one hand, 
Jensen (1986) argues that dividend payments prevent managers from undertaking 
negative-NPV projects because they have to disgorge the firm’s free cash flow. On 
the other hand, Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984) highlight that dividend 
payments increase the probability of a firm’s need to issue new securities, which 
facilitates the scrutiny of potential investors and aligns the interests of shareholders 
and managers. In both cases, dividend payments provide a weaker mechanism than 
debt payments do for limiting the cash available to managers because dividend 
payments are not subject to the same legal obligation as debt payments (Byrd, et al., 
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1998). 
 
Share repurchase. This is an additional method to limit managers’ control over free 
cash flow. This method should be used only when a listed company is undervalued by 
the market and its opportunity cost is limited, i.e., when the company does not have 
better investment opportunities for its free cash flow on hand.  
 
Remuneration policy. This mechanism differs from the others mentioned above in that 
it is an incentive, not a restriction. A remuneration package consists of fixed salary 
and unfixed compensation. The common scheme includes an annual bonus, stock 
grants, stock options, and other incentives (e.g., perks, tax reimbursements, and 
pensions). The effectiveness of unfixed compensation depends on investment 
opportunities. Gaver and Gaver (1993) find that growth firms are significantly more 
likely than non-growth firms to have stock option plans. In a later study, Gaver and 
Gaver (1995) analyze the proportions of executive compensation derived from salary, 
bonus, long-term incentive compensation, and stock-based compensation. They find 
that executives at growth firms receive a larger portion of their compensation from 
long-term incentive compensation, whereas executives at non-growth firms receive a 
larger portion of their pay from a fixed salary, which implies that long-term incentive 
contracts reduce the agency costs associated with shareholder-manager information 
asymmetries in growth firms. 
 
According to Jensen (1994), remuneration policies must be closely linked to firms’ 
market value. In addition, he stresses that stock and stock options can help align the 
interests of managers and shareholders because both mechanisms can reward 
managers sufficiently whenever they maximize shareholder wealth. However, there is 
an important difference between stock and stock options in that stock punishes 
managers whenever shareholder wealth decreases, whereas managers can relinquish 
their stock options to avoid losses. For this reason, Sanders (1999) suggests that the 
right compensation mechanism for a low-risk firm should be stock; otherwise, it 
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should be stock options. 
 
3.3.3.2 Mechanisms to mitigate risk shifting 
Risk shifting usually occurs with the introduction of debt and can be alleviated by 
convertible bonds and separate incorporation.  
 
Convertible bonds. As a special kind of financing instrument, convertible bonds offer 
the possibility of converting debt capital into equity. Many studies (Jensen and 
Meckiling, 1976; Smith and Warner, 1979; Harris and Raviv, 1985; Stein, 1992; 
Nachman and Noe, 1994; Cornelli and Yosha, 2003) have emphasized the usefulness 
of convertible bonds in containing incentives for risk shifting. As formulated by Black 
and Scholes (1973), investments with growing risk would increase the conversion 
option value of convertible bonds and therefore decrease risk shifting from 
shareholders to bondholders. Green (1984) shows that under certain conditions, the 
use of conversion features and warrants can help restore net present value, thus 
maximizing incentives and simultaneously fulfilling the firm’s financing requirements. 
On the one hand, callable, convertible bonds help control the overinvestment 
incentives that can arise if financing is provided prior to an investment option's 
maturity, as their conversion options provide sequential financing at a relatively lower 
cost (Mayers, 1996). On the other hand, because convertible debt can adjust firms’ 
debt levels through its convertibility, it is superior to common debt and equity in 
controlling managerial opportunism, including both over- and underinvestment 
(Isagawa, 2000).  
 
In reality, convertible bonds can be used under several conditions. Mikkelson (1981) 
observes that firms with substantial debt and good growth opportunities issue a larger 
quantity of convertible debt to obtain the financial resources needed for new 
investments. Stein (1992) argues that corporations may use convertible bonds as an 
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indirect way to incorporate equity into their capital structures when the direct issuance 
of debt could lead to financial distress and when adverse selection problems make a 
conventional stock issue unattractive. Essig (1991) shows that the probability of firms 
issuing convertible bonds is positively correlated to the R&D costs-to-sales ratio, the 
market-to-book ratio, the long-term debt-to-equity ratio, and cash flow volatility, 
whereas it is negatively correlated to the tangible assets ratio. Repullo and Suarez 
(1998) note that venture capital activities make particularly broad use of convertible 
bonds precisely because they protect firm activity from opportunistic behaviors. 
 
Separate incorporation. When debt funding projects are organized, it becomes 
difficult for shareholders to undertake more risky investment projects than those 
initially proposed to creditors. Accordingly, the problems of symmetric information 
and high capital costs can be alleviated to some extent. Based on the same rationale, 
when the market’s perceived risks of new projects are high and risk shifting problems 
dominate, one alternative is to issue new debt that is subordinated to old debt. 
 
3.3.3.3 Mechanisms to mitigate overinvestment in cases of pyramid 
ownership 
To mitigate conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders, investor 
protection is of first-order importance. As Zingales (2004) note, all other mechanisms 
become totally inefficient when conflicts of interest are based on “abuses carried out 
by those who are willing to falsify documents, to lie and to deceive, out of desperation 
or of a lack of scruples”, as in the notorious Enron and WorldCom cases. La Porta et 
al. (2002), Claessens et al. (2002), Doidge et al. (2004), and Gompers et al. (2003), 
among others, have documented how imperfect investor protection lowers firm value. 
For example, La Porta et al. (2000) find that corporate payouts are lower in countries 
with weaker investor protection, where the agency costs of free cash flow are more 
severe. Harvey (1995) shows that emerging markets display higher return volatility 
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and larger equity risk premia because on average, emerging market economies have 
weaker corporate governance. 
 
La Porta et al. (2002), Gompers et al. (2003), and Doidge et al. (2004) find that firm 
value increases with investor protection. Hail and Leuz (2006) establish a positive 
link between excess returns and various investor protection variables using 
cross-national evidence. Albuquerque and Wang (2008) show that strengthening 
investor protection has a significant wealth-redistribution effect from controlling to 
outside shareholders. Outside shareholders in Korea are willing to give up 11.2% of 
their capital stock holdings, or $4.7 billion of current wealth, in exchange for an 
environment with perfect investor protection. In the US, outside shareholders are 
willing to give up 0.38% of their capital stock holdings, or $43 billion of current their 
wealth, for the same result.  
 
In theory, relevant regulations and acts should be passed to improve investor 
protection, as the US Congress did with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. However, 
the political process to improve investor protection is naturally difficult because the 
political power required to control shareholders and incumbent entrepreneurs is much 
stronger than that required to control outside investors and future entrepreneurs 
(Albuquerque and Wang, 2008). 
 
3.3.3.4 Mechanisms to mitigate information asymmetry 
To reduce the adverse selection and moral hazard problems derived from information 
asymmetry, increased financial market efficiency is an immediate action, whereas 
concentration of debtholders and the reputation mechanism are also effective. 
 
Increase in financial market efficiency. In theory, rapid, transparent circulation of 
information in the financial system would reduce the adverse selection and moral 
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hazard problems because opportunistic behaviors would be forbidden. Incentives to 
generate and disseminate information are crucial features of a financial system (Allen 
and Gale 2001). Therefore, it is suggested that relevant regulations be approved to 
increase capital market efficiency. For instance, the Italian “Consolidated Act on 
Financial Intermediation” (Legislative Decree n.58/1998) reforms the law on financial 
services, stock exchanges, and listed companies to reduce the incentives for 
suboptimal investment (Enriques, 2008). 
 
Concentration of debt holders. As the number of creditors decreases, free-rider 
problems are reduced, and major creditors have an incentive to focus on the firm's 
managerial activity. Moreover, as direct relations are established between managers 
and creditors in the event of insolvency, it is easier to renegotiate with fewer creditors 
than with a large number of creditors, as each have different rights and demands 
(Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996). 
 
Examples of concentrated debt include bank debts and private placements through 
institutional investors. In the case of bank debts, it is particularly helpful to mitigate 
potential distortions in the process of investment project selection because banks are 
good at monitoring a firm’s investment decisions. However, bank financing has high 
intermediary costs and creates hold-up problems. Therefore, the firm must make a 
tradeoff between the cost of asymmetric information and hold-up. According to 
Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), firms at a low risk of default, firms with strong asset 
complementarities, and firms in non-cyclical businesses will tend to borrow from 
more creditors because the problems of asymmetric information are not as severe as 
firms at a high risk of default.  
 
Reputation building. According to Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and 
Roberts (1982), a reputation can be viewed as arising from learning over time from 
observed behavior about some exogenous characteristics of agents. Despite all of the 
problems (e.g., visibility bias, resolution preference, herding behavior, risk avoidance) 
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related to reputation-seeking by managers, from an evolutionary perspective, “honesty 
is the best policy” (Myers, 1977). As demonstrated by Diamond (1989), if there is 
little adverse selection, then the reputation mechanism will work from the beginning; 
conversely, if there is sufficient adverse selection, then a typical equilibrium path for a 
borrower is to choose projects with both high risk and high maximum return when 
“young”, and if it can survive long enough without a default, to switch to safe projects 
from that point forward. In the long term, reputation is important because it becomes a 
valuable asset worthy of protection. 
 
3.3.3.5 Mechanisms to mitigate overinvestment related to overconfidence 
As noted earlier, overconfidence is one of the most persistent behavioral biases, and 
thus, it is almost impossible to eliminate from an individual’s mindset. However, the 
literature (Malmendier and Tate, 2005) indicates that overconfidence is an observable 
characteristic (at least somewhat), and thus, a firm can distinguish between 
overconfident and realistic CEOs and make trade-offs. Furthermore, market 
competition has an impact on the level of prevalent CEO overconfidence and 
overinvestment. 
 
Intensive market competition. Englmaier (2010) and Englmaier (2011) show that in 
the R&D tournament, a firm tends to hire an overconfident CEO to obtain a 
competitive edge over its competitors. Accordingly, the prevailing CEO 
overconfidence results in an equilibrium outcome. Yu (2014) shows an inverted 
U-shaped relation between the prevailing CEO overconfidence level and the intensity 
of market competition. Additionally, the CEO overconfidence level converges to a 
realistic level when there are infinitely many firms in the market. This result suggests 
that firms in an oligopoly hire CEOs with greater overconfidence than firms in a 
duopoly. If the market is perfectly competitive, the benefits of this practice vanish and 
firms will hire realistic CEOs. In addition, it is shown that firm profit and R&D both 
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exhibit an inverted U-shaped relation with the intensity of market competition, which 
is consistent with the finding of Aghion et al. (2005). 
3.3.4 Investment behaviors of Chinese SOEs 
When studying corporate finance in a transitional economy, one must have a good 
understanding of fundamentals such as the economy’s culture, history, and political 
and legal systems (Williamson, 2000; Claessens, et al., 2002). Accordingly, this 
section presents a glimpse of these fundamental factors within which the investment 
behaviors of Chinese SOEs are created. 
 
3.3.4.1 Chinese SOE reform over the past three decades 
China’s transition from a planned to a market economy began in the late 1970s. In 
approximately 1980, although the public sector accounted for 95.3 percent of China’s 
total industrial and agricultural output, SOEs had little operational autonomy. Under 
the planned economic system, SOEs received all inputs from the state according to 
central plans; they delivered all of their outputs and transferred all of their revenues to 
the state. Simultaneously, all of an SOE’s funds were borrowed and repaid by the state, 
and all of its staff (including both managers and workers) were state-appointed and 
state-assigned. Moreover, to change China’s condition of being “poor and blank”, a 
“catchup” strategy was pursued, and developing heavy industries was prioritized. 
Accordingly, rates of interest, foreign exchange, and wages, along with the prices of 
energy, raw materials, and living necessities, were artificially suppressed by the state. 
This disadvantageous development strategy, together with the planned economic 
problems, induced both overinvestment in capital-intensive heavy industries and 
underinvestment in labor-intensive industries. Consequently, SOEs presented 
investment inefficiency. From 1957, when the “First Five-Year Plan” was completed, 
to 1978, when China was on the eve of reform and opening up, SOE investment 
increased by 6.7 times, whereas the GDP created by SOEs increased by only 3.9 
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times.  
 
With the market-oriented reforms implemented since the late 1970s, most of the 
prices of products and productive factors were gradually liberalized. Conversely, 
non-state domestic and foreign firms were given access to an increasing number of 
industries. In general, non-state firms are more competitive than SOEs in terms of 
their product lines, corporate governance, and operational costs, which render explicit 
the underperformance of SOEs. Since the beginning of the reform, the Chinese 
government has focused on improving SOE performance. SOE reform over the past 
three decades can be roughly divided into three stages. 
 
1) Enlargement of operational autonomy and interests (1978-1992) 
At the beginning stage of the reform, the Chinese government attributed SOE 
inefficiency to the lack of operational autonomy and material incentives. The third 
plenary session of the CPC’s 11th Central Committee, which was held in December 
1978, noted that one of the most serious drawbacks of China’s traditional economic 
system is excessively centralized power, and thus, the direction of reform should be to 
entrust local governments and enterprises with much more operational autonomy. In 
1979, the government granted 14 economic rights to SOEs, including production 
autonomy, the right to purchase raw materials, the right to sell products, and the right 
to employ workers. Later, incentive measures such as profit retention, replacing profit 
with taxation, and contracts for production and management were implemented. 
Unfortunately, the effects of these measures were limited
6
, and the number of SOEs 
experiencing losses had been increasing since the reform. By the end of 1990, the 
statistical proportion of loss-making SOEs had reached more than 30%; in reality, this 
indicator should be much higher following the deduction of government subsidies. 
 
                                                             
6 According to China’s National Bureau of Statistics, 1991, number of SOEs experiencing losse increased from 
4185 in 1985 to 11898 in 1990, the proportion of SOEs experiencing losses was 10.69% in 1985 increased to 31.5% 
in 1990. Meanwhile, the total losses (value in million RMB) increased from 2678 million in 1985 to 28603 million 
in 1990. 
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The causes of these SOE losses are complicated. First, conflicts of interest between 
the state (the owner) and insiders (managers and workers) became explicit and 
sometimes quite sharp after SOEs were given broad operational autonomy. The state 
was concerned about its fiscal revenues, whereas the insiders were concerned about 
their private interests. When SOEs profited, the insiders managed to retain a portion 
for themselves; when SOEs incurred losses, the insiders asked the government for 
subsidies. Second, severely asymmetric information between the state and insiders in 
a transitional economy made it difficult to implement operational contracts. The state 
did not have a clear understanding of each SOE’s costs and revenues, whereas the 
insiders could not precisely forecast the next step of the reform, such as which 
products were likely to have their prices liberalized or whether the current reforms 
would last for a long time. Third, policy burdens made SOEs less competitive than 
non-state firms (Lin, 1999). On the one hand, SOEs carried the strategic burdens of 
developing heavy industries in a capital-scarce economy; on the other hand, SOEs 
carried the social burdens of overstaffing, large retirement pensions, medical care, 
education, and other types of social welfare. 
 
2) Institutional innovations and structural adjustments (1993-2002)  
During this stage, the goal of China’s reform was defined, and the focus of SOE 
reform turned to institutional innovations and structural adjustments. Based on the 
reform philosophies of Deng Xiaoping’s “Talks during Excursions to China’s 
Southern Cities” in 1992, the Chinese Communist Party approved the “Decision of 
the CPC Central Committee on Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist 
Market Economic Structure” at the 3rd Plenum of the 14th CPC Congress in 1993. At 
that time, there were two urgent issues related to SOE reforms. The first issue 
involved restructuring the ownership structure of SOEs and building a modern 
corporate governance system, detaching government functions from enterprise 
functions, and establishing a stable nexus among stakeholders. The second issue was 
to adjust SOEs’ industrial structure to improve their efficiencies and to solve 
loss-making problems.  
156 
 
As the first step, all SOEs were required to build a modern enterprise system with 
features of “clarified property rights, well-defined powers and responsibilities, 
separate government and enterprise functions, and scientific corporate governance” 
(State Economic Reform Commission, 1994). As the second step, the 15th CPC 
National Congress proposed to “focus on large SOEs while relaxing control over 
small ones”, i.e., the government continued to support large SOEs in key industries 
(the so-called lifeline or pillar industries), whereas small SOEs were asked to fend for 
themselves and were allowed to improve efficiencies through measures such as 
restructuring, alliances, mergers, management contracts, stock cooperative systems, 
leases, and sales, which established a competition mechanism of the “survival of the 
fittest”. As the third step, the 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) proposed building a 
social security system independent of firms, relieving SOEs of their social burdens 
and creating a fair, level playing field for all firms. 
 
Moreover, to help SOEs obtain external funding, lower leverage ratios, and escape 
their difficulties and to provide a secondary market for joint-stock companies, China’s 
stock market was established in the early 1990s with the Shenzhen and Shanghai 
exchanges. Since then, an increasing number of companies have been listed in those 
two exchanges, many of which are SOEs. Before the SOEs went public, a small 
portion of their ownership was sold to individual investors, private firms, mutual 
funds, or other institutional investors. However, this joint-stock system reform is far 
from complete because the state retains dominant ownership even after the firms’ 
IPOs. 
 
3) Reform of the state-owned asset management system (2003-) 
In 2003, a new state-owned asset management system was established based on the 
proposals of the 16th CPC Congress in 2002. Until that time, SOEs were uniformly 
owned by the State Council, their reform and management affairs were conducted 
under the guidance of the National Economic and Trade Commission, their long-run 
investments were made based on the approval of National Development and Planning 
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Commission, their short-run investments were made based on the approval of the 
ministries of their corresponding industries, their disposal of state-owned assets was 
made pursuant to the approval of Ministry of Finance, and their income distribution 
policies were conducted under the direction of the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security. Under the new system, SOEs, according to their scale and importance, were 
owned by the State Council, provincial level governments, and local governments at 
lower administrative levels. A corresponding, specialized department—the 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC)—was 
established at different levels to implement the state owner’s power and 
responsibilities.  
 
Since 2003, laws and regulations concerning the supervision and administration of 
state-owned assets have been enacted, structural adjustments have been advanced, an 
assessment of top managers’ performance has been performed, and the efficiencies of 
large SOEs have steadily improved. For example, the number of SOEs supervised by 
the SASAC of the State Council decreased from 196 in 2003 to 113 in 2012; currently, 
their annual revenues account for approximately 40 percent of China’s GDP and their 
net profit is approximately $160 billion (nearly one trillion RMB) (SASAC of the 
State Council, 2012).  
 
Although the Chinese government has made notable progress in SOE reform through 
institutional innovations and structural adjustments, it is too early to say that this 
reform has been an overall success. According to 2013 statistics from the Shanghai 
government, loss-making SOEs in Shanghai account for approximately one third of 
the total number of that city’s SOEs. SOEs that are subject to the State Council are 
always criticized for obtaining their huge profits through monopoly powers; thus, 
their profits are not equivalent to efficiency.  
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3.3.4.2 A theoretical analysis of SOE investment inefficiency 
After more than three decades of reform, China’s SOEs changed from entities under 
the control of the government to relatively independent competitors in the market. 
However, in a transitional economy such as China, there remain many drawbacks in 
both corporate governance and the institutional environment that can result in SOE 
investment inefficiency. 
 
1) Inadequate incentives for SOE supervisors 
Although there are many conflicts between shareholders and management in the 
modern corporate system, these conflicts have a new feature in SOEs, namely, an 
absent owner. By law, the owner of an SOE is the state; in practice, the state entrusts 
its assets in hundreds of enterprises to government departments. Each entrusted 
government department then assigns management to SOEs and plays a supervisory 
role. At present, the supervisors are SASACs of governments at various levels. 
However, the issue is that the SASACs are not the true owners, and SASACs do not 
have adequate incentives to supervise SOE management. First, the power to appoint 
or change SOE executives belongs to the CPC’s organization department, whereas 
SASACs only have the power to assess SOE operational performance. Second, these 
executives typically enjoy (either implicitly or explicitly) certain administrative ranks 
according to the SOE’s reporting hierarchy (Huang et al., 2011). As a system, however, 
executives’ administrative ranks were abandoned in 2000. Accordingly, it is improper 
in Chinese political culture for a junior official to supervise superior executives of 
SOEs. For example, Jiang Jiemin, the former chief director of China Petroleum, is a 
member of the Central Committee of the CPC. Because Jiang’s political rank is even 
higher than that of the SASAC head of the State Council, it is very difficult for the 
latter to truly supervise the former. Third, because executives of SOEs may become 
government leaders, the best policy for incumbent officials of SASACs is to 
cooperate with those executives. Again, consider the example of Jiang Jiemin, who 
was appointed as the head of the SASAC of the State Council after he left his position 
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at China Petroleum. One can imagine that an official who has not cooperated with 
China Petroleum would be astonished at the news of this designation. 
 
To summarize, because SASAC officials do not have adequate incentives to supervise 
SOE behavior, SOE investment inefficiency arising from conflicts of interest and 
asymmetric information cannot be thoroughly contained under the current system. 
 
2) Inadequate incentives for managers 
SOE managers differ from their counterparts in non-state firms in many respects. First, 
because they are government-appointed, they cannot avoid government interference 
with their SOEs, and their discretionary powers are limited. Second, their 
compensation is largely defined by their administrative rank, and there is a weak 
relationship among compensation, performance, and contributions. Accordingly, SOE 
executives are undervalued compared to their counterparts in non-state firms. Third, 
when SOE performance improves, executives are rewarded with a bonus or promotion; 
when SOE performance decreases, executives are rarely penalized. Accordingly, their 
responsibilities are limited. Fourth, because SOE executives might become 
government officials, they do not serve repeated terms in SOE offices; knowing this, 
executives may make short-term decisions for the SOE’s investments. Fifth, the 
colleagues of any individual executive are also appointed by the government, and they 
also have incentives to expand their sub-empires inside a large SOE. Therefore, each 
executive’s Nash equilibrium involves avoiding the conflicts that arise from 
decreasing investments that relate to other divisions. Consequently, soft budget 
constraints also occur inside SOEs. Finally, because many SOE executives are not 
good at business administration, they are likely to make more mistakes in investment 
decisions. All of these reasons contribute to SOE investment inefficiency. 
 
3) Policy burdens and soft budget constraints 
Although the structural adjustments that started in 1997 have largely lightened SOEs’ 
policy burdens, many of the remaining policy burdens have been the primary causes 
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of SOEs’ soft budget constraints. 
 
At least two social burdens: SOEs must maintain employment and pay retirement 
pensions. In times of difficulty, non-state firms can lay off employees to mitigate their 
disadvantages to some extent; conversely, SOEs have to increase employment, as in 
2008. With respect to pensions, because the government refuses to cover old SOEs’ 
retirement benefits
7
, the older an SOE is, the heavier its burden is of paying these 
pensions. 
 
Two kinds of strategic burdens. On the one hand, most large SOEs in so-called pillar 
industries (capital- or technology-intensive industries) are not as competitive as their 
counterparts in developed economies. Second, many SOEs in so-called lifeline 
industries (such as railways and highways) cannot cover their investment and 
operation costs. Take the highway industry as an example. As noted by a spokesman 
for the Ministry of Transportation, until November 11, 2011, total loans for toll-road 
construction were approximately RMB 2.3 trillion, whereas toll earnings for 2010 
were RMB 285.9 billion. All of the provinces have incurred losses after deducting 
loan expenses, taxes, road maintenance, operating expenses, depreciation, and 
amortization
8
. Although the government knows that both the investment and losses 
are huge, it still supports the highway industry, partly for its spillover effects on the 
automobile industry. 
 
New policy burdens under the current tax-sharing system. Under the current 
tax-sharing system between central and local governments, GDP and tax contributions 
are simple and clear indicators for assessing local government leaders. Investment is 
an easy way to stimulate GDP and taxation, unlike private consumption, which is 
normally stable, and exports, which depend on foreign demands. To obtain good 
performance, political leaders tend to interfere with SOE investments, which may not 
                                                             
7 Namely, SOEs established in the age of the planned economy, when they were paid just enough for their work to 
cover expenses and their profits were used to develop capital-intensive heavy industries. 
8 Source: http://news.sohu.com/20111127/n327041590.shtml. 
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be optimal as measured by the principle of business. 
 
Political burdens. To implement the “Western China development strategy”, the 
government often assigns “political tasks” to SOEs, which is likely to induce many 
nonperforming investment projects.  
 
In light of these policy burdens, it is natural for the government to pay the bill when 
SOEs report losses. However, the issue is that the government cannot easily 
distinguish losses arising from policy burdens from losses arising from SOE managers’ 
mistakes. Being aware of this, SOE managers are likely to overinvest. 
 
4) Soft equity constraints 
There are two cases in which SOEs experience soft equity constraints: equity 
financing and investment decision making. 
 
The low costs of equity financing. According to the financing theory of pecking order, 
the cost of equity financing is generally higher than debt financing. However, China’s 
SOEs prefer equity financing to debt financing because of soft equity constraints. 
First, although the stock market’s financing function is abnormally emphasized, its 
function of improving resource allocation is neglected. Both the government and the 
intermediaries (including investment banks, accounting firms, and auditing firms) act 
on behalf of the listed companies instead of public investors; therefore, the cost of 
breaking laws or losing credit is much lower for Chinese listed companies. Second, as 
the Chinese government adopts a policy of financial repression (McKinnon, 1973), 
there are few channels for individual investment, and the supply of shares is limited 
under the IPO and SEO approval system: the offering prices of A shares
9
 are usually 
much higher. Third, Chinese listed companies adopt a policy of delivering either no or 
                                                             
9 A shares are denominated in RMB, offered and transferred in domestic market. There are also B shares, which 
are denominated in US dollars (on the Shanghai Exchange) or HK dollars (on the Shenzhen Exchange), offered 
and transferred among investors at home and abroad; H shares, denominated in HK dollars, offered and transferred 
in the Hong Kong market; N shares, denominated in US dollars, offered and transferred on the New York 
Exchange; and S shares, denominated in Singapore dollars, offered and transferred on the Singapore market. 
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few dividends. Consequently, in China, equity financing is generally more attractive 
than debt financing, and SOEs enjoy privileges in equity financing because of their 
governmental support. 
 
Weakness of public shareholders. In many countries, the original purpose of 
establishing a stock market is to increase liquidity and help companies access an 
easier financing channel, whereas in China, the government must consider 
maintaining control of SOEs (Chen, 2005). To avoid criticism for selling state-owned 
assets, SOEs are only allowed to offer incremental shares to the public, and the state 
owner must retain control over listed SOEs. Moreover, before 2005, shares held by 
the state and legal persons were non-tradable on the stock exchanges. These 
institutional arrangements caused severe conflicts between public shareholders and 
non-tradable shareholders. The former receives few dividends and cannot influence 
SOEs’ operation and investment decisions, and therefore, stock prices often widely 
deviated from companies’ intrinsic value because of severe speculation. The latter 
does not care about stock prices unless seasoned equity offerings are needed because 
threats of takeovers do not exist
10
 and non-tradable shares can only be liquidated 
according to net asset value outside the exchanges. Accordingly, the distortion of the 
stock market damages the effectiveness of corporate governance. 
 
After the reform of separate equity ownership in 2005 and 2006, non-tradable shares 
obtained marketability inside stock exchanges, and many shares that were previously 
held by the state owner or legal persons were liquidated. However, the state owner 
retains control over most blue-chip companies, and thus, there have been no 
fundamental changes in the corporate governance of these SOEs. By the end of 2011, 
capitalization of the Chinese stock market had reached RMB 26 trillion, 80 percent of 
which belongs to SOEs; this ratio is much higher than their proportion in the real 
economy. 
 
                                                             
10 On average, non-tradable shares account for approximately two-thirds of the capitalization of listed companies. 
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As mentioned above, SOEs can obtain cheap funds from equity financing, which 
decreases the capital costs of investment; moreover, because the state retains control, 
it is easy for SOE managers to pursue their private interests through overinvestment.  
 
5) Soft debt constraints 
The main instruments of debt financing in China include bank loans, corporate bonds 
issued by listed SOEs, and bonds issued by non-listed SOEs. Although bond issuance 
requires government approval, the determination of interest rates is dominated by the 
competition mechanism, and therefore, bonds impose tight constraints upon SOEs.  
 
Conversely, because the bank loan market is still largely depressed, interest rates for 
bank loans are much lower than interest rates for bonds with the same term structures, 
and their constraints for SOEs are not tight for several reasons. First, the banking 
system is dominated by four state-owned banks
11
 (Allen, Qian and Qian, 2005). 
Because the top managers of these state-owned banks are appointed by the 
government and SOEs can seek support from the government, SOEs enjoy privileges 
in the event of credit rationing. In this scenario, the risk of adverse selection increases. 
For example, government-supported companies have a higher ratio of nonperforming 
loans (Chen, 2010). Second, because SOE managers have incentives to obtain private 
benefits from overinvestment and because they know that the government normally 
will not dare to allow large SOEs to go bankrupt, their best choice is to waste cheaply 
obtained bank loans on “empire building” or on-the-job perks, thus introducing the 
moral hazard problem. Third, because the state-owned banks are simply another type 
of SOE, their top managers also do not have adequate incentives to take good care of 
state-owned assets. In brief, because SOEs and state-owned banks are like twin 
brothers, it is difficult to insert a market mechanism between them. 
 
Because of the presence of soft constraints from bank loans, the discretionary 
                                                             
11 Namely, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the Bank of China, the China Construction Bank and 
the Agricultural Bank of China. 
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governance of debt cannot work, and SOEs are inclined to overinvest. 
 
3.3.4.3 Inefficient investment in Chinese companies 
It is only in recent years that Chinese companies’ inefficient investment has become a 
topic of great interest among Chinese scholars. 
 
According to agency theory and because of China’s economic and political context, 
overinvestment can occur in China’s listed companies. However, as Aggarwal and 
Samwick (2006) argue, because of owner absenteeism in Chinese SOEs and agency 
problems in both SOEs and non-state companies, the shirker effect may appear, which 
will cause underinvestment. Zhang and Song (2009) propose a new model to measure 
inefficient investment by listed Chinese industrial companies and report that 39.2% of 
their sampled companies overinvest, whereas 60.74% underinvest. Wang and Sun 
(2009) also report overinvestment in Chinese listed companies based on an empirical 
study. These authors show that free cash flow significantly and positively influences 
firms’ investment behavior, ownership concentration, and ownership proportion of the 
biggest shareholder, which can alleviate overinvestment to some extent; however, 
debt—namely, leverage—does not have a significant relation to investment behaviors.  
 
Many scholars have investigated the correlation between inefficient investment and 
various factors such as free cash flow, government intervention, corporate governance, 
and CEO incumbent status.  
 
Li and Xiao (2012) study the relation between CEO tenure and a listed firm’s 
investment. They find that companies with longer CEO tenure will have higher 
investment levels; conversely, companies with shorter prospective CEO tenure will 
have lower investment levels. This tendency is the same for both SOE and 
non-state-owned companies. That said, SOEs and private companies are influenced 
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differently by the relation between CEO tenure and firms’ investment efficiency. For 
SOEs, overinvestment is more severe in the companies with longer CEO tenure, and it 
will be mitigated more in companies with shorter prospective CEO tenure. The 
authors do not find this relation in non-state-owned companies. Guo and Wang (2012) 
studied 710 listed SOEs in 2006 and find that both overinvestment and free cash flow 
are positively related to the magnitude of overinvestment. State institutional 
ownership, leverage rate, ownership scale, and deviation of control have a negative 
impact on overinvestment. Convertible bonds are also reported to mitigate firm 
investment both because their fixed interest rates decrease managers’ disposable free 
cash and because creditors more actively monitor managers’ behavior (Xu, 2014).  
 
SOEs have many burdens, including employment, medical care, and retirement 
benefits, among others. To support SOEs, China’s central government gives them a 
special subsidy or helps them more easily obtain factors of production. Relatively 
cheap and easy access to the factors of production drives SOEs to invest more. Fiscal 
decentralization is regarded as a possible solution to this problem. Li and Gao (2010) 
thoroughly study this issue by checking the correlation between fiscal decentralization 
and overinvestment. They argue that although fiscal decentralization can alleviate this 
problem, it cannot solve it. Tang and Luo (2014) focus their study on local SOEs in 
the fiscal decentralization context and argue that leverage has a significant and 
positive correlation with the degree of local SOE overinvestment; moreover, in areas 
experiencing a more exacting scale of fiscal decentralization, overinvestment has a 
greater influence on the debt rate.  
 
Financing constraint is a key factor that influences firms’ investment behavior. Based 
on an empirical study of Chinese listed companies, Luo et al. (2012) argue that bank 
credit significantly boosts a firm’s overinvestment in SOEs but does not significantly 
influence private firms’ investment decisions. This finding reveals the different levels 
of financing efficiency among enterprises with different types of ownership. 
Equity-based refinancing is often used by Chinese listed companies. Qu and Yang 
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(2013) report that equity-based refinancing has a significant and positive correlation 
with firm overinvestment; compared to listed private companies, SOEs engage in 
much more extensive overinvestment because of equity-based refinancing. The 
authors also argue that this finding is evidence of tunneling behaviors by a firm’s 
controlling shareholders.   
 
Some scholars also investigate firm overinvestment behavior related to the influence 
of government intervention. Xiang et al. (2014) find that at the initial stage of a local 
governor’s tenure, intervention in local SOEs is small, and therefore, local SOEs’ 
overinvestment is weak; the longer a local governor’s tenure is, the greater the 
intervention in local SOEs is; therefore, local SOEs’ engage in more extensive 
overinvestment. However, when a local governor is about to leave his or her position, 
the magnitude of overinvestment drops dramatically. Wu and Yu (2009) report that 
overinvestment is much more extensive in local SOEs than in local private companies 
and argue that intervention from local government aggravates firms’ overinvestment. 
Zhang et al. (2014) also document the positive relation between government 
intervention and firm overinvestment and note that diversification is one of the most 
important types of overinvestment in firms, especially SOEs.    
 
3.4 Hypothesis Development  
The relationship between shareholders and management in Chinese SOEs is unique 
and differs from that described by traditional agency-cost theory, which is primarily 
based on asymmetrical information. By law, SOEs are owned by the state, but the 
problem is the question of who the state is: in practice, the state entrusts local 
governments, and governments empower governors to manage SOEs. Owner 
absenteeism causes large problems in SOEs (Aggarwal and Samwick, 2006) because 
there is no clear ownership: local governments and governors do not have sufficient 
motivation to monitor SOE management. When there is an agency problem between 
the state and the governors who are appointed to manage SOEs, there is also another 
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agency problem between SOE management and the governors, who themselves are 
the agents of the state (Xu and Yan, 2011).  
 
The state normally holds majority ownership in listed SOEs. Simultaneously, 
institutional and individual activism is weak (e.g. Weng, 2008; Sun and Liu, 2009) 
and thus, the severe agency problems in SOEs may have negative consequences. To 
pursue their own interests, managers may act to maximize their own benefits, hurting 
the firm's long-term interests (Wang, 2000). 
Thus, the thesis presents the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2a: Among Chinese publicly listed companies SOE attribute has a 
positive relation to firm’s investment. 
Hypothesis 2b: In general, Chinese listed SOEs engage in overinvestment. 
 
3.5 Research Methodology             
3.5.1 Samples    
The samples include non-financial companies listed on both the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. As in the previous study, financial 
companies are excluded from the sample because their assets and financing situations 
are very different from those of non-financial companies. Again, this thesis chooses 
data from A shares only, and the data are the same as in the study described in 
Chapter 2.  
 
To check the hypothesis in this chapter, the thesis uses many accounting items such as 
Tobin’s Q, cash flow, fixed assets, annual revenue, and financial leverage. All of 
these data can be obtained from the CSMAR database.  
 
One issue that needs to be highlighted is that because the thesis verifies two 
hypotheses in this chapter, the data for Hypothesis 2a and 2b are different. For 
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Hypothesis 2a, the thesis uses the sample that contains listed SOEs and non-SOE 
listed companies. However, for Hypothesis 2b, the thesis only uses samples based on 
all listed SOEs. Thus, the number of samples (firm-year observations) for the first 
empirical study to test Hypothesis 2a in this Chapter becomes 9897. To check the 
hypothesis 2b, this thesis conducts fours regressions. The first regression is conducted 
on the samples including all firms, the second regression is conducted on the 
subsamples including all SOEs, the third regression is conducted on the subsamples 
including all local SOEs and the fourth regression is conducted on the subsamples 
including only central SOEs. Obviously, the number of samples for these regressions 
becomes smaller and smaller. Sample number of the first regression is 9897, that of 
the second regression is 5297; the third regression contains 4622 samples while the 
last regression only has 675 samples. 
3.5.2 Research method    
The goal of this chapter is to verify two hypotheses: (1) Among Chinese publicly 
listed companies SOE attribute has a positive relation to firm’s inevsestment; and (2) 
in general, Chinese listed SOEs overinvest. Below is the description of the research 
method for these two hypotheses.  
 
a) Research method for Hypothesis 2a: Among Chinese publicly listed 
companies SOE attribute has a positive relation to firm’s investment. 
To check Hypothesis 2a, the thesis refers to Richardson’s (2006) method and divides 
the method into 3 steps, which are illustrated below.  
 
The thesis separates the firm’s total investment into two parts. The first part is the 
investment amount that maintains the firm’s existing assets. The second part is the 
total investment in new projects (Strong and Meyer, 1990; Richardson, 2006).  
𝐼𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤        (3-1) 
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Amortization and depreciation can be a proxy for Imaintenance, which is necessary to 
maintain the firm’s plant, machinery, and other facilities.  
 
Based on investment efficiency, the thesis then decomposes Inew into two additional 
parts. Investment in the projects that can generate positive NPV is the expected 
investment and the normal part, whereas investment in the projects that only generate 
negative NPV is the unexpected investment and the abnormal part.  
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝐼𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑     (3-2) 
 
The unexpected investment part can be either positive or negative. When it is positive, 
Inew is bigger than the expected investment level, which indicates overinvestment. 
When it is negative, Inew is smaller than the expected investment level, which 
indicates underinvestment.  
 
There are many studies that discuss the determinants of firms’ investment decisions 
(e.g., Hubbard, 1998; Brito and John, 2001; Wang and Sun 2009), including growth 
opportunity, financial leverage, cash, and firm size, among others. Thus, the thesis 
constructs a model to predict the firm’s new investment level. If the firm’s investment 
can be explained by the model, it belongs to the expected part; the actual investment 
that cannot be explained by the model is the unexpected part. Note here that the 
expected part derived from the model can be either higher or lower than the firm’s 
actual investment amount. In theory, the difference between the firm’s actual 
investment amount and the model’s investment prediction can be obtained by 
calculating the residuals of the regression. See Figure 3.3 below for illustration. 
 
[Figure 3.3] 
  
 
From formula 3-1 above, we can easily obtain the following:   
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𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝐼𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 − 𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒            (3-3) 
 
All of the elements that compose Itotal and Imaintenance for each listed company are 
reported in the firm’s annual report and are available in the CSMAR database. 
Therefore, Inew can be calculated from these data and it is easy to obtain each 
company’s actual new investment level. The thesis runs a regression based on Inew as 
the dependent variable and all of the other investment determinants mentioned earlier 
as independent variables to predict the firm’s new investment, which the thesis marks 
as I
*
new. According to the regression definition, the difference between Inew and I
*
new 
comprises the residuals of the regression. Thus, the following equation can be 
obtained: 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝐼𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑  
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤
∗ + 𝜀          (3-4) 
where ( 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤
∗ = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 + ∑ 𝛽 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠
𝑛
2 ) and ε  is the 
regression residual that is equal to 𝐼𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑.   
 
Thus, this thesis can calculate regression residuals and judge the firm’s investment 
situation based on the signs of the regression residuals. If the sign is positive, the firm 
overinvests; if the sign is negative, the firm underinvests.  
 
The thesis then performs another regression in which Iunexpected—namely, the residuals 
of the regression presented in equations 3-4 — is the dependent variable. The 
independent variables contain dummy variables (including SOE attribute and free 
cash flow status), along with accounting and financial items such as leverage, gross 
margin, and an ownership attribute variable. The coefficient of SOE attribute denotes 
the relationship between SOE attribute and Iunexpected. If the coefficient is significant 
and the sign is positive, then SOE attribute will cause the firm to invest more, thus 
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proving Hypothesis 2a.   
 
b) Research method for Hypothesis 2b: In general, listed SOEs overinvest. 
Hypothesis 2b argues that Chinese listed SOEs generally engage in overinvestment. 
The thesis borrows empirical methods used by Vogt (1994) and Mei (2005) in this 
research.  
 
Financing constraints have a substantial impact on a firm’s investment decisions. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that insiders have better information than outsiders 
about a company’s value in the capital market. To offset the risks caused by 
asymmetric information, capital lenders normally require higher returns on the funds 
that they lend. However, high interest rates may make positive-NPV projects 
unprofitable; therefore, adverse selection occurs in the capital market in that firms 
with a tight inside cash flow are required to forgo good positive-NPV projects 
because of high external financing costs. The authors thus formulate a pecking order 
(PO) hypothesis, which provides that firms prefer to use internal funds for investment 
instead of debt or equity-based financing. Because of financing constraints, if firms 
cannot generate sufficient cash flow for all of their positive-NPV projects, the firm is 
underinvested.  
 
Conversely, agency problems also play an important role in a firm’s investment 
decisions. Many scholars find that managers’ pecuniary and non-pecuniary income 
are positively related to company size, and managers in bigger companies have much 
higher incomes than managers in smaller companies (e.g., Conyon and Murphy, 
2000). Thus, managers are more likely to overinvest in negative-NPV projects to 
obtain more benefits based on an increased company size (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Jensen, 1986).  
 
Based on the two scenarios set forth above, this thesis infers that with a firm’s 
increasing opportunities to invest in positive-NPV projects, the sensitivity between 
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free cash flow and investment becomes tighter, meaning that the firm experiences 
financing constraints and underinvestment occurs. Conversely, with a firm’s 
decreasing opportunities to invest in positive-NPV projects, the sensitivity between 
free cash flow and investment becomes tighter, meaning that the firm experiences 
agency problems and overinvestment occurs. 
 
Similar to the method used by Vogt (1994) and Mei (2005), the thesis first constructs 
a model describing the value of a firm’s investment, including growth measures, 
accounting measures, the impact of company size, and the annual fix effect.  
 
𝐼 = α + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊 + ∑ 𝛽 𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠
𝑛
2   (3-5) 
 
In equation 3-5, I stands for the firm’s investment, and β1 reflects the correlation 
between free cash flow and firm investment. Other investment factors include cash 
stock, growth opportunities (measured by Tobin’s Q), annual sales, yearly effect, and 
industrial impact.  
 
To identify whether financing constraints or agency problems have a greater influence 
on firm investment, this study introduces the interaction between cash flow and 
Tobin’s Q as a new independent variable in the above equation. Therefore, the 
equation becomes 
 
𝐼 = α + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊 × 𝑄
+ ∑ 𝛽 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠
𝑛
3
 
                       (3-6) 
 
In equation 3-6, CASHFLOW × Q is the interaction of free cash flow and Tobin’s Q 
(namely, investment opportunities). The other variables remain the same as in 
173 
 
equation 3-5.  
 
The purpose of CASHFLOW × Q is to investigate what factor induces sensitivity 
between investment and free cash flow in the firm. If the model presented in 3-6 is 
linear, then the coefficient of CASHFLOW × Q,  𝛽2 will be the following: 
 
𝛽2 =
𝛿𝐼
𝛿𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊×𝛿𝑄
          (3-7) 
 
Thus, 𝛽2 =
𝛿𝐼/𝛿𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊
𝛿𝑄
, because 
𝐼
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊
 equals to the coefficient of 
CASHFLOW. Therefore, equation 3-7 can be written as 
 
𝛽2 =
𝛿𝛽1
𝛿𝑄
            (3-8) 
Indeed, 
𝛿𝛽1
𝛿𝑄
 is the first-order derivative of 
𝛽1
𝑄
, and thus,  
 
𝛽2 = (
𝛽1
𝑄
) ′                (3-9) 
 
Based on calculus principles, it can be inferred that 
1) If 𝛽2 > 0 , then β1  and Q are consistent with the relation of an 
increasing function, that is, when Q becomes larger (namely, when there 
are more investment opportunities), sensitivity between free cash flow 
and investment will be tighter, the firm will experience financing 
constraints and lack sufficient money to fund positive projects, and the 
firm will thus be underinvested.  
2) If 𝛽2 < 0, then β1 and Q are consistent with the relation of a decreasing 
function, that is, when Q becomes smaller (namely, when there are fewer 
investment opportunities), sensitivity between free cash flow and 
investment will be tighter, the firm will experience agency problems, 
managers will invest in projects with negative NPVs based on their 
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personal benefits, and the firm will thus be overinvested. 
 
In summary, the sign of the regression coefficient of the interaction variable 
indicates a firm’s investment status. A positive sign indicates underinvestment, 
whereas a negative sign indicates overinvestment.  
  
3.5.3 Variables 
a) Variable definition for Hypothesis 2a: Among Chinese publicly listed 
companies SOE attribute has a positive relation to firm’s investment. 
 
The dependent variable of regression for Hypothesis 2a is Inew. As mentioned above, 
Inew equals total investment minus expenditure to maintain existing assets. A detailed 
definition is provided below. 
Inew = Itotal − Imaintenance 
In which 
Itotal = CAPEX + Acquisition + R&D − SalePPE 
 
Imaintenance = Depreciation + Amorization 
 
Many scholars have discussed the determinants that can influence firm investment 
behaviors (e.g., Hubbard, 1998; Guo and Wang, 2012). Based on these studies and 
Richardson (2007) model, the thesis chooses variables that measure a firm’s growth 
opportunities, debt ratio, cash stock, company age, company size, stock return, 
yearly-fixed effects, and industry-fixed effects. Why the regression does not include 
provincial-fixed effects is because although listed firms are registered in different 
provinces, they can make investments across China and overseas freely, so firms’ 
registered provinces do not matter with their investment amount. The first step in 
verifying Hypothesis 2a is to obtain a firm’s proper new investment level so that the 
thesis can calculate the difference between the appropriate new investment level and 
the actual new investment level, namely, the residuals of the regression. The table 3.1 
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below presents details for the regression’s dependent and independent variables to 
predict a firm’s appropriate new investment level.    
[Table 3.1] 
In Table 3.1, all independent variables are divided into three groups. Firm’s average 
Tobin’s Q and Company age represent firm’s growth opportunities. Cash stock, 
leverage (debt rate), company size and stock return represent firm’s financing 
constraints. Fixed effects include industry dummy and year dummy. The standard 
approach in the literature has been to use market price relative to some measure of 
fundamental value to determine growth opportunities. Tobin’s Q (the ratio of the 
market value of assets to the current replacement cost of those assets) is the most 
widely used measure of growth opportunities (Narayanan, 1988; Vogt, 1994; 
Richardson, 2007). Firm level investment is lessened when firms are more difficult to 
raise additional cash to finance the new investment as captured by firm maturity, 
leverage, firm size, and level of cash (e.g., Fazzari et al., 1988; Hubbard, 1998). A 
prior year stock return is included as an additional variable to reflect growth 
opportunities not reflected in Tobin’s Q as Richardson (2007) did. Prior firm level 
investment is also included to represent non-modeled firm characteristics that impact 
investing decisions. This thesis also includes indicator variables, as dummy variables, 
for industry membership and temporal effects to capture additional variation in 
investment expenditure that are not explained by the measures of growth 
opportunities and financing constraints. One important note is that including these 
additional variables may reduce the power of tests to capture firm overinvestment. For 
instance, if over-investment is concentrated in some specific industry groups, in 
particular time periods or is concentrated in firms of a certain sector then the model 
may inappropriately classify abnormal investment as normal investment. To address 
this possibility, multiple investment expectation models are examined later on in this 
thesis. 
 
Based on the above regression, the study can obtain the firm’s proper new investment 
level, which this thesis names pInew, and the thesis then calculates the firm’s free cash 
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flow. Free cash flow is the cash flow that is greater than what is necessary to maintain 
existing assets and debts and to finance the firm’s optimal new investments. To 
calculate free cash flow, the following components are required: 
1) CFEAD: Cash flow from existing assets and debts; 
2) Imaintenance: Expenditure of investment necessary to maintain existing assets; and 
3) pInew: Predicted expenditure of new investment that finances good projects. 
 
𝐶𝐹𝐸𝐴𝐷 = 𝐶𝐹𝑂 − 𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝑅𝑁𝐷    (3-10a) 
As shown in equation 3-10a, CFEAD equals a firm’s operating cash flow (CFO) minus 
Imaintenance plus R&D expenditures. The reason that R&D expenditures should be added 
to CFEAD is that accounting regulations require firms to make R&D expenditures; 
therefore, R&D expenditures are deducted from the firm’s operating cash flow.  
 
A firm’s free cash flow can be obtained from the difference between CFEAD and the 
firm’s expected new investment, pInew. 
 
FCF = 𝐶𝐹𝐸𝐴𝐷 − 𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤                 (3-10b) 
 
the thesis then constructs two dummy variables to describe FCF, as set forth 
below: 
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝐶𝐹 > 0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 = 0 
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝐶𝐹 < 0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 = 0 
 
As mentioned previously, the regression residuals for Table 3.1 are the measures of a 
firm’s investment situation. This thesis names the residual Inewerr; its sign indicates 
whether the firm is overinvested (when its sign is positive) or underinvested (when its 
sign is negative). The abstract values of Inewerr reflect the magnitude of over- or 
underinvestment.  
 
177 
 
To verify Hypothesis 2a about whether SOE attribute is positively related to firm’s 
unexpected investment, this thesis makes the second regression, which includes Inewerr 
as the dependent variable and FCFpositve, FCFnegative, SOETAG, and components 
reflecting firm features as independent variables. Table 3.2 presents the details.  
 
[Table 3.2] 
 
 
b) Variable definition for Hypothesis 2b: In general, Chinese listed SOEs 
engage in overinvestment. 
 
Hypothesis 2b argues that in general, Chinese listed SOEs are overinvested. To verify 
this hypothesis, as mentioned in equations 3-5 and 3-6, this study runs a regression 
between a firm’s investment level and cash flow, investment opportunity measured by 
Tobin’s Q, interaction of cash flow and Tobin’s Q, debt rate, cash amount, company 
size, year indicator, and industry indicator. As state earlier, these variables are tightly 
related to firm’s investment, similar to the regression in Hypothesis 2a, the thesis also 
puts these variables into regressions to capture firm’s investment. Table 3.3 provides 
details.  
 
[Table 3.3] 
 
3.5.4 Models    
3.5.4.1 Models for Hypothesis 2a 
The first step is to make a fixed-effects panel data estimator
12
 that predicts a firm’s 
appropriate new investment level. Referring to Richardson’s (2006) and Guariglia and 
                                                             
12 A Hausman test is conducted to check whether fixed effect model or random effect model should be deployed. 
H0: difference in coefficients between fixed effect and random effect model is not systematic 
Chi2(9)=112.05;  Prob>chi2 = 0.0000. So fixed effect model should be selected. 
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Yang (2016) method, a fixed-effects panel data model is used to predict the expected 
investment expenditure in new positive NPV projects, which can be interpreted as the 
optimal level of investment expenditure. Specifically, denoting with Tobin's Q, with 
Cash, its ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets; with Sales Revenue
13
, the 
natural logarithm of its total annual sales revenue; with Company Age, the number of 
years elapsed since its listing; with Stockreturn, its return on stocks; and with 
Leverage, the ratio of its short-term and long-term debt to total assets, the thesis 
estimates the following equation:  
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑖,𝑡 = α + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐿𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
                                                  (3-11) 
Where the subscript i indexes firms; t indexes years and j indexes industry. The thesis 
lags all independent variables except companyage to alleviate the simultaneity issue 
(Duchin et al., 2010). The error term in equation 3-11 is made up of four 
components.μiis a firm-specific effect; μtis a time-specific effect, which the thesis 
controls for by including year dummies capturing business cycle effects; μjis a 
industry-specific effect which the thesis takes into account by including industry 
dummies; Finally εi,t is an idiosyncratic component. 
 
Based on the above regression, the thesis can predict a firm’s appropriate new 
investment level, pInew. Next, this thesis calculates the firm’s free cash flow and 
constructs FCFpositve and FCFnegative according to the methods described in Table 3.2.  
 
Inewerr, the difference between a firm’s actual new investment and predicted new 
investment, can be obtained from the residuals of the above regression. To verify 
                                                             
13 The thesis will use both annual sales revenue (Lnrev) and total assets (Lnsize) as proxy of firm size. Section 
§3.6.1.2 reports four panels, coefficient of firm’s annual sales revenue is not significant in the third panel, so the 
thesis chooses total asset as firm size proxy in the fourth panel. 
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whether SOE attribute is positively associated with firm’s inefficient investment in 
Chinese listed SOEs, another pooled panel regression is conducted, as set forth below: 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑟 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑂𝐸 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒
+ 𝛽4𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑚 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀 
                                     (3-12) 
As previously discuss, Inewerr denotes a firm’s investment situation; if Inewerr is positive, 
the firm is overinvested, whereas if Inewerr is negative, the firm is underinvested. In 
addition, abstract values of Inewerr indicate firms’ overinvestment or underinvestment 
scale. The study runs regressions for all of the samples. In the four panels, the thesis 
will put different SOE attribute dummy variable (i.e. SOETAG, LOCALTAG and 
Centralsoe) into the regressions and signs of β3 will be checked; if the signs are 
positive and the coefficient is significant, Hypothesis 2a can be proven.   
 
3.5.4.2 Models for Hypothesis 2b. 
Hypothesis 2b argues that in general, Chinese listed SOEs are overinvested. 
Following Vogt (1994) and Mei (2005), this thesis introduces the model below to 
check the relationship between investment-FCF (free cash flow) sensitivity and 
Tobin’s Q to reveal whether such sensitivity is caused by financing constraints or 
agency problems. Agency problems in the firm lead to overinvestment, whereas 
financing constraints normally induce underinvestment.   
 
𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡 = α + 𝛽1𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹 + 𝛽4𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑡−1 × 𝐶𝐹 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦
+ 𝛽8𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀 
                                      (3-13) 
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In the above equation, because Tobin’s Q, debt rate, annual sales revenue, and cash 
amount have a lagged effect on firm investment, the thesis uses the one period-lagged 
value of the abovementioned variables for the regression. Note that variables with 
financial values are scaled by the firm’s one-period lagged fixed assets on both sides 
of the equation to eliminate unit dimensions.   
 
To verify Hypothesis 2b, the thesis runs this pooled panel regression on the samples 
of all SOE companies (SOETAG=1) and check the sign of interaction item. As a 
comparison, the thesis also runs the regression on all of the samples so this study can 
investigate the investment situation in both SOEs and all Chinese listed companies.   
 
3.6 Empirical Results                  
3.6.1 Results of the empirical study for Hypothesis 2a   
3.6.1.1 Variable descriptive statistics 
Table 3.4 presents descriptive statistics for the variables in the regression for equation 
3-11.  
[Table 3.4] 
 
Because the original data contain data from various industries and from different 
years, there are some singular values in the samples, making the standard deviations 
of both the dependent and independent variables abnormally large. To eliminate the 
influences of these singular values in the regression, the thesis winsorized all of the 
variables (except for Companyage and Lnrev) at the 0.01 level. Table 3.4 shows the 
descriptive statistics after the Winsorized operation.  
 
Table 3.5 shows the correlations among the variables in regression to predicate firm’s                                 
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new investment, namely equation 3-11. The maximum correlation is -0.3771 between 
lnrev and TobinQ, and other absolute values of the correlations are generally lower 
than 0.35, thus indicating that multicollinearity is not significant and that it is 
unnecessary for us to create a special treatment for panel 3-11. 
[Table 3.5] 
 
3.6.1.2 Regression Results  
Table 3.6 reports the results of the regression that predict a firm’s investment level 
based on a fixed effects panel data model. As discussed previously, the regression’s 
residuals will indicate a firm’s over- or underinvestment.  
 
[Table 3.6]  
 
The regressions are based on fixed effects panel data models. This thesis presents the 
results of the four panels in Table 3.6.  
 
In the first model, the thesis only considered the firm’s investment opportunities, 
which are measured by Tobin’s Q. Firms with more investment 
opportunities—namely, firms with a high Tobin’s Q—will typically have higher 
investment expenditures (Narayanan, 1988), and thus, the thesis predicts that the 
coefficient sign of Tobin’s Q will be positive. This result is consistent with the 
argument that Tobin’s Q is significantly and positively related to a firm’s investment 
expenditure. However, the adjusted R-squared of this model is quite low—less than 
1%—which indicates that the model missed many other factors in this model.  
 
This thesis presents the influence of industry dummy variables and year dummy 
variables in model II. The result shows that industry and year play significant roles in 
determining a firm’s investment level. The R-squared of model II is 2.1%, which 
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together with an F value of 31.1 denotes that year and industry are significant factors 
influencing a firm’s investment level. Therefore, year and industry should be adopted 
in the following models.    
 
Model III reports other variables (except for Tobin’s Q) that influence a firm’s 
investment decisions. Like Richardson (2006), this thesis includes the firm’s debt rate, 
cash stock, stock return, company size, and company age in the model. Unlike 
Richardson, in model 3, this thesis uses the firm’s annual revenue—not the firm’s 
total assets—as the measure of firm size because some companies may not have big 
total fix assets even they are big companies such as trading companies and high-tech 
companies thus some scholars choose firm annual sales revenue as a proxy for firm 
size (e.g., Core et al., 1999; Ozkan, 2007); Zhou (2010) also reports a correlation 
between firm revenue and firm investment. Most of the predicted signs of the 
abovementioned variables are positive, except for firm debt rate and company age. 
According to Jensen (1986) and Lang et al. (1996), financing constraints will cause 
firms either to underinvest or to control the degree of overinvestment; therefore, the 
predicted sign of the debt rate is negative. Older firms normally have greater total 
assets and thus have lower growth rates because of the scale effect (Xie, 2005; Song 
and Huang, 2012). The thesis predicts that there is a negative relation between 
company age and firm investment level, and therefore, the sign is negative. The 
results support all predictions and indicate that company age and debt rate are 
negatively related to firm investment level but that cash stock, stock return, and 
revenue are positively related to investment level. However, the relation between 
firm’s revenue and firm’s investment is not significant in this model. So, in model IV, 
this thesis will choose firm total assets as the proxy of firm size. All of the 
coefficients of the variables in model III are significant except Lnrev, with within 
R-squared of 3.6% and an F value of 58.89. These outputs show that the variables are 
relevant in explaining firms’ investment decisions, but because of low R-squared 
value, it seems that the model misses some important variables; the thesis then will 
introduce one period lagged firm investment as an independent variable later in this 
183 
 
chapter.  
 
Model IV includes all of the variables from model I to model III, but subsititute firm 
annual sales revenue (Lnrev) with firm total assets (Lnsize) as the proxy of firm size. 
Thus, the explanatory power slightly increased to 5.1%. All of the control variables 
comply with the expectation that a firm’s new investment decreases with company 
age and debt rate and increases with cash stock, stock return, firm size and growth 
opportunities. All of the coefficients are significant. Again, the within R-squared 
value is small so the thesis will introduce one period lagged firm investment as an 
independent variable later in this chapter. 
 
This thesis then uses model IV to predict the firm’s new investment (namely, pInew) 
to calculate free cash flow in equation 3-12. Localtag is the dummy variable to 
identify SOEs owned by the local government, whereas centralsoe identifies SOEs 
owned by the central government. Refer to Table 2.2 and Table 3.2 for detailed 
definitions of each variable. Table 3.7 provides descriptive statistics of the variables 
in regression 3-12.  
 
[Table 3.7] 
 
To test Hypothesis 2a, the thesis runs equation 3-12 based on four panels. The results 
of the regressions are presented in Table 3.8. 
 
This thesis checks the relation between a firm’s unexpected investment and the SOE 
attribute dummy variable in all of the samples in the first panel. In the second and 
third panel, the thesis substitutes SOE attribute with local SOE attribute and central 
SOE attribute, respectively. In the fourth panel, the thesis puts both CENTRALSOE 
and LOCALTAG into the regression. Note that both CENTRALSOE and 
LOCALTAG comprise the subset of SOETAG. 
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[Table 3.8]  
 
The result of panel I supports the hypothesis 2a. All of the coefficients are significant, 
and the F value is 50.96, thus indicating that the regression is meaningful. Consistent 
with both agency theory and many previous studies (e.g., Wang and Sun, 2009; Zhou 
and Wang, 2011), ownership concentration is negatively related to unexpected 
investment. This result reflects how major shareholders play effective roles in 
controlling and monitoring management in listed Chinese companies. A firm’s 
business operational margin has a negative influence on the investment level. This 
result does not consist with the financing constraint hypothesis, which holds that if a 
firm has a higher operational margin and thus more disposable funds, it is more likely 
to engage in additional investment if other conditions remain the same. This may 
because the firms with higher operating margin have better management thus they can 
prevent overinvestment in general. FCFnegative and FCFpositive are equal to FCF for 
values of FCF less or greater than zero. This allows the relation between 
over-investment and free cash flow to be asymmetric (Richardson, 2006). In 
particular, the slope coefficient based on the sign of free cash flow reveals that 
over-investment is concentrated in firms with positive free cash flow. The coefficient 
of negative FCF is 0.069 and the coefficient of positive FCF is 0.075, significantly
14
 
different at the 1% level. When firms do not have free cash flow, (i.e., FCF is 
negative) the possibility of over-investment is mitigated because the firm is forced to 
access external financial markets to raise funds necessary to support any additional 
investment. Thus capital markets serve a monitoring role in disciplining managerial 
use of funds. The regression results in Table 3.8 shows that firms with positive free 
cash flow are more likely to over-invest on average. This result supports the financing 
constraint hypothesis. The regression results in Table 3.8 also relate to 
under-investment. The positive coefficient on β2 indicates that firms with negative 
free cash flow experience less over-investment. This relation is consistent with the 
                                                             
14To test heterogeneity of coefficients of FCFpositive and FCFnegative, the F-test is constructed. 
H0:β1=β2;  H1: β1 ≠ β2.  
Testing Results: t=26.18, p=0.000. So the two coefficients are significantly different. 
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understanding that firms subject to cash short falls from operating activities scale back 
on their investment activities. However it is necessary to note that the strength of the 
relation between abnormal investment and free cash flow is relieved for firms with 
negative free cash flow because these firms may be able to raise additional cash from 
external financial markets to support their investment. SOETAG is significantly and 
positively related to the firm’s unexpected investment. This result implies that when 
other conditions remain the same, SOEs will engage in more investment than 
non-SOEs. Furthermore, SOE attribute is associated with more investment in Chinese 
public listed firms, thus proving Hypothesis 2a.  
 
To further investigate the relation between SOE attributes and a firm’s investments, 
this thesis substitutes SOE attribute with local SOE and central SOE in panel II and 
III respectively. The regression result of panel II shows that local SOEs engage in 
more unexpected investment than other firms, but the regression result of panel III 
reveals that central-SOE attribute has a positive—but not significant—relation to a 
firm’s unexpected investment. This finding is interesting, and some previous studies 
may provide an explanation for the difference. Zhao and Hao (2013) find that because 
local governments are motivated to win the GDP competition, local governments tend 
to intervene in SOEs, and such interventions normally cause overinvestment. 
However, local government intervention has a much weaker influence on central 
SOEs than it does on local SOEs. Hao and Liu (2011) argue that because central 
SOEs are directly managed by the SASAC (State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission), central SOEs more easily bypass the intervention of 
local governments.  Meanwhile, some authors (Li and Gao, 2010; Tang and Luo, 
2014) reveal that fiscal decentralization is a reason for overinvestment by local SOEs. 
They argue that because of fiscal decentralization, local governments assume too 
many responsibilities related to fiscal expenditure. However, local governments 
cannot rely solely on fiscal income, and therefore, they have the motivation and 
ability to shift some of these burdens to local SOEs by intervening in local SOE 
investment and financing behaviors. These authors find that local SOEs that are more 
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overinvested generally shoulder higher debt rates, a finding that is consistent with 
their argument. 
 
In panel IV, the thesis puts both CENTRALSOE and LOCALTAG into the regression. 
The signs of all coefficients remain the same as in panel II and panel III. Both 
LOCALTAG and CENTRALSOE show a positive relation with firm’s unexpected 
investment with significance at 0.01 level. 
3.6.2 Results of the empirical study for Hypothesis 2b 
3.6.2.1 Variable descriptive statistics 
Table 3.9 gives variable descriptive statistics of the regression listed in equation 3-13. 
To eliminate the influences of these singular values on the regression, the thesis 
Winsorized newinvest, CF, CA, TobinQ, and lever at the 0.01 level. Table 3.9 shows 
the descriptive statistics after the Winsor operation.  
 
[Table 3.9] 
 
3.6.2.2 Regression results  
Table 3.10 gives the results of the regressions to check firms’ overinvestment status, 
as discussed in equation 3-13.  
 
[Table 3.10] 
 
The results for the four models are presented in Table 3.10. The first model is 
conducted using the full samples, including both SOEs and non-SOEs. In the second 
model, the thesis runs the regression on the SOEs only. Models three and four report 
the results of regressions in local SOEs and central SOEs, respectively.  
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Hypothesis 2b argues that Chinese listed SOEs generally overinvest. Financing 
constraints have a substantial impact on firms’ investment decisions. This thesis infers 
that if the sensitivity between free cash flow and investment becomes tighter with an 
increase in a firm’s opportunities to invest in positive-NPV projects, the firm 
experiences financing constraints and underinvestment occurs. Conversely, if the 
sensitivity between free cash flow and investment opportunities becomes tighter with 
a decrease in a firm’s opportunities to invest in positive-NPV projects, the firm 
experiences agency problems and overinvestment occurs. This thesis uses the 
interaction Cashflow×Q to represent the sensitivity between free cash flow and 
investment opportunities. If the regression coefficient of QCFK is positive, the firm is 
underinvested; if the sign is negative, the firm is overinvested.  
 
Model one is analyzed for all of the sampled companies. A firm’s investment 
opportunities (measured by Tobin’s Q), cash flow, sales revenue, amount of cash 
stock, and size are positively related to its annual investment amount, but debt rate 
(lever) has a negative relation to annual investment amount. The results comply with 
financing constraint theory and are similar to those of Mei’s (2005) study. The sign of 
coefficient of interaction Cashflow×Q (namely QCFK) is negative, and it is 
significant at the 1% level. This indicates that listed Chinese companies are generally 
overinvested.  
 
The thesis deletes non-SOE companies from the sample and rerun the regression in 
the second model so that the study can check cash flow and investment opportunity 
sensitivity among Chinese listed SOEs. The results are similar to those of model one: 
all of the signs remain the same, but some coefficients are no longer significant at 1%. 
The coefficient of QCFK remains negative and strongly significant at 1%, which 
reveals that Chinese listed SOEs are generally overinvested. Thus, Hypothesis 2b is 
proven.  
 
To conduct a further investigation on the relation between SOE attribute and a firm’s 
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investment behavior, the thesis continues the regression in two subgroups of SOEs. 
Model three is designed for local SOEs, and model four is designed for central SOEs. 
The results of model 3 are highly similar to those of model 2. Again, the coefficient of 
QCFK is significantly negative, indicating that local SOEs are generally overinvested. 
The results of model 4 are slightly different from those of models 2 and 3. First, none 
of the coefficients are significant except for Tobin’s Q, which is positive at the 10% 
level. Second, the coefficient sign of cash amount (CA) becomes negative (from 
positive) in the previous three models. Third, although the coefficient of QCFK 
remains negative, it is not significant, with a t-statistics value of only -0.313. Based on 
the results of model 4, it cannot say that listed central SOEs are overinvested. Indeed, 
this output is similar to the finding obtained in the previous section on Hypothesis 2a, 
i.e., that local SOEs engage in more unexpected investment than central SOEs do. The 
finding for model three reveals that local SOEs are overinvested, but this study does 
not obtain the same finding for central SOEs. One possible explanation for this result 
is that local government engages in more intervention in local SOEs because of GDP 
competition and fiscal decentralization, which are discussed at the end of section 
3.6.1.2. Another possible explanation is that there are only 675 observations in the 
sample set of central SOEs, a number that is insufficient for the cross-section OLS 
regression. This explanation can be tested in a future study that includes more 
firm-year observations.   
 
3.6.3 Robustness test  
3.6.3.1 Robustness test for Hypothesis 2a 
As discussed in section 3.6.1.2, the R-squared values of regressions based on fixed 
effects panel data models are very low. The results indicate that the model may miss 
some important explanatory variable. Referring to Richardson (2006), this thesis adds 
one period lagged firm investment as an additional explanatory variable. To construct 
the model, according to Arellano and Bond (1991), Blundell and Bond (1998) and 
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Windmeijer (2005), the thesis introduces a two-step, bias-corrected system GMM 
(Generalized Method of Moments) estimator for a dynamic panel data model in 
determining firm’s investment, as shown in equation 3-14 below.  
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑖,𝑡 = α + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(3-14) 
 
Table 3.11 shows the results of regression based on above DPD-GMM model. 
[Table 3.11] 
This thesis then uses this regression to predict the firm’s new investment (namely, 
pInew) to calculate free cash flow in equation 3-12 based on sys GMM panel data 
model. To test Hypothesis 2a, the thesis redoes equation 3-12 based on four panels. 
The results of the regressions are presented in Table 3.12 
[Table 3.12] 
The result of panel I supports the hypothesis 2a. All of the coefficients are significant, 
and the F value is 65.03, thus indicating that the regression is meaningful. Again, 
ownership concentration is negatively related to unexpected investment. Same as 
result based on fixed effects panel data model, a firm’s business operational margin 
has a negative influence on the investment level. Consistant with the previous results, 
the coefficient of negative FCF is 0.0557 and the coefficient of positive FCF is 0.169, 
significantly
15
 different at the 1% level. Thus, the regression results in Table 3.12 
show that again firms with positive free cash flow are more likely to over-invest on 
average. SOETAG is significantly and positively related to the firm’s unexpected 
investment thus proving Hypothesis 2a once more.  
 
Results in Panel II to Panel III are also same as previous outputs based on fixed 
                                                             
15To test heterogeneity of coefficients of FCFpositive and FCFnegative, the F-test is constructed. 
H0:β1=β2;  H1: β1 ≠ β2.  
Testing Results: t=68.19, p=0.000. So the two coefficients are significantly different. 
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effects panel data model. Local SOEs engage in more unexpected investment than 
other firms, again the regression result of panel III reveals that central-SOE attribute 
has a positive—but not significant—relation to a firm’s unexpected investment. Both 
LOCALTAG and CENTRALSOE show a positive relation with firm’s unexpected 
investment with significance at 0.01 level in Panel IV.  
 
In summary, the regression results based on system GMM dynamic panel data models 
are similar to the results shown in Table 3.8. SOE attribute is positively related to a 
firm’s unexpected investment at the 0.01 level, and local SOE companies engage in 
more unexpected investment than other companies. Moreover, central SOE attribute 
does not significantly influence a firm’s level of unexpected investment. Therefore, 
the research methods are robust.  
 
3.6.3.2 Robustness test for Hypothesis 2b 
The thesis substitutes a firm’s gross margin (profit) for its sales revenue (sales) as the 
proxy for firm operational performance in equation 3-13. The thesis also substitutes 
natural logarithm of firm’s total assets (lnsize) for size dummy in equation 3-13. 
Table 3.13 shows the results of the regressions based on a firm’s gross margin. 
 
The results for the four models are presented in Table 3.13. The first model is 
conducted using the full samples, including both SOEs and non-SOEs. In the second 
model, the thesis runs the regression on the SOEs only. Models three and four report 
the results of regressions in local SOEs and central SOEs, respectively.  
 
[Table 3.13] 
 
The regression based on firm profit has results that are similar to those of model 3-13. 
For all companies—SOEs and local SOEs alike—QCFK is significantly and 
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negatively related to a firm’s annual investment, which indicates that overinvestment 
occurs in all companies (i.e., SOEs and local SOEs). In addition, similar to the outputs 
of model 3-13, QCFK is not significant for central SOEs. The above results comply 
with the results of model 3-13, and thus, the regression model is robust.  
 
3.7 Conclusion and Discussion      
Firm investment behavior is a key research field in both corporate governance and 
corporate finance. In this chapter, the thesis examines the investment behavior of 
Chinese listed SOEs. Chinese SOEs are different from modern corporations both in 
their internal corporate governance and in their external financing conditions.  
 
Because of compensation regulations and the absence of the State owner, as this thesis 
showed in Chapter 2, Chinese SOEs experience both serious agency problems and 
serious conflicts of interest. SOE managers have incentives to offset their 
compensation loss through overinvestment whenever there is adequate internal cash 
flow. However, Chinese SOEs enjoy advantages in external financing and investment 
conditions. The Chinese government offers SOEs large tax reductions and subsidies, 
and SOEs can obtain favorable bank loans because of financial repression (Shaw and 
Kinnon, 1973) and ownership discrimination in credit rationing. Simultaneously, 
China’s SOEs have many more opportunities than ordinary private firms to go public 
because of China’s approval and review system for initial public offerings (IPOs). For 
the above reasons, the thesis argues that listed Chinese companies suffer from severe 
investment inefficiencies, specifically, the overinvestment problem. 
 
In this chapter, the thesis argues that SOE attribute is positively related firm’s 
overinvestment in Chinese listed SOEs, and the thesis finds that Chinese listed SOEs 
are generally overinvested. This thesis begins the research by referring to the previous 
works of Richardson (2006), Vogt (1994), and Mei (2005).  
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This empirical study shows that SOE attribute has a significantly positive influence on 
a firm’s unexpected investments. The results reveal that with other conditions 
controlled, SOEs will engage in more investment than non-SOEs. Furthermore, SOE 
attribute is associated with firm’s engagement in more investment. The thesis then 
separates SOEs into local SOEs and central SOEs for further investigation. The 
regression results show that local SOEs invest more than other firms, but central SOE 
attribute does not have a significant relation to a firm’s level of unexpected 
investments. The implication of the results is not only that SOE attribute causes firms 
to engage in more investment but also that a local SOE attribute instead of a central 
SOE attribute is the primary factor driving overinvestment by Chinese listed SOEs.  
 
The thesis verifies the overinvestment situation of Chinese listed companies in the 
second part of this chapter, arguing that listed SOEs are generally overinvested. Firms 
experience both agency problems and financing constraints when making investment 
decisions. Agency problems normally cause a firm to overinvest, and financing 
constraints restrict a firm’s disposable funds and cause underinvestment. This thesis 
checks the relation between a firm’s annual investment and the interaction of its cash 
flow and Tobin’s Q (Cashflow×Q). The empirical study shows a significantly 
negative relation between a firm’s annual investment and Cashflow×Q among all 
listed firms, SOEs and local SOEs. The regression does not find a significant relation 
between the two factors among central SOEs. These results support the hypothesis 
that listed SOEs are generally overinvested. Furthermore, the result reveals that 
although local SOEs are overinvested, central SOEs may not be overinvested. 
Furthermore, local SOEs might be the primary factor that causes overinvestment by 
listed SOEs. This finding is consistent with outputs of the regression verifying 
Hypothesis 2a, in which the thesis finds that local SOE attribute instead of central 
SOE attribute, can result in positive unexpected investments by a firm. In summary, 
the empirical studies in this chapter support two hypotheses that SOE attribute causes 
more investment and that listed SOEs are generally overinvested.  
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3.8 Research Limitation and Discussion 
Although the studies in this chapter are robust and can be mutually authenticated, 
there are several points that can be optimized or need further discussion.  
 
The first point is that this thesis uses a firm’s average Tobin’s Q as the measure of its 
investment opportunity. However, only a firm’s marginal Q can reflect firm 
performance and operational characteristics. Hayashi (1982) notes that one of the 
conditions under which average Q and marginal Q are equal is a fully effective capital 
market. Many studies report that Chinese stocks are only reaching (or is approaching) 
weak effectiveness (Wu, 1996; Lan et al., 2005). In such a situation, the stock price of 
listed Chinese firms only reflects a firm’s historical information. Therefore, as an 
index of a firm’s future investment opportunity based on stock price, average Q 
results in inevitable measurement errors. In future studies, margin Q should be the 
preferred choice, although it is very difficult to calculate.  
 
The second point is that the thesis only setts yearly dummy variables in the models 
but do not consider either macroeconomic or fiscal policy changes during the period 
that my study covers. Future research should consider such changes to make the result 
more convincing.  
 
In addition, in future studies, more and sufficient firm-year observations of central 
SOE samples should be collected to check the relation between a firm’s annual new 
investment and the sensitivity between free cash flow and investment.  
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Figure 3.1 Impact of growth opportunities and financial conditions on firm 
investment Policy 
 Growth opportunities 
High Low 
Financial 
condition 
Positive 
Optimal investment 
policy 
Managerial overinvestment 
Negative Risk avoidance 
Risk shifting and 
underinvestment (Myers) 
Source: Brito and John (2001) 
 
This figure summarizes the relationship between growth prospects, financial 
conditions, and investment choices.  
 
Figure 3.2 Mechanisms for mitigating investment inefficiency 
Causes of investment 
Inefficiency 
Mechanisms of intervention 
Shareholder-manager conflicts 
1 Debt overhang  
2 Dividend payments 
3 Share repurchase 
4 Remuneration policy 
Risk shifting 
5 Convertible bonds 
6 Separate incorporation 
Pyramid ownership 7 Investor protection 
Asymmetric information 
8 Increased financial market efficiency 
9 Concentration of debt holders 
10 Reputation-building 
Overconfidence 11 Intensive market competition 
 
This figure presents a detailed illustration of each mechanism that corresponds to the 
various causes of investment inefficiency. 
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Figure 3.3 Illustration of firm investment measurement 
 
 
This figure presents the structure of firm’s total investment. This thesis separates the 
firm’s total investment into two parts. The first part is the investment amount that 
maintains the firm’s existing assets. The second part is the total investment in new 
projects (Strong and Meyer, 1990; Richardson, 2006).  
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Table 3.1 Variable definitions for regression to predict appropriate new 
investment level 
Variable Name Definition 
New Investment
2
 
(Dependent Variable) 
Inew Inew=Itotal-Imaintenance 
Itotal=CAPEX+Acquisition+RND-Sale PPE 
Imaintenance=Depreciation +Amortization 
Investment opportunities 
Average Tobin’s Q  
Company Age 
 
 
TobinQ 
companyage 
 
Tobin’s Q= Market value/Book value 
Natural logarithm of years since firm’s IPO 
 
Financing Constraints 
Cash Stock
2
 
Leverage (Debt rate)  
Company Size 
 
Wcash 
Wlever 
lnrev 
 
Operational Net Cash Flow + Short-term Investment 
(Debt)/(Total assets) 
Natural logarithm of firm’s annual revenue 
Stock Return 
 
wstockreturn 
 
(Total Market value/Prior Year’s Total Market value)-1 
 
Fixed effectss 
Industry Dummy
1
 
Yearly Dummy 
 
DUMIND* 
Accper 
 
Refer to note below 
2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 
Note1:  
A: Agriculture; B: Oil and Gas; C: Manufacturing; D: Power and Utilities; E: Construction; F: Wholesale and Retail; G: 
Transportation and Logistics; H: Lodging; I: Information Technology; K: Real Estate; L: Commercial Services; M: R&D and 
Technical Services; N: Water and Environment; O: Residential Services; P: Education; Q: Health; R: Culture, Sports, 
Entertainment; S: Conglomerate. 
Note2: All of the investment expenditures mentioned in the regression are scaled by average total assets to eliminate unit 
dimensions. 
This table presents details for the regression’s dependent and independent variables to 
predict a firm’s appropriate new investment level. The model considers three impacts 
to firm’s invest level: Investment opportunities, Financing constraints and fixed 
effectss.   
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Table 3.2 Variable definitions for the regression to verify Hypothesis 2a 
Variable Name Definition 
Unexpected Investment 
(Dependent Variable) 
Inewerr Inewerr= Inew – I
*
new 
Firm’s actual new investment minus expected new 
investment, also equal to regression residuals 
Free Cash Flow Dummy 
Positive FCF  
Negative FCF 
 
 
FCFpositive 
FCFnegative 
 
When FCF>0, FCFpositive=FCF; FCF<0, 
FCFnegative=0 
When FCF<0, FCFpositive=FCF; FCF>0, 
FCFnegative=0 
 
State Owned Attribute Dummy 
SOE attribute 
 
Firm Features 
Ownership concentration 
 
Business operation margin 
 
 
 
SOETAG 
 
 
Blockholder 
 
Grossm 
 
If firm is ultimately controlled by the state, SOETAG=1, 
otherwise SOETAG=0 
 
(Ownership of the largest shareholder)/(Ownership of top 
four largest shareholders) 
(Gross profit)/(Operating revenue) 
 
Note:  
a) Inew=Itotal-Imaintenance in which Itotal=CAPEX+Acquisition+RND-Sale PPE; Imaintenance=Depreciation +Amortization 
b) FCF=(CFO - Imaintenance + RND)-pInew  
c) If the regression coefficient of SOETAG is significant and positive, it means that SOE status is positively related to firm’s 
overinvestment, and thus Hypothesis 2a is proven.  
d) Inewerr is scaled by firm’s total assets. 
This table presents the variables for the regression to verify hypothesis 2a, namely, 
Among Chinese publicly listed companies, SOE attribute drives the firm to invest 
more. Dependant variable is Unexpected Investment, labeld as Inewerr, which is scaled by 
firm’s total assets.  
 
This thesis separates the firm’s total investment into two parts. The first part is the 
investment amount that maintains the firm’s existing assets. The second part is the 
total investment in new projects. So Inew=Itotal-Imaintenance in which 
Itotal=CAPEX+Acquisition+RND-Sale PPE; Imaintenance = Depreciation + 
Amortization. FCF denotes firm’s free cash flow. FCF can be obtained as: FCF=(CFO 
- Imaintenance + RND)-pInew , in which CFO is firm’s operating cash flow. RND is 
cash for firm’s research and development activities. pInew is predicated firm new 
investment based on firm investment model described in table 3.1. If the regression 
coefficient of SOETAG is significant and positive, it means that SOE status is 
positively related to firm’s overinvestment, and thus Hypothesis 2a will be proven.  
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Table 3.3 Variable definitions for the regression to verify Hypothesis 2b 
Variable Name Definition 
Annual Investment 
(Dependent Variable) 
newinvest  [(Fixed assets)t-(Fixed assets)t-1]/ (Total assets)t-1 
Fixed asset=Net fixed assets+ project materials +ongoing 
projects 
Investment opportunity 
Tobin’s Q  
 
 
TobinQ 
 
 
Market value / Total book value 
 
Cash Flow 
 
Cash Amount 
 
Firm Features 
Debt Rate 
Annual Revenue 
Company Size Dummy 
 
Interaction 
(Cash Flow) ×Tobin’s Q 
 
Year Indicators 
 
Industry Indicators 
CF 
 
CA 
 
 
lever 
sales 
size 
 
 
QCFK 
 
i.Accper 
 
Dumind* 
(Net operating cash flow – Dividend & interests –
Taxation ) / (Total assets)t-1 
(Cash+ Short-term investment) / (Total assets)t-1 
 
  
(Debt)/(Total assets) 
(Annual sales revenue ) / (Total assets)t-1 
If sales revenue >400 million RMB, size=1 otherwise =0 
 
 
(Cash flow) ×Tobin’s Q /(Total assets)t-1 
 
Dummy variable 
 
Dummy variable 
 
This table presents variable definitions for the regression to verify hypothesis 2b, 
namely, in general Chinese listed SEOs engage in overinvestment. Refer to Vogt 
(1994) method the sign of the regression coefficient of the interaction variable (QCFK) 
indicates a firm’s investment status. A positive sign indicates underinvestment, 
whereas a negative sign indicates overinvestment. 
 
Note that variables with financial values, including Newinvest, CF, CA sales QCFK, 
are scaled by the firm’s one-period lagged fixed assets on both sides of the equation to 
eliminate unit dimensions. 
 
Company Size Dummy is based on the criteria of sales revenue. If sale revenue is 
bigger than 400 million RMB, the firm will be a large company, or it is a middle and 
small size enterprise. This criteria comes from the Definition of Small and Middle 
Size Firms in China (中小企业划型标准规定), issued by the Chinese Ministry of 
Industry and Information in 2011. 
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Table 3.4 Descriptive statistics for the variables in the regression to predicate 
firm’s new investment (equation 3-11) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
WInew 12214 0.0369881 0.0633495 -0.0959157 0.2547226 
TobinQ 12262 2.380027 1.724699 0.786597 10.9623 
Wlever 12263 0.4776212 0.2567108 0.045867 1.690677 
Wcash 12263 0.0502551 0.0761732 -0.1743393 0.2644009 
Companyage 12257 1.759775 1.147074 -5.899897 3.093282 
Lnrev 12263 20.97578 1.554027 7.124728 28.65564 
Wstockretrun 12263 0.4034784 1.112433 -0.7828947 5.435644 
Note: 
a) wcash denotes firm’s cash amount, it is defined as: Operational Net Cash Flow plus 
Short-term Investment 
b) wlever is firm’s debt ratio, defined as: (Debt)/(Total assets)  
c) companyage is natural logarithm of years since firm’s IPO. 
d) lnrev is natural logarithm of firm’s annual revenue. 
e) wstockretrun denotes firm’s market value, defines as: (Total Market value/Prior Year’s Total 
Market value)-1  
f) Wlnew is firm’s new investment, defined as: Inew=Itotal-Imaintenance  
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables in the regression to predicate 
firm’s new investment, i.e., equation 3-11. To eliminate the influences of these 
singular values in the regression, this thesis winsores all of the variables (except for 
Companyage  and  Lnrev) at the 1% level. 
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Table 3.5 Variable correlation matrix for regression to predicate firm’s new 
investment (equation 3-11)  
(obs=12207) WInew wstockreturn TobinQ wlever Wcash Companyage lnrev 
        
WInew 1       
wstockretrun -0.0285 1      
TobinQ -0.0390 0.3687 1     
wlever -0.1778 0.0229 -0.0778 1    
Wcash 0.0806 0.0837 0.0619 -0.1092 1   
Companyage -0.2499 -0.0398 -0.1223 0.3968 0.0648 1  
lnrev 0.0972 0.0260 -0.3771 0.1498 0.1620 0.1805 1 
Note: 
a) wcash denotes firm’s cash amount, it is defined as: Operational Net Cash Flow plus 
Short-term Investment 
b) wlever is firm’s debt ratio, defined as: (Debt)/(Total assets)  
c) companyage is natural logarithm of years since firm’s IPO. 
d) lnrev is natural logarithm of firm’s annual revenue. 
e) wstockretrun denotes firm’s market value, defines as: (Total Market value/Prior Year’s Total 
Market value)-1  
f) Wlnew is firm’s new investment, defined as: Inew=Itotal-Imaintenance  
 
This table presents the correlations among the variables in regression to predicate 
firm’s new investment, namely equation 3-11. The maximum correlation is -0.3771 
between lnrev and TobinQ, and other absolute values of the correlations are generally 
lower than 0.35, thus indicating that multicollinearity is not significant.  
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Table 3.6 Results of regression to predict firm investment level (equation 3-11) 
VARIABLES Predicted Sign Panel under FE    
  I II III IV 
TobinQt-1 + 0.00469***   0.00461*** 
  (10.93)   (7.448) 
wlevert-1 -   -0.0675*** -0.0678*** 
    (-13.51) (-13.62) 
Wcasht-1 +   0.0172* 0.0211** 
    (1.946) (2.367) 
Companyage -   -0.00921*** -0.0247*** 
    (-4.373) (-7.620) 
Lnrevt-1 +   0.00140  
    (1.167)  
wstockretrunt-1 +   0.00291*** 0.00134* 
    (6.435) (1.823) 
Lnsizet-1 + 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.00432** 
(2.531) 
Constant  0.0243*** 0.0424*** 0.0554** 0.00724 
  (20.93) (27.44) (2.340) (0.199) 
Year Indicators  No Yes No Yes 
Observations  9,917 12,214 9,917 9,917 
R-squared  0.015 0.009 0.036 0.051 
F Value  119.54 13.52 58.89 35.85 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: 
a) wcash denotes firm’s cash amount, it is defined as: Operational Net Cash Flow plus 
Short-term Investment 
b) wlever is firm’s debt ratio, defined as: (Debt)/(Total assets)  
c) companyage is natural logarithm of years since firm’s IPO. 
d) lnrev is natural logarithm of firm’s annual revenue. 
e) wstockretrun denotes firm’s market value, defines as: (Total Market value/Prior Year’s Total 
Market value)-1  
f) lnsize is natural logarithm of firm’s year end total assets.  
 
This table presents the results of the regression that predict a firm’s investment level. The 
regression’s residuals will indicate a firm’s over- or underinvestment. The table reports four 
models under fixed effects estimator. In the first model, the thesis only considered the firm’s 
investment opportunities, which are measured by Tobin’s Q. The table presents the influence of 
industry dummy variables and year dummy variables in model II. Model III reports other variables 
(except for Tobin’s Q) that influence a firm’s investment decisions. Model IV includes all of the 
variables from model I to model III, and thus, the explanatory power increases to 5.1%. 
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Table 3.7 Descriptive statistics of the variables in regression to check relation 
between overinvestment and SOE attribute (equation 3-12) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Inewerr 9897 -1.36E-18 0.0510989 -0.1848675 0.2918235 
FCFpositive 9897 0.0243858 0.0493844 0 1.024537 
FCFnegative 9897 -0.0310753 0.0742954 -4.93934 0 
soetag 9897 0.5147191 0.5000034 0 1 
localtag 9897 0.4326567 0.4998037 0 1 
centralsoe 9897 0.062968 0.2429163 0 1 
blockholder 9897 0.6402853 0.20023668 0.1114677 1 
grossm 9897 0.248837 0.1779676 -1.812309 1 
Note: 
a) Inewerr denotes firm’s unexpected investment which can be obtained from the regression 
residues described in table 3.6.  
b) FCFpositive and FCFnegative denote firm’s positive and negative free cash flow respectively. 
c) Soetag is dummy variable of SOEs.  
d) localtag is dummy variable of local SOEs. 
e) centralsoe is dummy variable of central SOEs. 
f) blockholder denotes firm’s ownership concentration, which can be calculated as Ownership of 
the largest shareholder divided by Ownership of top four largest shareholders. 
g) grossm is business operation margin, can be obtained as: (Gross profit)/(Operating revenue) 
 
This table presents Descriptive statistics of the variables in regression to check 
relation between overinvestment and SOE attribute which is described in equation 
3-12.  
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Table 3.8 Regression results to test Hypothesis 2a-the relation between firm’s 
overinvestment and SOE attribute 
 Panel    
I II III IV 
Variables All SOEs Local SOEs Central SOEs Local and 
Central SOEs 
FCFpositive 0.0758*** 0.0751*** 0.0751*** 0.0756*** 
 (6.028) (5.972) (5.960) (6.015) 
FCFnegative 0.0691*** 0.0703*** 0.0746*** 0.0692*** 
 (9.059) (9.224) (9.809) (9.061) 
soetag 0.00809***    
 (6.395)    
blockholder -0.0157*** -0.0147*** -0.0107*** -0.0157*** 
 (-5.035) (-4.761) (-3.556) (-5.038) 
grossm -0.00621* -0.00714** -0.00824** -0.00636* 
 (-1.784) (-2.057) (-2.369) (-1.826) 
localtag  0.00747***  0.00839*** 
  (5.976)  (6.433) 
centralsoe   0.00151 0.00608** 
   (0.635) (2.461) 
Year Effect 
Industry Effect 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Constant 0.00702** 0.00751*** 0.00972*** 0.00700** 
 (2.437) (2.615) (3.404) (2.432) 
Observations 9,897 9,897 9,897 9,897 
Adjusted R-squared 
F Value 
0.0226 
50.96 
0.0218 
50.28 
0.0183 
44.06 
0.0226 
42.64 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: 
a) FCFpositive and FCFnegative denote firm’s positive and negative free cash flow 
respectively. 
b) Soetag is dummy variable of SOEs.  
c) localtag is dummy variable of local SOEs. 
d) centralsoe is dummy variable of central SOEs. 
e) blockholder denotes firm’s ownership concentration, which can be calculated as Ownership 
of the largest shareholder divided by Ownership of top four largest shareholders. 
f) grossm is business operation margin, can be obtained as: (Gross profit)/(Operating revenue) 
This table presents regression results to test the relation between firm’s over investment and SOE 
attribute. The table reports results of four panels. The first panel checks the relation between a 
firm’s unexpected investment and the SOE attribute dummy variable in all of the samples. In the 
second and third panel, the thesis substitutes SOE attribute with local SOE attribute and central 
SOE attribute, respectively. In the fourth panel, the thesis puts both CENTRALSOE and 
LOCALTAG into the regression. Note that both CENTRALSOE and LOCALTAG comprise the 
subset of SOETAG.  
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Table 3.9 Descriptive statistics of the variables for regression to verify hypothesis 
2b (equation 3-13)  
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
newinvest 9897 .0687221 .3274577 -.4808693 7.02214 
TobinQ 9897 2.484 1.763 0.8015 11.352 
lever 9897 0.519 1.399 0.00708 96.959 
CF 9897 -1.890752 8.975367 -107.5083 10.6366 
sales 9897 .7396158 .5927821 .0005669 10.0152 
QCFK 9897 -10.26381 197.9393 -16468.94 196.816 
CA 9897 0.466 1.155 -0.783 5.605 
size 9897 .8703366 .3359498 0 1 
Note: 
a) newinvest denotes firm’s annual investment, it is defined as: [(Fixed assets)t-(Fixed 
assets)t-1]/ (Total assets)t-1. 
b) lever is firm’s debt ratio, defined as: (Debt)/(Total assets)  
c) CF is firm’s cash flow. 
d) sales denotes firm’s sales revenue. 
e) QCFK denotes the interaction of Tobin’Q and cash flow. It is defined as: (Cash flow) ×
Tobin’s Q /(Total assets)t-1  
f) CA denotes firm’s cash amount 
g)  size is company size dummy variable. Namely, If sales revenue >400 million RMB, size=1 
otherwise =0. 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the variables for regression to verify 
hypothesis 2b which is described in equation 3-13. The table shows the descriptive 
statistics after the Winsor operation at 0.1% level to newinvest, CF, CA, TobinQ, and 
lever.  
  
205 
 
Table 3.10 Results of the regression to check overinvestment status among SOEs 
 Models    
 I II III IV 
VARIABLES All Companies SOE Local SOE Central SOE 
TobinQt-1 0.0252*** 0.0135*** 0.0128*** 0.0264* 
 (11.00) (3.944) (3.513) (1.650) 
levert-1 -0.00519** -0.0147 -0.0115 -0.0602 
 (-2.030) (-0.829) (-0.618) (-0.622) 
CF 0.0122*** 0.00526 0.00630 -0.178 
 (3.281) (0.520) (0.612) (-0.874) 
sales 0.000649 0.000432 -0.000394 0.0272 
 (0.101) (0.0536) (-0.0467) (0.582) 
QCFK -0.000353*** -0.000909*** -0.000880*** -0.000877 
 (-18.94) (-4.131) (-3.928) (-0.313) 
CA 0.00656*** 0.00179 0.00269 -0.119 
 (2.679) (0.274) (0.404) (-0.909) 
size 0.0977*** 0.100*** 0.104*** 0.0502 
 (8.087) (5.006) (4.937) (0.556) 
Industry Indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.0610*** -0.0325 -0.0352 -0.00315 
 (-3.451) (-1.198) (-1.225) (-0.0255) 
Observations 9,894 5,297 4,622 675 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0722 0.0264 0.0235 0.0368 
F Value 43.88 8.19 6.55 1.98 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: 
a) TobinQ is Market Valus/Total assets 
b) lever is firm’s debt ratio, defined as: (Debt)/(Total assets)  
c) CF is firm’s cash flow. 
d) sales denotes firm’s sales revenue. 
e) QCFK denotes the interaction of Tobin’Q and cash flow. It is defined as: (Cash flow) ×
Tobin’s Q /(Total assets)t-1  
f) CA denotes firm’s cash amount 
g)  size is company size dummy variable. Namely, If sales revenue >400 million RMB, size=1 
otherwise =0. 
 
This table presents results of the regression to check overinvestment status among SOEs which is 
described in equation 3-13. The results for the four models are presented in this Table. The first 
model is conducted using the full samples, including both SOEs and non-SOEs. In the second 
model, the thesis runs the regression on the SOEs only. Models three and four report the results of 
regressions in local SOEs and central SOEs, respectively.  
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Table 3.11 Firm Unexpected investment: FE vs SYS GMM Estimator 
             Panel I Panel II 
VARIABLES    Fixed effects Panel Data DPD-System GMM  
WInewt-1  0.390*** 
  (23.49) 
TobinQt-1 0.00457*** 0.00207* 
 (7.427) (1.929) 
lnsizet-1 0.00433** -0.0276** 
 (2.548) (-2.521) 
wstockretrunt-1 0.00136* 0.000215 
 (1.856) (0.0952) 
wlevert-1 -0.0676*** -0.0762** 
 (-13.67) (-2.304) 
Wcasht-1 0.0200** -0.0881** 
 (2.467) (-2.126) 
companyage -0.0249*** -0.0159*** 
 (-7.697) (-7.387) 
Industry Effect No Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes 
Constant 0.00746 -0.148*** 
 (0.206) (-3.652) 
Arellano-Bond Test  
(3 order autocorrelation. p-value ) 
Sargan Test (p-value ) 
 
 
             
 
0.1656 
0.0588 
Observations 9,910 9,910 
R-squared 0.052  
Number of Firm 1,944 1,944 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: 
a) wcash denotes firm’s cash amount, it is defined as: Operational Net Cash Flow plus 
Short-term Investment 
b) wlever is firm’s debt ratio, defined as: (Debt)/(Total assets)  
c) companyage is natural logarithm of years since firm’s IPO. 
e) wstockretrun denotes firm’s market value, defines as: (Total Market value/Prior Year’s Total 
Market value)-1  
f) lnsize is natural logarithm of firm’s year end total assets. 
g) WInew is firm’s yearly new investment 
 
This table presents the comparison between fixed-effects panel data model and the 
dynamic panel data model in determining firm’s yearly new investment. Estimates in 
column 1 were obtained using the fixed effects estimator. Estimates in column 2 were 
obtained using the system GMM estimator. Test statistics and standard errors (in 
parentheses) of all variables in the regressions are asymptotically robust to 
heteroscedasticity. The dependent variable is Inew, the difference between firm total 
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investment and investment to maintain existing assets (namely, Inew=Itotal-Imaintenance, see 
table 3.1 for details.). For the system GMM regression, m3 is a test for third-order serial 
correlation of the differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the 
null of no serial correlation. The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions is 
distributed as Chi-square under the null of instrument validity. We treat TobinQt-1, 
lnsizet-1, wstockretrunt-1, wlevert-1, and wcasht-1 as potentially endogenous variables. 
Levals of these variables dated t-2 and further are used as instruments in the 
first-differenced equations and first-differences of these same variables lagged twice 
are used as additional instruments in the level equations.  
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Table 3.12 Robustness test for Hypothesis 2a under Sys GMM Estimator 
 Panel    
I II III IV 
Variables All SOEs Local SOEs Central SOEs Local and 
Central SOEs 
FCFpositive 0.169*** 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.168*** 
 (16.42) (16.38) (16.39) (16.41) 
FCFnegative 0.0557*** 0.0565*** 0.0588*** 0.0557*** 
 (8.174) (8.300) (8.647) (8.176) 
soetag 0.00571***    
 (4.994)    
blockholder -0.0108*** -0.0100*** -0.00733*** -0.0108*** 
 (-3.825) (-3.583) (-2.679) (-3.826) 
grossm 0.0361*** 0.0354*** 0.0346*** 0.0360*** 
 (11.25) (11.07) (10.82) (11.22) 
localtag  0.00513***  0.00585*** 
  (4.541)  (4.963) 
centralsoe   0.00159 0.00477** 
   (0.741) (2.134) 
Year Effect 
Industry Effect 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Constant -0.00893*** -0.00853*** -0.00705*** -0.00893*** 
 (-3.415) (-3.271) (-2.722) (-3.417) 
Observations 9,897 9,897 9,897 9,897 
Adjusted R-squared 
F Value 
0.068 
65.03 
0.067 
64.61 
0.065 
62.66 
0.068 
59.62 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: 
a) FCFpositive and FCFnegative denote firm’s positive and negative free cash flow 
respectively. 
b) Soetag is dummy variable of SOEs.  
c) localtag is dummy variable of local SOEs. 
d) centralsoe is dummy variable of central SOEs. 
e) blockholder denotes firm’s ownership concentration, which can be calculated as Ownership 
of the largest shareholder divided by Ownership of top four largest shareholders. 
f) grossm is business operation margin, can be obtained as: (Gross profit)/(Operating revenue) 
This table presents regression results to test the relation between firm’s over investment and SOE 
attribute. The table reports results of four panels. The first panel checks the relation between a 
firm’s unexpected investment and the SOE attribute dummy variable in all of the samples. In the 
second and third panel, the thesis substitutes SOE attribute with local SOE attribute and central 
SOE attribute, respectively. In the fourth panel, the thesis puts both CENTRALSOE and 
LOCALTAG into the regression. Note that both CENTRALSOE and LOCALTAG comprise the 
subset of SOETAG. 
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Table 3.12 Robustness test for Hypothesis 2b 
 Models    
 I II III IV 
VARIABLES All Companies SOE Local SOE Central SOE 
TobinQt-1 0.0350*** 0.0252*** 0.0252*** 0.0369** 
 (16.64) (7.822) (7.444) (2.333) 
levert-1 -0.00661*** -0.0530*** -0.0472*** -0.146 
 (-3.080) (-3.971) (-3.469) (-1.628) 
CF 0.0176*** 0.0340*** 0.0345*** 0.130 
 (5.757) (4.208) (4.265) (0.708) 
profit -0.137*** -0.0949** -0.117*** -0.0740 
 (-4.618) (-2.328) (-2.763) (-0.335) 
QCFK -0.000239*** -0.000597*** -0.000589*** -0.000147 
 (-15.60) (-3.330) (-3.291) (-0.0623) 
CA 0.0112*** 0.0221*** 0.0226*** 0.0842 
 (5.591) (4.217) (4.297) (0.709) 
lnsize 0.0604*** 0.0589*** 0.0621*** 0.0618*** 
 (21.53) (16.12) (15.37) (4.561) 
Industry Indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1.286*** -1.226*** -1.298*** -1.263*** 
 (-20.63) (-15.02) (-14.42) (-3.992) 
Observations 9,894 5,297 4,622 675 
Adjusted R
2
 0.096 0.076 0.075 0.120 
F Value 62.32 24.27 20.85 3.46 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: 
a) TobinQ is Market Valus/Total assets. 
b) lever is firm’s debt ratio, defined as: (Debt)/(Total assets)  
c) CF is firm’s cash flow. 
d) profit denotes firm’s sales gross margin, scaled by firm’s total asste. 
e) QCFK denotes the interaction of Tobin’Q and cash flow. It is defined as: (Cash flow) ×
Tobin’s Q /(Total assets)t-1  
f) CA denotes firm’s cash amount 
g)  lnsize is natural logarithm of firm’s year end total assets. 
 
This table presents results of robustness test for Hypothesis 2b. The thesis substitutes a firm’s 
gross margin (profit) for its sales revenue (sales) as the proxy for firm operational performance in 
equation 3-13. Table 3.12 shows the results of the regressions based on a firm’s gross margin.The 
results for the four models are presented in this Table. The first model is conducted using the full 
samples, including both SOEs and non-SOEs. In the second model, the thesis runs the regression 
on the SOEs only. Models three and four report the results of regressions in local SOEs and 
central SOEs, respectively. The above results comply with the results of model 3-13, shown in 
Table 3.10, and thus, the regression model is robust.   
210 
 
Chapter 4. The Relationship between Executive Compensation and 
Investment Behavior in Chinese Listed Companies 
4.1 Abstract  
This chapter examines the relation between compensation regulation and a firm’s 
investment inefficiency. The thesis finds a significant and positive relation between 
the extent of compensation regulation and the degree of a listed SOE’s 
overinvestment. For those SOEs that are not overinvested, the thesis finds that 
compensation regulation will increase firm investment. These findings reveal that 
compensation regulation will cause agency problems in SOEs. This thesis finds that 
both local and central SOEs have a similar relation between compensation regulation 
and firm investment behavior.  
    
4.2 Introduction                
4.2.1 Background and rationale  
This thesis has investigated executive compensation in Chapter 2 and firms’ 
investment situations in Chapter 3. The research finds that executive compensation in 
Chinese listed companies is significantly below the market-determined level. 
Simultaneously, the thesis demonstrates that a firm’s SOE attribute is positively 
related to firm’s overinvestment and that, in general, listed SOEs are overinvested.  
 
In this chapter, the thesis attempts to investigate the possible relation between 
executive compensation regulation and firm investment behavior in listed SOEs.  
 
Because of executive compensation regulation in Chinese SOEs, executive 
compensation of SOE managers is below the market level. Moreover, SOE executives 
normally either do not have equity incentives or have only very weak equity-based 
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incentives that cannot offset the gap between their actual compensation and the 
executive compensation levels of private companies (Wang and Tang, 2014). 
Underpayment of executive compensation causes serious agency problems in Chinese 
listed SOEs. According to classic agency theory, agency issues appear when the 
interests of a firm's managers are not in line with those of the firm's owners, and thus, 
the managers will adopt a preference for on-the-job perks, shirking, or making 
self-interested and entrenched decisions that reduce shareholder wealth (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). It is understandable that because executives of SOEs are underpaid, 
they will find other ways to offset their losses, thus causing agency problems.  
 
Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997) argue that agents behave to maximize their own 
interests, and the interests of agents are normally not in line with the interests of 
principals.  
 
Conversely, asymmetric information between principals and agents in Chinese SOEs 
aggravates agency problems. Absentee ownership is a prominent problem suffered by 
Chinese SOEs. Legally, the state is an SOE’s owner. In practice, however, 
departments of central government and local governments are entrusted as supervisors 
to manage SOEs. Currently, the supervisors are SASACs in various levels of 
government. The problem is that these SASACs are not the true owners, and therefore, 
their officials do not have adequate incentives to supervise SOE management. In this 
situation, the managers who perform the day-to-day management of SOEs possess 
much more information than the government does. This inside information enables 
SOE executives to make managerial decisions that serve their own interests. 
Overinvestment is a common choice that enables SOE executives to realize their own 
interests. On the one hand, executives can obtain additional benefits from investment 
projects. On the other hand, overinvestment normally increases firm size, which will 
provide executives with more power and higher compensation because firm size is the 
one of most important determinants of executive compensation (Robert, 1956; Ciscel 
and Carroll, 1980; Tosi et al., 2000).  
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SOE investment inefficiency that arises out of conflicts of interest and asymmetric 
information cannot be thoroughly resolved under the current system. Therefore, I 
investigate whether the regulation of SOE executive compensation will result in 
overinvestment by listed SOEs. 
 
In the remainder of this chapter, the thesis investigates the relation between executive 
compensation regulation and overinvestment in Chinese listed SOEs. 
  
4.2.2 Research purpose     
The goal of this chapter is to investigate the relation between executive regulation and 
overinvestment in Chinese listed companies. This study checks the correlation 
between the degree of executive compensation regulation and the degree of a firm’s 
overinvestment.  
Specifically, this chapter performs the following tasks: 
 It investigates the relation between compensation regulation and a firm’s 
unexpected investment in all of the sampled companies; 
 It investigates the relation between compensation regulation and a firm’s 
unexpected investment in all of the companies with positive unexpected 
investment; and 
 It investigates the relation between compensation regulation and a firm’s 
unexpected investment in all SOEs. 
 
4.2.3 Key findings 
In this section, the thesis finds a significant and positive relation between the extent of 
compensation regulation and the degree of a listed SOE’s overinvestment. For those 
SOEs that do not overinvest, this thesis finds that compensation regulation increases a 
firm’s investment. These findings reveal that compensation regulation causes agency 
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problems in SOEs. The thesis finds that both local and central SOEs show a similar 
relation between compensation regulation and firm investment behavior. The 
evidence reported in this section supports the argument that the regulation of 
executive compensation causes listed SOEs to overinvest.  
 
4.3 Literature Review  
Although there is a rich body of research that relates agency problems to corporate 
investment, very few of these studies focus on the relation between executive 
compensation and firms’ investment behaviors both in China (Shi et al., 2013) and 
worldwide (Ryan and Wiggins, 2002).  
 
Some scholars study how executive compensation structure influences firms’ 
investment decisions. Gaver and Gaver (1995) show that executives’ long-term 
incentive compensation is a larger portion of their total compensation at growth firms, 
whereas their fixed salary is a larger portion of their total compensation at non-growth 
firms. Kang et al. (2006) investigate the role of executive compensation structure on a 
firm's investment behavior. They argue that equity-based executive compensation is a 
key determinant of a firm's long-term investments in American corporations based on 
the finding that a firm's long-term investments increase with the increased weight of 
CEO equity-based compensation after controlling for financing constraints and 
Tobin's Q. Eisdorfer et al. (2013) obtain the similar finding that managers who receive 
more debt-based compensation (as a share of total compensation) tend to underinvest, 
whereas managers who receive more equity-based compensation are more likely to 
engage in overinvestment. Ryan and Wiggins (2002) argue that compensation 
structure and R&D are endogenous with each other. On the one hand, a firm’s growth 
opportunities are positively related to the use of stock options in its compensation 
structure. On the other hand, stock options and restricted stock have a positive 
influence on a firm’s R&D investment. Livne et al. (2013) examine the banking 
industry, documenting a positive relation between a firm’s short-term investment and 
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CEO cash bonuses and reporting that banks with short-term investments pay higher 
cash bonuses to their executives than banks with long-term investments; in general, 
the former group of banks experience higher risk and worse performance.  
 
Some other authors investigate executive compensation and firm investment spending 
from an agency problem perspective. Chakraborty et al. (1999) investigate uncertain 
CEO compensation and firms’ investment decisions. These authors demonstrate that 
the more uncertain compensation received by the CEO, the fewer investments a firm 
will make; however, permanent earnings uncertainty has a greater impact than 
temporary earnings uncertainty on a firm’s investments. This negative relation 
between uncertain CEO compensation and firm capital investment implies that agency 
costs influence a firm’s investment decisions. Chen (2004) studies the relation 
between R&D expenditure and CEO compensation at Forbes 500 firms. Chen argues 
that changes in R&D spending are strongly and positively related to changes in CEO 
compensation when the CEO approaches retirement—namely, either horizon 
problems or so-called myopia problems in which the firm faces a small earnings 
decline or loss. The results of this empirical study support the author’s argument and 
reveal that neither horizon problems nor myopia problems are associated with reduced 
R&D spending. This study also indicates that the level of association between 
changes in CEO compensation and R&D spending provides an effective way to 
mitigate agency problems related to reducing R&D expenditures to increase 
short-term financial performance. Mauer and Ott (2000) argue that because of agency 
problems, managers will maximize the value of their own compensation packages 
rather than their firms’ equity value. Kanagaretnam and Sarkar (2011) extend that 
study and report that a compensation contract consisting of a fixed salary and 
equity-based compensation will mitigate underinvestment problems. The extent of 
that mitigation relies on the proportion of fixed salary and equity-based compensation.  
 
Several studies have been published on the relation between executive compensation 
and firm investment behavior in the Chinese context.  
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Luo et al. (2008) argue that as a type of long-term incentive, equity-based 
compensation can influence executives’ investment decisions. Conversely, investment 
will influence a firm’s performance and therefore impact executive compensation 
levels. This empirical study shows that executive compensation and firm investment 
are endogenous when determined together. In Chinese listed companies, equity-based 
compensation has a positive impact on a firm’s investment, which also has a positive 
relation with equity-based incentives for executives. Xia and Yu (2012) study Chinese 
listed firms from 2004 to 2010 based on panel data and the GMM method. They 
document that both cash compensation and equity-based compensation for executives 
interact with a firm’s investment behaviors. Such relations are different in firms with 
different ownership; the authors show that private Chinese listed firms have better 
corporate governance mechanisms than SOEs, whereas SOE executives either do not 
have stock or have only a very small amount of stock. Meanwhile, compared to 
executives in non-SOEs, executives in SOEs care a great deal about being promoted 
in the political administrative ranks. Xu and Liu (2014) study incentive-based 
executive compensation and firms’ investment behavior from an endogeneity 
perspective based on a simultaneous equation model. These authors report that a 
firm’s investment behavior influences its accounting performance and then impacts 
executive compensation; investment intensity is negatively related to executive 
compensation, and therefore, the executive compensation mechanism suppresses the 
intensity of a firm’s investment. Equity-based compensation will increase firm 
investment, and compensation performance sensitivity is not related to firm 
investment. This study is consistent with previous literature reporting that 
compensation and investment are endogenous. Conversely, this study implies that 
compensation regulations in SOEs mitigate incentives to SOE executives.    
 
One important study on the relation between executive compensation and firm 
investment is conducted by Xin et al. (2007). Similar to the method in this thesis, the 
authors first build a compensation model based on those used by Chinese listed 
private firms, from which they calculate the gap between predicted and actual 
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compensation levels. The authors then calculate the extension of a firm’s under- or 
overinvestment and then check the relation between the compensation gap and the 
extension of a firm’s overinvestment. Xin et al. report that local SOEs are 
overinvested because compensation incentives for management have failed. This 
study is important because its research method avoids the endogeneity problem of 
previous studies and reveals a positive and significant relation between the 
compensation gap and a firm’s overinvestment. However, that thesis has several 
points that require improvement. First, it uses data from 2000 to 2004, the period 
before China’s 2005 split-share reform (Zheng et al., 2007), which significantly 
influences the corporate governance (Wang et al., 2010) of listed Chinese firms. 
Therefore, the thesis’s findings are questionable because of the existence of abnormal, 
non-tradable ownership and its strong influence on both executive compensation and 
firms’ investment decisions. Furthermore, SASAC (State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission of the State Council) was established in March of 
2003 during the first session of the tenth people’s congress of People’s Republic of 
China
16
. Before SASAC was established in 2003, all Chinese SOEs were managed by 
local governments or various ministries of central government. After March of 2003, 
all SOEs were managed and supervised by central SASAC and its local affiliates in 
each province according to previous administration and company size. The change is 
fundamental to SOEs, personnel management, financial management and overall 
corporate governance structure of Chinese SOEs have been significantly reformed 
since early 2003. No doubt, executive compensation and firm’s investment decision 
of Chinese SOEs were also largely changed before and after 2003. However Xin et. al 
do not consider such changes in their thesis which causes standpoints of their research 
weak and inconvincible. Second, to construct an executive compensation model, the 
authors use a cross-section regression. However, executive compensation is inertial, 
which means that current compensation is closely related to compensation levels in 
previous periods; in other words, the compensation levels of previous periods strongly 
                                                             
16 http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2003-03/06/content_761870.htm 
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influence current compensation. A simple cross-section regression cannot reflect all 
of the useful information that determines executive compensation levels. According to 
the studies by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Windmeijer (2005), using a GMM 
(Generalized Method of Moments) estimator for a dynamic panel data model to utilize 
more information contained in the samples for estimation is preferred. Thus in this 
research, a two-step, bias-corrected GMM estimation is introduced to obtain a better 
statistical inference. Third, the authors build a compensation model based on all 
private firms while omitting all SOEs. They argue that because private firms do not 
have compensation regulations, their executives receive compensation that is 
determined by the market. Although this argument sounds reasonable, in real human 
resources practices, both private firms and SOEs recruit managers. Therefore, even 
private firms will set their executive compensation, at least to some extent, using 
SOEs (which are normally leading companies in the industry) as a reference. In this 
sense, both SOEs and private firms determine the market level of an executive’s 
compensation. If a study exempts SOEs and uses purely private firms as a proxy for 
the entire market, it is possible that compensation regulation is exaggerated, and 
therefore, a conclusion based on that distorted data is questionable. Finally, Xin et. al 
use total compensation of three managers with highest income in the company as the 
compensation index in their research. However, this methodology is explicitly 
questionable. Normally in a company, the managers on higher level have more power 
to make investment decisions. But, it is not necessarily to infer that higher level 
managers always have higher compensation. In China, many listed companies belong 
to different conglomerates. The chairman or general manager of a listed company also 
take responsibility in the conglomerate and receive their majority compensation from 
listed company’s mother company. So the lower managers in a listed company may 
have higher compensation than does a chairman or a general manager. If merely to 
use top 3 salaries as the compensation proxy in the research, it may cause bias to only 
include lower level managers but miss chairmen or general managers who are more 
powerful when make investment decisions. A better sampling method to overcome 
such a bias is to use the total compensation of all managers disclosed by company’s 
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annual reports, same method as described in chapter two of this paper. 
 
Shi et al. (2013) investigate the influence of executive compensation on a firm’s 
external investments, including both equity and debt investments. The authors report a 
non-lineal, reversed “U” shape relation between the two. In addition, the study reveals 
that executive compensation decreases with the growth of a firm’s total external 
investment.  
 
Bu and Wen (2013) attempt to answer the question of whether the stickiness of 
executive compensation increases a firm’s investment. According to those authors’ 
research, the stickiness of executive compensation is defined as the gap between 
increases in executive compensation when firm performance is improving and 
decreases in executive compensation when firm performance is declining. Bu and 
Wen report that the greater the stickiness of executive compensation is, the greater the 
reward a firm will offer to executives and the greater the risk taking of the executive, 
which lead to a larger investment from the firm. This phenomenon is much more 
severe in privately held firms and local SOEs than in central SOEs; the authors argue 
that this finding also implies that central SOEs’ regulation of executive compensation 
and investment amounts since 2004 has an impact on central SOEs.  
 
Chen and Sun (2014) study the correlation between executive compensation and a 
firm’s total investment among Chinese listed firms. The authors document that 
executive compensation is positively related to firm investment in all Chinese listed 
firms but that in listed SOEs, the correlation is insignificant. They argue that in 
Chinese firms, executive compensation influences firm investment and that executives 
who receive higher compensation will have more power to influence investment 
decisions. The authors further explain that executive compensation in Chinese SOEs 
is constrained by the existing system, and therefore, SOE executives are not motivated 
to make investment decisions that are in the interest of the firm. Although their study 
provides some useful information about the relation between executive compensation 
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and Chinese firms’ investment behavior, its research methodology and conclusion are 
questionable. On the one hand, to investigate how executive compensation influences 
a firm’s investment behavior, the authors merely run a regression between a firm’s 
annual total investment and the total compensation of the firm’s top 3 executives, 
together with some other variables such as Tobin’s Q and financial leverage. However, 
this method is questionable because a firm’s total investment and executive 
compensation are endogenous with each other (Ryan and Wiggins, 2002; Luo et al., 
2008). Direct regression of the two variables causes an endogeneity problem and 
creates a biased result. On the other hand, the authors only use data from three years, 
with only 780 firm-year observations for SOE samples. Because a firm’s investment 
is inertial, it is doubtable that three years are sufficient for a good investigation of the 
relation between executive compensation and firm investment. In addition, the 
relatively smaller size of the SOE sample set is most likely why the correlation 
between a firm’s total investment and its executive compensation is insignificant in 
that study. In contrast, this paper’s argument is that there is regulation of executive 
compensation in Chinese SOEs and that such regulation causes SOE executives to 
obtain less compensation than their peers in non-SOEs; therefore, SOE executives are 
motivated to overinvest to compensate for their income loss caused by the 
compensation regulations of the SOEs that they serve.  
 
Based on a gambling theory framework, Zhang and Zhu (2014) present a theoretical 
perspective on overinvestment and compensation reform in Chinese SOEs. They 
argue that among the possible choices based on gambling between executives and the 
board of directors, whenever the board engages in monitoring, executives’ optimal 
strategy is to overinvest. Based on the utility-function model, the authors prove that if 
the firm has no financing constraints, the proportion of performance-based 
compensation has a positive relation to the size of the firm’s overinvestment and a 
negative relation to the return rate claimed by outside investors. This argument means 
that for Chinese SOEs that normally do not have financing constraints, executives’ 
pursuit of compensation will—to some extent—lead to overinvestment. The authors 
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also give three suggestions about how to mitigate SOE overinvestment. First, SOEs 
should increase the proportion of innovation-related compensation in their executive 
compensation structures. Second, the government needs to introduce outside and 
private investors to SOEs and allow market competition to monitor SOE management. 
Third, the convenient financing between SEOs and state-owned banks should be 
gradually eliminated so that debt-financing issues can suppress overinvestment. 
Although Zhang and Zhu’s research does not provide a specific quantitative model to 
measure the relation between executive compensation and firm investment, it is very 
significant in that it reveals the basic connection between these two key components 
of corporate governance and operations. Their research also provided this paper with 
good suggestions to further investigate the correlation between executive 
compensation and overinvestment using methods that are more quantitative.  
 
In summary, the studies on executive compensation and firm investment behavior are 
not abundant. The existing studies do not support each other in a systemic way. 
Simultaneously, although several studies present useful information and show good 
progress in this field, the research methods and data used by previous studies still 
need to be checked and optimized.             
4.4 Hypothesis Development  
Listed Chinese firms, especially SOEs, experience many corporate governance 
challenges that are different from those experienced by firms in developed economies. 
Executive compensation in Chinese SOEs has several features. First, the major 
portion of executive compensation in Chinese SOEs is cash-based. Very few SOEs 
adopt equity-based compensation, and in those firms, the incentive effect of such 
compensation is very weak. Second, with respect to compensation and performance 
sensitivity, SOEs care more about executive compensation and their accounting 
performance (e.g., ROA and ROE), whereas private firms generally focus on the 
relation between executive compensation and stock price (Firth et al., 2006). Third, 
the compensation of SOE executives is generally lower than in private firms because 
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of compensation regulations in SOEs (Chen et al., 2006). In Chapter 2 of this thesis, 
the existence of such regulations in SOEs is proved.  
 
There are two schools of thought about the mechanism of the agency problem’s 
influence on a firm’s capital investment decisions.  
 
Personal cost theory argues that a firm’s investments impose additional costs on 
executives (e.g., Aggarwal and Samwick, 2006) in the sense that if a firm either 
begins new projects or modifies existing projects, managers will have to assume 
larger responsibilities, and therefore, they need to either spend more time or work 
harder to acquire more knowledge and new skills. Based on the above argument, the 
thesis infers that if the personal costs of investment projects are very high, managers 
may discard some positive-NPV projects, thus causing underinvestment.  
 
That said, Jensen (1986 & 1993) argues that managers normally have an impulse to 
invest because they can derive personal benefits from controlling more resources. 
Because of such “empire building”, managers will even choose negative-NPV 
investment projects to maximize company size instead of shareholders’ interests. 
Managers’ preference for deriving personal benefits from negative-NPV projects will 
cause overinvestment. Some studies support the argument that executive 
compensation is more closely related to company size than to firm performance (e.g., 
Robert, 1956; Simon, 1957; Agrawal and Walking, 1994; Jones and Kato, 1996; Wan 
et al., 2008). 
 
In Chapter 2, this thesis finds that Chinese listed SOEs regulate executive 
compensation. In Chapter 3, the thesis finds that SOEs are generally overinvested. 
However, Chinese SOEs normally do not have financing constraints, and Chinese 
governments have an impulse to obtain GDP growth, which requires SOEs to invest 
more. Thus from an agency-problem and financial constraint perspective, this thesis 
argues that because SOEs regulate executive compensation, their executives attempt 
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to overinvest to obtain more personal benefits so that they can compensate for the gap 
between their income and the incomes of private-firm executives.  
Accordingly, the thesis formulates the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: In Chinese listed SOEs, the degree of compensation regulation is 
positively related to the extent of the firm’s unexpected investment.  
 
4.5 Research Methodology             
4.5.1 Samples  
In this section, the thesis examines the relation between compensation regulation and 
firms’ overinvestment. The study begins based on previous sections of this thesis. In 
Chapter 2, this thesis finds that because of compensation regulation, executive 
compensation in Chinese listed SOEs is below the market level. The thesis obtains the 
gap between the market-determined compensation level and actual executive 
compensation in Chapter 2; the thesis labeled that gap COMPENgap. The thesis 
investigates firms’ investments in Chapter 3 and finds that, in general, Chinese listed 
SOEs are overinvested; the degree of overinvestment is Inewerr, which represents the 
unexpected part of a firm’s investment. 
 
The study in this section is based on previous studies in Chapters 2 and 3, and thus, 
the samples in this study are the same as in the two previous studies. In this section, 
this thesis uses COMPENgap and Inewerr as inputs of regression.  
 
4.5.2 Research methods 
In this section, the thesis verifies Hypothesis 3, which argues that in Chinese listed 
SOEs, the degree of compensation regulation is positively related to the extent of a 
firm’s overinvestment.  
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To check this hypothesis, this thesis first needs to determine the degree of 
compensation regulation and the firm’s overinvestment. In the previous two chapters, 
the thesis has already obtained these two values. Figure 4.1 shows the details.  
 
[Figure 4.1] 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the thesis separates a firm’s investment into two parts: 
investment to maintain existing assets and new investment. This thesis then separates 
new investment into two parts. Expected new investment can be described by a firm’s 
growth opportunities and other determinants such as leverage, firm size, stock return, 
and free cash stock.   Unexpected investment is defined as the gap between a firm’s 
actual investment and its expected investment, as mentioned above. Unexpected 
investment can be positive or negative and refers to investments that cannot be 
explained by a firm’s profile. 
 
When unexpected investment is negative, it indicates that the firm is underinvested; 
when unexpected investment is positive, it indicates that the firm is overinvested. In 
addition, the absolute value of unexpected investment reflects the degree of a firm’s 
under- or overinvestment.  
 
In Chapter 2, the thesis studies executive compensation in listed Chinese firms. This 
thesis first constructs a market-determined compensation model based on all Chinese 
listed firms, including both SOEs and private firms. Second, the thesis calculates the 
difference between market-determined compensation and executives’ actual 
compensation. The gap denotes whether a firm’s executive compensation is higher or 
lower than the market level. If the sign is positive, the firm offers its executives less 
than the market level, and there is compensation regulation. Conversely, if the sign is 
negative, the firm offers its executives more than the market level, and there is 
overpayment.  
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In this section, this thesis checks the relation between unexpected investment and the 
compensation gap. If there is a significant and positive correlation between the two, it 
can infer that regulation of executive compensation is one cause of overinvestment.  
4.5.3 Variables 
There are eight variables in the regression. The dependent variable is the firm’s 
unexpected investment, and the independent variable is the difference between 
market-determined compensation and an executive’s actual compensation.  
 
[Table 4.1]  
 
Table 4.1 shows the eight variables to be checked in this section: a firm’s unexpected 
investment (Inewerr) is defined and calculated in Chapter 3, and the extent of 
compensation regulation is measured in Chapter 2.  
 
4.5.4 Model 
The thesis checks the relation between a firm’s unexpected investment and the extent 
of executive compensation regulation in this section based on the model set forth 
below.  
 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑟 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑃 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐴𝑁𝑌𝐴𝐺𝐸 +
𝛽4𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁 + 𝛽6𝐼𝐷𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂 + 𝛽7𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀          
(4-1) 
In the above equation, if β1 is significant and positive, it means that compensation 
regulation is a significant determinant of overinvestment. To control firm attributes, 
the thesis puts LNSIZE, COMPANYAGE, EXESHARE, SHARECON, IDRATIO 
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and CEODUAL into the model to reflect firm’s corporate governance features. Year 
effects are also considered in the model to control business cycle and macroeconomic 
fluctuation year to year. This thesis runs the above regression for all listed firms, 
listed SOEs, listed central SOEs, and listed local SOEs to investigate whether 
ownership influences the relation between compensation regulation and a firm’s 
investment behavior.  
 
4.6 Results                 
4.6.1 Variable descriptive statistics  
Table 4.2 shows the variable descriptive statistics for regression 4-1. This thesis lists 
four sample sets: all sample firms, all SOEs, central SOEs only, and local SOEs only.  
 
[Table 4.2]  
 
It is apparent that samples from SOEs occupy more than 50% of the total observations. 
Moreover, more than 86.6% of the SOEs sampled are local SOEs; approximately 45% 
of listed Chinese companies are local SOEs. One notable finding relates to the firm’s 
unexpected investment (Inewerr) in various sample sets categorized by various types of 
ownership. The means of unexpected investment for all firms and local SOEs are 
positive, but the means of unexpected investment for all SOEs and central SOEs 
become negative. This result implies that although the number of central SOEs is 
small, the value of central SOEs’ underinvestment is large, i.e., although the mean of 
unexpected investment for all SOEs is negative, that of local SOEs is positive. The 
implication of these figures is consistent with the results of regression 3-12 listed in 
Table 3.8.  
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4.6.2 Regression results  
Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 show the regression results for Hypothesis 3. Table 4.3 lists 
the results for the regression that was run on all firms, all non-SOEs and all types of 
SOE samples. Table 4.4 shows the results for the regression that was run on all firms 
and all non-SOEs. For the purpose of comparison, this thesis also reports the 
regression results in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6, which include only observations for 
which Inewerr is positive and Inewerr is positive respectively. The difference between 
market-determined compensation and actual compensation (execomgap) used in 
Tables 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 is calculated based on a fixed effects panel data model. 
The thesis gives a detailed description of the model in Chapter 2.  
 
In each table, the thesis gives the results for four or five subgroup sample sets. The 
“All firms” column shows the results for all samples, “Non-SOEs” shows the results 
for all non-SOE firms, “All SOEs” shows the results for all SOE samples, “Local 
SOEs” shows the results for local SOE samples, and “Central SOEs” shows the 
results for central SOE firms only.  
[Table 4.3]  
[Table 4.4]  
[Table 4.5]  
[Table 4.6] 
Table 4.3 provides the regression results for the full set of observations, all non-SOEs 
and different type of SOEs. This thesis finds a significant and positive relation 
between compensation regulation and a firm’s unexpected investment in all firms. 
The result also shows that a significant and positive relation between compensation 
regulation and a firm’s unexpected investment in SOE firms with different types of 
ownership, but there does not exist a significant and relation between the two in 
non-SOE firms. The results show that, in general, compensation regulation is a 
significant determinant of more investment by all firms especially by SOEs. However, 
compensation regulation does not show significant relation to unexpected investment 
by non-SOEs. These findings may imply that agency problems are different in SOEs 
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than in non-SOEs; when compensation is regulated in SOEs, executives are more 
likely to conduct additional investment so that they can serve their own interests. 
Conversely, in private or non-SOE firms, when compensation is lower than the 
market level, executives have less motivation to make more investment or they do not 
have sufficient fund to support more investment.  
 
To further clarify this point, in Table 4.4, the thesis lists the results of the regression 
conducted in all firms and in all non-SOE samples with observations when the 
unexpected investment is either positive or negative. The table shows that for all 
non-SOEs, when Inewerr is positive, the relation between the compensation gap and a 
firm’s unexpected investment is positive; when Inewerr is negative, the relation between 
the compensation gap and a firm’s unexpected investment is negative. As discussed in 
previous sections, a positive Inewerr indicates that a firm is overinvested, whereas a 
negative Inewerr indicates that a firm is underinvested. Therefore, the results in Table 
4.3 and 4.4 reveal that the agency problem caused by compensation regulation in 
SOEs is overinvestment, whereas in non-SOEs, there does not exist a significant 
relation between compensation regulation and firm’s inefficient investment, so the 
agency problem in non-SOEs may be different from that in SOEs. Meanwhile, for 
non-SOEs there is a significant and positive relation between executive compensation 
gap and firm’s inefficient investment in firms with overinvestment; a negative relation 
is found between the two in firms with underinvestment. Some scholars (e.g.: Tang et. 
al., 2011; Yu et al., 2012; Peng et al., 2016) find that either political connection or 
close relation with banks can remove or relieve financing constraints of non-SOEs. 
Thus the implication of above findings is that among non-SOEs without or with 
relatively less financing constraints, the compensation regulation will cause 
executives to make more investment while among those non-SOEs with strong 
financing constraints, such regulation will cause executives to be shirking thus lead 
firm underinvestment. This difference also complies with previous theories (Wu and 
Yu, 2009; Luo et al., 2012). Because SOEs normally do not have financing 
constraints, it is much easier for them to make more investments than it is for 
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non-SOEs, which generally lack funds. Therefore, when SOE executives find that 
their incomes are below the market level, they find it relatively easier to make 
additional investments that they can use to serve their own interests. However, 
because non-SOEs normally experience financing constraints, when executives in 
non-SOEs believe that their compensation is lower than the market level, it is very 
difficult for them to choose making more investments because of financing 
constraints; accordingly, the better choice for those executives is shirking.    
 
Table 4.5 reports the results for observations where Inewerr is positive, namely, where a 
firm’s unexpected investment is positive or the sampled firms are overinvested. The 
results are similar to the data in Table 4.3. For all SOEs (including both central and 
local SOEs), compensation regulation is positively related to overinvestment. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is proven. The findings are slightly different from those of 
Xin et al. (2007), who report a positive relation between compensation regulation and 
firm overinvestment only in local SOEs. One possible explanation for this 
discrepancy can be that over the past ten years, the government has loosened its direct 
administration of central SOEs. Another notable finding is that in overinvested 
non-SOE firms, compensation regulation is positively related to overinvestment. The 
implication of this finding shows that in non-SOE firms without financing constraints, 
overinvestment is associated with lower executive compensation, indicating the same 
agency problem occurs in non-SOEs as that in SOEs.   
 
Table 4.6 reports the results for observations where Inewerr is negative, namely, where 
a firm’s unexpected investment is negative or the sampled firms are underinvested. 
For all SOEs (including both central and local SOEs), compensation regulation is 
negatively related to unexpected investment. For all non-SOEs, the negative relation 
between compensation gap and firm’s unexpected investment is also observed. Some 
scholars (e.g.: Lin and Bo, 2012; Firth et al., 2012) argue that state ownership does 
not necessarily help in reducing the firm’s financing constraints on investment. 
Meanwhile non-SOEs are normally suffering financing constraints. The findings 
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above reveal that when facing financing constraints, executives in both SOEs and 
non-SOEs choose to make less investment due to either fund shortage or shirking 
preference.    
4.6.3 Robustness test              
4.6.3.1 Robustness test based on system GMM estimation 
To test the robustness of the research in this section, this thesis first uses system 
GMM estimators of dynamic panel data models to predicate both executive 
compensation level and firm’s investment level in chapter 2 and chapter 3 
respectively and then uses the data from the estimation to check the relation between 
firm’s unexpected investment and executive compensation gap between the market 
determined compensation level and actual compensation. Table 4.7, Table 4.8, Table 
4.9 and Table 4.10 show the regression results. 
[Table 4.7]  
[Table 4.8]  
[Table 4.9] 
 [Table 4.10] 
As shown in above tables, the signs of all coefficients in the regressions based on 
system GMM estimator of dynamic panel data models remain the same as those in 
previous regressions based on fixed effects estimator of panel data models. The 
relation between compensation regulation and overinvestment is significantly positive 
in all SOEs at 0.01 level but significantly negative in all non-SOEs now at 0.1 level. 
The outputs demonstrate that this research is robust in general for SOEs. For 
Non-SOEs, the outputs of regressions based on system GMM estimator reveal that 
executive compensation gap is negatively associated with firm’s investment which 
indicates that executives in non-SOEs choose shirking when their compensation is 
regulated to below market level. Among all non-SOEs, when the companies have 
over-investment (i.e. 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑟 ≥ 0), the executive compensation gap is positively 
related to investment gap (i.e. Inewerr); when companies have under-investment (i.e. 
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𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑟 ≤ 0), executive compensation gap has a negative relation with investment gap. 
The results demonstrate that in general executives in non-SOEs trend to choose 
under-investment when their compensations are below market level. So the agency 
problems in non-SOEs are, different from that in SOEs, underinvestment due to 
management’s shirking. These findings may imply that agency problems are different 
in SOEs than in non-SOEs; when compensation is regulated in SOEs, executives are 
more likely to conduct additional investment so that they can serve their own interests. 
Conversely, in private or non-SOE firms, when compensation is lower than the 
market level, executives have less motivation to make more investment or they do not 
have sufficient fund to support more investment thus choose to make fewer 
investments so that they can avoid additional responsibilities.  
 
For all SOEs (including both central and local SOEs), compensation regulation is 
positively related to overinvestment both in fixed effects estimation and system GMM 
estimation. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is proven. 
4.6.3.2 Robustness test considering 2008 global financial crisis 
There was a severe global financial crisis since 2008. How does this crisis affect 
China, specifically firm investment in Chinese listed firms and the relation between 
executive compensation regulation and firm investment behavior this thesis is 
investigating?  
 
Some scholars (e.g.: Jia, 2008; Liao, 2008; Bo et al., 2014) argue that global financial 
crisis affects China’s economy through three ways: export lose, investment lose and 
confidence lose. Thus the crisis has a negative impact to Chinese corporate 
investment (Bo et al., 2014). However, to courter the impact of this financial crisis, 
from 2009 to 2010, Chinese government launched economy stimulate plan by 
injecting roughly 4-trillion investment to public infrastructures such as airport, 
railway, rural area development and Tax refund, etc. Many studies (e.g.: Guo et al., 
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2009; Liu, 2012; Chen, 2014) report that the 4-trillion investment plan drives Chinese 
macro economy a V-shape turnaround from 2008 to 2009. During the same period, 
the plan also increased the overall investments of Chinese firms. Contribution of 
capital formation to GDP rate quickly increased to 87.6% in 2009 (Liu, 2012). Thus 
the global financial crisis may shock to credit markets and the financial crisis has 
worsened credit market conditions in which the quantity of credit available for 
borrowers is lower and costs of borrowing are higher (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). 
Under such a condition, firms normally cut capital expenditures, reduce debt issuance, 
draw down lines of credit, and substitute internal liquidity for external liquidity 
(Campello et al., 2010; Duchin et al., 2011). However, Kahle and Stulz (2010), 
Paunova (2010) document that corporate behaviours during the financial crisis are not 
always consistent with the predictions of the financing constraints theory, instead 
firms respond directly to a contraction in demand and to risk (Kahle and Stulz, 2010). 
Chinese investment stimulate plan brings additional fuzziness to this argument 
because the plan encourage the firms to investment more by loosen the credit control 
and by tax refund.  
 
To test whether the relation between executive compensation gap and firm’s 
unexpected investment is still remaining the same without the impact from financial 
crisis and 4-trillion investment plan, the thesis conducts a robustness test by stopping 
the samples after year of 2008. Below Table 4.11 shows the results of regression 
based on fixed effects estimations predicating both executive compensation level and 
firm’s investment level.  
[Table 4.11] 
 
As shown in the above table, the signs of all coefficients in the regressions based on 
fixed effects estimator of panel data models with subsamples prior to year of 2009 
remain the same as those in previous regressions based on full sample sets. The 
relation between compensation regulation and unexpected investment is significantly 
positive in all SOEs at 0.01 level and significantly negative in all non-SOEs at 0.01 
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level too. For local SOEs, such relation is also significantly positive but for central 
SOEs the relation is not significant although it is still positive. The outputs 
demonstrate that in general the research method adopted by this thesis is robust even 
when the thesis takes impact to firm’s investment behaviors from global financial 
crisis into consideration. One possible explanation for relatively weak positive 
relation between compensation gap and firm’s unexpected investment in central SOEs 
is that central SOEs are monitored directly by central SASAC, so it is more difficult 
for executives in central SOEs to make overinvestment even central SOEs normally 
do not have financing constraints.  
 
4.7 Conclusion and Discussion            
In this section, this thesis checks the relation between compensation regulation and 
overinvestment by Chinese listed firms.  
 
The thesis finds a significant and positive relation between the extent of compensation 
regulation and the degree of a listed SOE’s overinvestment. For those SOEs that are 
not overinvested, namely, SOEs with a negative Inewerr, this thesis finds that 
compensation regulation decreases a firm’s investment. These findings reveal that 
compensation regulation causes agency problems in SOEs in two ways. Normally 
Chinese SOEs do not have financing constraints so it is easy for SOE executives to 
make more investments that serve their own interests (Li et al., 2007). On the other 
hand when because of some reasons there are financing constraints in SOEs, 
executives will choose less investment due to either fund shortage or shirking 
preference. Unlike some other studies (e.g., Xin et al., 2007), the thesis finds local and 
central SOEs show a similar relation between compensation regulation and 
investment behavior. The evidence provided in this section supports the argument that 
the regulation of executive compensation is associated with overinvestment in 
Chinese listed SOEs.  
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Non-SOEs also show two relations between compensation regulation and firm 
investment. Because non-SOEs typically experience financing constraints when they 
raise funds for investment, executives find it difficult to increase firm investment even 
if they want to do so to fulfill their own interests. Therefore, when an executive’s 
compensation is regulated to below the market level, the easier choice is to decrease 
investment so that they can expend less effort on the job. In the context of 
compensation regulation, executives of non-SOEs choose shirking, whereas 
executives of SOEs pursue their own interests through overinvestment. This 
difference reflects the different external political and economic conditions 
experienced by SOEs and non-SOEs and provides good support for previous studies 
showing that SOEs have much weaker financing constraints than non-SOEs (e.g., 
Wang, 2009; Shen et al., 2010). Meanwhile, when facing financing constraints, 
executives in both SOEs and non-SOEs choose to make less investment due to either 
fund shortage or shirking preference. 
 
4.8 Research Limitations and Discussion of Future Studies 
In the previous sections of this thesis, the thesis studied the regulation of executive 
compensation in Chinese listed firms and inefficient investment by firms. Empirical 
studies show not only that compensation regulation exists in Chinese SOEs but also 
that Chinese listed SOEs are generally overinvested. This study also reveals that 
compensation regulation has a positive relation with overinvestment in Chinese SOEs, 
whether they are central or local.  
 
Although the study is robust, it has several limitations. First, this thesis only analyzed 
executive cash compensation because although equity-based compensation is growing, 
it currently remains a small portion of total compensation. In the future, equity 
incentives will be an important part of the total compensation package, and possible 
researches should focus on this issue later.   
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Second, to measure each firm’s investment opportunities, this thesis used its average 
Tobin’s Q. However, only a firm’s marginal Q can reflect both firm performance and 
operational characteristics (Hayashi, 1982). Because Chinese stock is only reaching 
(or approaching) weak effectiveness (Wu, 1996; Lan et al., 2005), the stock price of 
listed Chinese firms merely reflects their historical information. Therefore, as an 
index of a firm’s future investment opportunity based on stock price, average Q 
inevitably results in measurement errors. In future studies, margin Q would be the 
preferable choice, although it is very difficult to calculate.  
 
In future studies, more and sufficient firm-year observations of central SOE samples 
should also be collected to check the relation between a firm’s annual new investment 
and the sensitivity between free cash flow and investment.   
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Figure 4.1 Study framework of Hypothesis 3 
 
 
This figure presents study framework of hypothesis 3 to verify relation between 
executive compensation and firm’s inefficient investment. To deploy the study, this 
thesis first needs to determine the degree of compensation regulation and then the 
firm’s overinvestment.  
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Table 4.1 Variable definitions of the regression for Hypothesis 3 
Variable Name Definition 
Firm’s Unexpected Investment 
(Dependent Variable) 
Inewerr Difference between a firm’s actual and expected 
investment  
Extent of Compensation Regulation EXECOMGAY Market-determined compensation – Actual compensation 
Company Size  
Publicly listed duration 
LNSIZE 
COMPANYAGE 
Natural log of firm total assets 
Natural log of total years since IPO 
Management Ownership 
Blockholder 
Independent Director Ratio 
CEO Duality 
 
EXESHARE 
SHARECON 
IDRATIO 
CEODUAL 
 
(Management ownership)/(Total ownership) 
(Ownership of the largest shareholder)/(Total ownership) 
(Num. of independent directors)/(Num. of all directors) 
Dummy Variable, 1: CEO and Chairman are the same 
person; 0: CEO and Chairman are two persons 
This table presents variable definitions of regression to verify relation between firm’s 
unexpected investment and executive compensation gap to market level.  
 
 
Table 4.2 Variable descriptive statistics for regression to verify relation between 
firm inefficient investment and executive compensation gap 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Inewerr 9902 0.0007058 0.05478 -0.2187 0.2853 
EXECOMGAP 9902 473545.2 3724985 -6.70e+07 1.81e+08 
LNSIZE 
COMPANYAGE 
9902 
9902 
21.54605 
1.759339 
1.24315 
1.147326 
15.41772 
-5.899897 
28.40521 
3.093282 
EXESHARE 
SHARECON 
IDRATIO 
CEODUAL 
9902 
9902 
9902 
9902 
0.0529188 
36.46624 
0.3616346 
0.1913157 
0.1481761 
15.23286 
0.0506886 
.3933531 
0 
0.082 
0.0833333 
0 
0.891 
88.55 
0.7142857 
1 
Note: 
a) Inewerr is Firm’s Unexpected Investment which is defined as: Difference between a firm’s 
actual and expected investment 
b) EXECOMGAP is executive compensation gap between market determined level and actual 
level. 
 
This table presents Variable descriptive statistics for regression to verify relation 
between firm inefficient investment and executive compensation gap.  
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Table 4.3 Results of the regression for Hypothesis 3 (SOE Sample) under Fixed 
Effects Estimator 
 Panel I Panel II Panel III Panel IV Panel V 
VARIABLES All Firms Non-SOEs SOEs Local SOEs Central SOEs 
execomgap 79.12*** 3.286 119.2*** 106.1*** 145.7*** 
 (14.07) (1.140) (12.44) (9.734) (6.042) 
lnsize 190,700,000*** 102,300,000*** 228,000,000*** 246,000,000*** 234,400,000** 
 (13.05) (14.10) (8.715) (9.209) (2.448) 
companyage -17,190,000 14,440,000 50,540,000 886,878 348,300,000 
 (-0.637) (1.261) (0.876) (0.0159) (1.357) 
exeshare 259,100,000 -3,388,000 4,267,000,000 2,944,000,000 11,030,000,000 
 (1.538) (-0.0588) (1.412) (0.987) (0.967) 
sharecon -1,789,000 -1,705,000*** -1,729,000 -92,572 -11,780,000 
 (-1.507) (-2.992) (-0.806) (-0.0449) (-1.192) 
idratio -1,021,000,000*** -321,200,000** -1,918,000,000*** -1,078,000,000* -5,083,000,000** 
 (-3.065) (-2.151) (-3.108) (-1.742) (-2.266) 
CEODUAL 42,250,000 12,210,000 -4,260,000 -11,690,000 109,400,000 
 (0.928) (0.692) (-0.0403) (-0.116) (0.211) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -3,565,000,000*** -1,996,000,000*** -4,219,000,000*** -4,838,000,000*** -3,633,000,000 
 (-10.84) (-12.31) (-7.063) (-7.934) (-1.642) 
Observations 9,902 4,608 5,294 4,621 673 
Adj. R-squared 0.046 0.050 0.059 0.052 0.103 
F Value 36.66 18.66 25.66 19.26 5.8 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: 
l) Execomgap is total cash compensation gap (between actual level and market determined level) 
of all top executives in the firm. Unit is CNY.  
m) lnsize denotes firm size which is natual logarithm of firm’s total assets. 
n) Companyage is Natural log of total years since firm IPO 
o) EXESHARE denotes executives’ ownership, calculated as: (Management ownership)/(Total 
ownership) 
p) SHARECON denotes firm’s ownership concentration percentage, defined as: (Ownership of 
the largest shareholder)/(Total ownership) *100% 
q) IDRATIO is ratio of firm’s independent directors, defined as: (Num. of independent 
directors)/(Num. of all directors) 
r) CEODUAL is dummy variable of whether CEO and Chairman is the same person in a firm 
 
This table presents the results of the regression to verify relation between firm’s inefficient 
investment and executive compensation gap. The table reports results of five regressions. The first 
regression is run on all firms. The second regression is run on all non-SOEs. The third regression 
is run on all SOEs. The fourth regression is run on all local SOEs and the last regression is run on 
all central SOEs. All regressions are under fixed effects panel data estimators. 
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Table 4.4 Results of the regression for Hypothesis 3 (Non-SOEs samples) under 
Fixed Effects Estimator 
 Panel I Panel II Panel III Panel IV 
 All Inewerr All Inewerr Inewerr<=0 Inewerr>0 
VARIABLES All Firms All Non-SOEs Non-SOEs Non-SOEs 
execomgap 79.12*** 3.286 -8.837*** 19.76*** 
 (14.07) (1.140) (-4.678) (4.137) 
lnsize 1.907e+08*** 1.023e+08*** -1.150e+08*** 3.196e+08*** 
 (13.05) (14.10) (-26.04) (23.65) 
companyage -1.719e+07 1.444e+07 2.929e+06 1.246e+07 
 (-0.637) (1.261) (0.437) (0.575) 
exeshare 2.591e+08 -3.388e+06 2.407e+06 8.891e+07 
 (1.538) (-0.0588) (0.0741) (0.768) 
sharecon -1.789e+06 -1.705e+06*** -1.326e+06*** 1.063e+06 
 (-1.507) (-2.992) (-4.022) (0.971) 
idratio -1.021e+09*** -3.212e+08** -2.767e+08*** -1.369e+08 
 (-3.065) (-2.151) (-3.283) (-0.460) 
CEODUAL 4.225e+07 1.221e+07 1.152e+06 -1.616e+07 
 (0.928) (0.692) (0.113) (-0.479) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -3.565e+09*** -1.996e+09*** 2.483e+09*** -6.618e+09*** 
 (-10.84) (-12.31) (25.61) (-21.52) 
Observations 9,902 4,608 2,811 1,797 
R-squared 0.046 0.050 0.240 0.276 
F Value 36.65 18.66 67.76 52.39 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: 
a) Execomgap is total cash compensation gap (between actual level and market determined level) 
of all top executives in the firm. Unit is CNY.  
b) lnsize denotes firm size which is natual logarithm of firm’s total assets. 
c) Companyage is Natural log of total years since firm IPO 
d) EXESHARE denotes executives’ ownership, calculated as: (Management ownership)/(Total 
ownership) 
e) SHARECON denotes firm’s ownership concentration percentage, defined as: (Ownership of 
the largest shareholder)/(Total ownership) *100% 
f) IDRATIO is ratio of firm’s independent directors, defined as: (Num. of independent 
directors)/(Num. of all directors) 
g) CEODUAL is dummy variable of whether CEO and Chairman is the same person in a firm 
This table presents the results of the regression to verify relation between firm’s inefficient 
investment and executive compensation gap. The table reports results of four regressions. The first 
regression is run on all firms. The second regression is run on all non-SOEs. The third regression 
is run on all non-SOEs with unexpected investment (Inewerr) smaller than or equal to zero, 
namely non-SOEs with underinvestment. The fourth regression is run on all non-SOEs with 
unexpected investment (Inewerr) bigger than zero, namely non-SOEs with overinvestment.  
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Table 4.5 Results of the Regression for Hypothesis 3 under Fixed Effects 
Estimator–companies with overinvestment  
(Inewerr>=0) Panel I Panel II Panel III Panel IV Panel V 
VARIABLES All Firms Non-SOEs All SOEs Local SOEs Central SOEs 
execomgap 157.8*** 19.76*** 212.5*** 201.5*** 186.2*** 
 (15.96) (4.137) (12.87) (10.80) (4.512) 
lnsize 6.853e+08*** 3.196e+08*** 8.552e+08*** 7.654e+08*** 1.254e+09*** 
 (24.15) (23.65) (17.31) (14.24) (7.932) 
companyage -3.210e+08*** 1.246e+07 -6.048e+08*** -5.834e+08*** -4.225e+08 
 (-5.929) (0.575) (-5.447) (-4.973) (-1.177) 
exeshare -1.227e+08 8.891e+07 -1.127e+09 1.384e+09 -6.425e+09 
 (-0.344) (0.768) (-0.140) (0.149) (-0.383) 
sharecon 7.499e+06*** 1.063e+06 9.222e+06** 9.136e+06** 6.861e+06 
 (3.181) (0.971) (2.288) (2.166) (0.502) 
idratio -1.568e+09** -1.369e+08 -3.201e+09*** -1.975e+09 -1.076e+10*** 
 (-2.399) (-0.460) (-2.891) (-1.623) (-3.659) 
CEODUAL 3.822e+07 -1.616e+07 7.404e+07 5.919e+07 1.150e+09 
 (0.422) (-0.479) (0.366) (0.283) (1.469) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1.356e+10*** -6.618e+09*** -1.632e+10*** -1.482e+10*** -2.295e+10*** 
 (-21.10) (-21.52) (-14.52) (-12.10) (-6.598) 
Observations 4,079 1,797 2,282 2,012 270 
R-squared 0.231 0.276 0.268 0.196 0.527 
F Value 93.99 52.39 63.94 37.53 21.98 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: 
a) Execomgap is total cash compensation gap (between actual level and market determined level) 
of all top executives in the firm. Unit is CNY.  
b) lnsize denotes firm size which is natual logarithm of firm’s total assets. 
c) Companyage is Natural log of total years since firm IPO 
d) EXESHARE denotes executives’ ownership, calculated as: (Management ownership)/(Total 
ownership) 
e) SHARECON denotes firm’s ownership concentration percentage, defined as: (Ownership of 
the largest shareholder)/(Total ownership) *100% 
f) IDRATIO is ratio of firm’s independent directors, defined as: (Num. of independent 
directors)/(Num. of all directors) 
g) CEODUAL is dummy variable of whether CEO and Chairman is the same person in a firm 
 
This table presents the results of the regressions to verify relation between firm’s inefficient 
investment and executive compensation gap. The table reports results of five regressions. All five 
regressions are run among samples with unexpected investment (Inewerr) is positive, namely 
companies with overinvestment. The first regression is run on all firms; the second regression is 
run on all non-SOEs; the third regression is run on all SOEs; the fourth regression is run on all 
local SOEs and the last regression is run on all central SOEs.   
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Table 4.6 Results of the Regression for Hypothesis 3 under Fixed Effects 
Estimator–companies with underinvestment  
(Inewerr<=0) Panel I Panel II Panel III Panel IV Panel V 
VARIABLES All Firms Non-SOEs All SOEs Local SOEs Central SOEs 
execomgap -93.05*** -13.01*** -132.0*** -93.58*** -308.4*** 
 (-16.66) (-5.112) (-14.94) (-11.18) (-9.270) 
lnsize -2.331e+08*** -8.273e+07*** -2.930e+08*** -2.336e+08*** -4.909e+08*** 
 (-21.78) (-16.46) (-17.26) (-14.53) (-6.875) 
companyage 2.148e+08*** 303,782 3.492e+08*** 2.962e+08*** 7.186e+08*** 
 (11.38) (0.0383) (10.57) (9.886) (4.064) 
exeshare 4.334e+08 1.095e+07 -7.892e+08 9.297e+08 -2.684e+11 
 (1.463) (0.125) (-0.181) (0.244) (-0.721) 
sharecon -2.082e+06*** -1.116e+06*** -2.492e+06** -2.400e+06** -1.083e+06 
 (-2.652) (-2.906) (-2.050) (-2.175) (-0.167) 
idratio -7.882e+08*** -3.068e+08*** -9.281e+08** -5.735e+08* -1.428e+09 
 (-3.405) (-3.075) (-2.469) (-1.665) (-0.790) 
CEODUAL -2.266e+07 -1.751e+06 -1.120e+07 -3.117e+07 3.003e+08 
 (-0.713) (-0.141) (-0.197) (-0.603) (1.042) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 4.780e+09*** 1.820e+09*** 5.872e+09*** 4.602e+09*** 9.432e+09*** 
 (19.94) (16.31) (15.28) (12.65) (5.805) 
Observations 2,932 1,201 1,731 1,557 174 
R-squared 0.281 0.244 0.352 0.282 0.648 
F Value 114.09 38.32 93.55 60.64 30.03 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: 
h) Execomgap is total cash compensation gap (between actual level and market determined level) 
of all top executives in the firm. Unit is CNY.  
i) lnsize denotes firm size which is natual logarithm of firm’s total assets. 
j) Companyage is Natural log of total years since firm IPO 
k) EXESHARE denotes executives’ ownership, calculated as: (Management ownership)/(Total 
ownership) 
l) SHARECON denotes firm’s ownership concentration percentage, defined as: (Ownership of 
the largest shareholder)/(Total ownership) *100% 
m) IDRATIO is ratio of firm’s independent directors, defined as: (Num. of independent 
directors)/(Num. of all directors) 
n) CEODUAL is dummy variable of whether CEO and Chairman is the same person in a firm 
 
This table presents the results of the regressions to verify relation between firm’s inefficient 
investment and executive compensation gap. The table reports results of five regressions. All five 
regressions are run among samples with unexpected investment (Inewerr) is positive, namely 
companies with overinvestment. The first regression is run on all firms; the second regression is 
run on all non-SOEs; the third regression is run on all SOEs; the fourth regression is run on all 
local SOEs and the last regression is run on all central SOEs. 
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Table 4.7 Results of the Regression for Hypothesis 3 under system GMM DPD 
Estimator 
 Panel I Panel II Panel III Panel IV Panel V 
VARIABLES All Firms Non-SOEs SOEs Local SOEs Central SOEs 
execomgap 103.0*** -4.104* 142.4*** 129.6*** 159.8*** 
 (20.63) (-1.796) (17.90) (12.67) (9.309) 
lnsize -2.011e+07 -3.804e+07*** -5.599e+06 4.914e+07 -8.350e+07 
 (-1.192) (-5.858) (-0.187) (1.562) (-0.800) 
companyage 2.610e+06 4.282e+06 7.119e+07 -2.321e+07 6.202e+08** 
 (0.0912) (0.455) (1.148) (-0.390) (2.181) 
exeshare 2.363e+08 -4.259e+07 1.496e+09 1.773e+08 7.238e+09 
 (1.315) (-0.887) (0.464) (0.0563) (0.576) 
sharecon 7.293e+06*** -1.312e+06*** 1.056e+07*** 1.021e+07*** 9.092e+06 
 (5.652) (-2.680) (4.538) (4.550) (0.837) 
idratio -9.383e+08*** -3.675e+08*** -1.685e+09** -1.469e+09** -1.519e+09 
 (-2.639) (-2.949) (-2.547) (-2.239) (-0.613) 
CEODUAL -3.152e+07 1.295e+07 -1.497e+08 -1.721e+08 1.623e+08 
 (-0.648) (0.880) (-1.320) (-1.605) (0.284) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 5.074e+08 9.489e+08*** 1.952e+08 -8.368e+08 7.130e+08 
 (1.364) (6.648) (0.293) (-1.201) (0.296) 
Observations 9,902 4,608 5,294 4,621 673 
Adj. R-squared 0.050 0.017 0.073 0.055 0.130 
F Value 39.58 6.1 31.98 20.63 7.55 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: 
a) Execomgap is total cash compensation gap (between actual level and market determined level) 
of all top executives in the firm. Unit is CNY.  
b) lnsize denotes firm size which is natual logarithm of firm’s total assets. 
c) Companyage is Natural log of total years since firm IPO 
d) EXESHARE denotes executives’ ownership, calculated as: (Management ownership)/(Total 
ownership) 
e) SHARECON denotes firm’s ownership concentration percentage, defined as: (Ownership of 
the largest shareholder)/(Total ownership) *100% 
f) IDRATIO is ratio of firm’s independent directors, defined as: (Num. of independent 
directors)/(Num. of all directors) 
g) CEODUAL is dummy variable of whether CEO and Chairman is the same person in a firm 
This table presents the results of the regression to verify relation between firm’s inefficient 
investment and executive compensation gap among all SOEs. To check robustness of this study, 
the thesis uses system GMM estimator in determining both executive compensation and firm 
investment level. The table reports results of five regressions. The first regression is run on all 
firms. The second regression is run on all non-SOEs. The third regression is run on all SOEs. The 
fourth regression is run on all local SOEs and the last regression is run on all central SOEs.   
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Table 4.8 Results of the Regression for Hypothesis 3 under system GMM DPD 
Estimator – Non-SOEs  
 Panel I Panel II Panel III Panel IV 
 All Inewerr All Inewerr Inewerr<=0 Inewerr>0 
VARIABLES All Firms All Non-SOEs Non-SOEs Non-SOEs 
execomgap 103.0*** -4.104* -25.49*** 43.37*** 
 (20.63) (-1.796) (-11.18) (14.35) 
lnsize -2.011e+07 -3.804e+07*** -1.694e+08*** 1.360e+08*** 
 (-1.192) (-5.858) (-24.02) (18.19) 
companyage 2.610e+06 4.282e+06 -1.147e+07 1.032e+07 
 (0.0912) (0.455) (-1.140) (0.933) 
exeshare 2.363e+08 -4.259e+07 -6.119e+07 4.661e+07 
 (1.315) (-0.887) (-1.212) (0.811) 
sharecon 7.293e+06*** -1.312e+06*** -1.828e+06*** 2.351e+06*** 
 (5.652) (-2.680) (-3.602) (3.902) 
idratio -9.383e+08*** -3.675e+08*** -4.141e+08*** 1.990e+08 
 (-2.639) (-2.949) (-3.220) (1.295) 
CEODUAL -3.152e+07 1.295e+07 -3.822e+06 -2.022e+07 
 (-0.648) (0.880) (-0.241) (-1.184) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 5.074e+08 9.489e+08*** 3.725e+09*** -2.931e+09*** 
 (1.364) (6.648) (24.37) (-17.45) 
Observations 9,902 4,608 2,811 1,797 
R-squared 0.050 0.017 0.308 0.319 
F Value 39.58 6.1 91.7 68.06 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: 
a) Execomgap is total cash compensation gap (between actual level and market determined level) 
of all top executives in the firm. Unit is CNY.  
b) lnsize denotes firm size which is natual logarithm of firm’s total assets. 
c) Companyage is Natural log of total years since firm IPO 
d) EXESHARE denotes executives’ ownership, calculated as: (Management ownership)/(Total 
ownership) 
e) SHARECON denotes firm’s ownership concentration percentage, defined as: (Ownership of 
the largest shareholder)/(Total ownership) *100% 
f) IDRATIO is ratio of firm’s independent directors, defined as: (Num. of independent 
directors)/(Num. of all directors) 
g) CEODUAL is dummy variable of whether CEO and Chairman is the same person in a firm 
 
This table presents the results of the regression to verify relation between firm’s inefficient 
investment and executive compensation gap. To check robustness of this study, the thesis uses 
system GMM estimator in determining both executive compensation and firm investment level. 
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The table reports results of four regressions. The first regression is run on all firms. The second 
regression is run on all non-SOEs. The third regression is run on all non-SOEs with unexpected 
investment (Inewerr) smaller than or equal to zero, namely non-SOEs with underinvestment. The 
fourth regression is run on all non-SOEs with unexpected investment (Inewerr) bigger than or 
equal to zero, namely non-SOEs with overinvestment.  
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Table 4.9 Results of the Regression for Hypothesis 3 under system GMM DPD 
Estimator – companies with overinvestment 
(Inewerr>=0) Panel I Panel II Panel III Panel IV Panel V 
VARIABLES All Firms Non-SOEs All SOEs Local SOEs Central SOEs 
execomgap 203.9*** 217.2*** 351.7*** 153.9*** 43.37*** 
 (24.59) (17.94) (15.87) (9.587) (14.35) 
lnsize 4.205e+08*** 6.544e+08*** 3.380e+08*** 1.130e+09*** 1.360e+08*** 
 (13.62) (12.20) (5.254) (8.115) (18.19) 
companyage -1.428e+08*** -2.021e+08* -9.741e+07 -8.491e+07 1.032e+07 
 (-2.650) (-1.798) (-0.841) (-0.214) (0.933) 
exeshare 3.110e+08 -2.834e+08 6.594e+08 -1.998e+09 4.661e+07 
 (0.901) (-0.0428) (0.0986) (-0.0748) (0.811) 
sharecon 1.933e+07*** 2.271e+07*** 2.831e+07*** 2.595e+07* 2.351e+06*** 
 (7.843) (5.269) (6.258) (1.729) (3.902) 
idratio -6.041e+08 -2.446e+09** -2.275e+09* -4.857e+09 1.990e+08 
 (-0.876) (-1.978) (-1.762) (-1.266) (1.295) 
CEODUAL -5.469e+06 -6.576e+06 1.426e+06 3.571e+08 -2.022e+07 
 (-0.0594) (-0.0299) (0.00645) (0.375) (-1.184) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -8.990e+09*** -1.350e+10*** -7.249e+09*** -2.353e+10*** -2.931e+09*** 
 (-13.10) (-11.37) (-5.225) (-7.336) (-17.45) 
Observations 4,079 1,797 2,282 2,012 270 
R-squared 0.249 0.283 0.226 0.554 0.319 
F Value 107.89 70.99 46.03 25.48 68.06 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: 
a) Execomgap is total cash compensation gap (between actual level and market determined level) 
of all top executives in the firm. Unit is CNY.  
b) lnsize denotes firm size which is natual logarithm of firm’s total assets. 
c) Companyage is Natural log of total years since firm IPO 
d) EXESHARE denotes executives’ ownership, calculated as: (Management ownership)/(Total 
ownership) 
e) SHARECON denotes firm’s ownership concentration percentage, defined as: (Ownership of 
the largest shareholder)/(Total ownership) *100% 
f) IDRATIO is ratio of firm’s independent directors, defined as: (Num. of independent 
directors)/(Num. of all directors) 
g) CEODUAL is dummy variable of whether CEO and Chairman is the same person in a firm 
 
This table presents the results of the regressions to verify relation between firm’s inefficient 
investment and executive compensation gap. To check robustness of this study, the thesis uses 
system GMM estimator in determining both executive compensation and firm investment level.  
The table reports results of five panels. All five panels are run among samples with unexpected 
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investment (Inewerr) is positive, namely companies with overinvestment. The first regression is 
run on all firms; the second regression is run on all non-SOEs; the third to fifth regression is run 
on all SOEs; the fourth regression is run on all local SOEs and the last regression is run on all 
central SOEs.   
  
246 
 
Table 4.10 Results of the Regression for Hypothesis 3 under System GMM DPD 
Estimator–companies with underinvestment  
(Inewerr<=0) Panel I Panel II Panel III Panel IV Panel V 
VARIABLES All Firms Non-SOEs All SOEs Local SOEs Central SOEs 
execomgap -25.28*** -30.41*** -16.70*** -12.50*** -10.09 
 (-6.260) (-7.108) (-2.873) (-3.135) (-0.263) 
lnsize -2.358e+08*** -1.316e+08*** -2.934e+08*** -2.237e+08*** -5.716e+08*** 
 (-24.95) (-14.13) (-20.71) (-22.67) (-6.145) 
companyage 8.257e+07*** 5.458e+06 1.525e+08*** 1.100e+08*** 4.221e+08* 
 (5.112) (0.411) (5.383) (5.829) (1.719) 
exeshare 1.366e+08 5.061e+06 2.098e+09 1.173e+09 5.235e+10 
 (0.588) (0.0365) (0.555) (0.485) (0.115) 
sharecon -2.535e+06*** -1.553e+06** -2.779e+06*** -2.363e+06*** -7.356e+06 
 (-3.811) (-2.352) (-2.800) (-3.579) (-0.860) 
idratio -4.500e+08** -6.612e+08*** -3.183e+08 -1.473e+08 3.263e+08 
 (-2.306) (-3.847) (-1.039) (-0.711) (0.143) 
CEODUAL 5.697e+06 1.367e+07 8.004e+06 -4.974e+06 4.746e+07 
 (0.211) (0.634) (0.171) (-0.159) (0.126) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 4.986e+09*** 2.973e+09*** 6.057e+09*** 4.578e+09*** 1.152e+10*** 
 (24.03) (14.80) (19.08) (20.74) (5.431) 
Observations 4,079 1,797 2,282 2,012 270 
R-squared 0.298 0.287 0.320 0.368 0.398 
F Value 119.14 45.35 78.15 87.78 9.97 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: 
a) Execomgap is total cash compensation gap (between actual level and market determined level) 
of all top executives in the firm. Unit is CNY.  
b) lnsize denotes firm size which is natural logarithm of firm’s total assets. 
c) Companyage is Natural log of total years since firm IPO 
d) EXESHARE denotes executives’ ownership, calculated as: (Management ownership)/(Total 
ownership) 
e) SHARECON denotes firm’s ownership concentration percentage, defined as: (Ownership of 
the largest shareholder)/(Total ownership) *100% 
f) IDRATIO is ratio of firm’s independent directors, defined as: (Num. of independent 
directors)/(Num. of all directors) 
g) CEODUAL is dummy variable of whether CEO and Chairman is the same person in a firm 
 
This table presents the results of the regressions to verify relation between firm’s inefficient 
investment and executive compensation gap. The table reports results of five regressions. All five 
regressions are run among samples with unexpected investment (Inewerr) is positive, namely 
companies with overinvestment. The first regression is run on all firms; the second regression is 
run on all non-SOEs; the third regression is run on all SOEs; the fourth regression is run on all 
local SOEs and the last regression is run on all central SOEs. 
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Table 4.11 Results of the Regression for Hypothesis 3 under Fixed effects 
Estimator–Subsamples prior to Year 2009  
 Panel I Panel II Panel III Panel IV Panel V 
VARIABLES All Firms Non-SOEs All SOEs Local SOEs Central SOEs 
execomgap 62.08*** -16.46*** 85.94*** 88.89*** 46.59 
 (6.022) (-5.086) (5.464) (6.408) (0.559) 
lnsize 2.101e+08*** 5.328e+07*** 2.682e+08*** 2.037e+08*** 6.364e+08*** 
 (10.38) (8.160) (8.471) (7.235) (3.446) 
companyage 4.278e+06 1.880e+07* 5.262e+07 8.312e+07 -3.279e+06 
 (0.113) (1.842) (0.825) (1.520) (-0.00759) 
exeshare 5.055e+08 4.308e+07 6.931e+09 8.496e+09 2.325e+08 
 (0.632) (0.293) (0.635) (0.919) (0.00276) 
sharecon -31,995 -1.166e+06** -136,325 1.293e+06 -1.654e+07 
 (-0.0205) (-2.253) (-0.0586) (0.653) (-0.986) 
idratio -1.177e+09** -1.648e+08 -2.009e+09*** -1.691e+09*** -7.071e+09 
 (-2.511) (-1.195) (-2.778) (-2.718) (-1.500) 
CEODUAL 1.804e+06 1.390e+07 -5.991e+07 -4.859e+07 -2.437e+07 
 (0.0281) (0.844) (-0.542) (-0.519) (-0.0296) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -4.019e+09*** -1.047e+09*** -5.099e+09*** -3.926e+09*** -1.077e+10** 
 (-8.776) (-7.038) (-7.136) (-6.172) (-2.584) 
Observations 2,350 806 1,544 1,398 146 
R-squared 0.054 0.077 0.067 0.070 0.094 
F Value 23.15 11.7 18.78 17.53 2.62 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: 
a) Execomgap is total cash compensation gap (between actual level and market determined level) 
of all top executives in the firm. Unit is CNY.  
b) lnsize denotes firm size which is natural logarithm of firm’s total assets. 
c) Companyage is Natural log of total years since firm IPO 
d) EXESHARE denotes executives’ ownership, calculated as: (Management ownership)/(Total 
ownership) 
e) SHARECON denotes firm’s ownership concentration percentage, defined as: (Ownership of 
the largest shareholder)/(Total ownership) *100% 
f) IDRATIO is ratio of firm’s independent directors, defined as: (Num. of independent 
directors)/(Num. of all directors) 
g) CEODUAL is dummy variable of whether CEO and Chairman is the same person in a firm 
 
This table presents the results of the regressions to verify relation between firm’s inefficient 
investment and executive compensation gap based on fixed effects estimations predicating 
executive compensation level and firm’s investment level. The table reports results of five 
regressions. The first regression is run on all firms; the second regression is run on all non-SOEs; 
the third regression is run on all SOEs; the fourth regression is run on all local SOEs and the last 
regression is run on all central SOEs. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusions 
5.1 Findings summary   
This thesis studies the correlation between firms’ investment behavior and executive 
compensation in publicly listed companies that offer Chinese A shares. The thesis 
argues that because the Chinese government regulates executive compensation in 
SOEs, executive compensation in those firms will be lower than it if was solely 
determined by the market. Furthermore, because there are serious agency problems in 
Chinese SOEs, the gap between the higher market-determined compensation level and 
the lower actual compensation level will cause inefficient investments that allow SOE 
executives to acquire personal benefits and offset the loss caused by the compensation 
gap.  
 
The first part of this thesis investigates whether executive compensation in Chinese 
SOEs is depressed by implicit or explicit government regulations. To begin the study, 
the thesis first constructs a market-oriented model to measure expected executive 
compensation levels by considering firm size, industry, corporate governance, and 
relevant accounting indices. This thesis then predicts the market-determined 
compensation level for each company based on the model and calculates the 
difference between the market-determined compensation level and the executive’s 
actual compensation level.  
 
The second part of this thesis focuses on investigating firm investments. The thesis 
divides firm investments into two parts (Richardson, 2006). The first part is 
reasonable investment, which includes investments that not only support existing 
assets and future growth opportunities but also have an NPV greater than zero. The 
second part, which cannot be explained by existing assets and growth opportunities, is 
inefficient investment. Following this logic, the thesis obtains the difference between 
a firm’s actual investments and its predictable investments, a value that denotes a 
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firm’s inefficient investments. As mentioned in previous chapters, the sign of this 
difference indicates whether a firm is under- or overinvested. The absolute value of 
this difference indicates the degree of a firm’s inefficient investments.  
 
The third part of this thesis studies the correlation between the executive 
compensation gap and a firm’s inefficient investments. This thesis conducts the study 
in various sample sets including SOEs, central SOEs, local SOEs, and non-SOEs to 
verify the rigor of the research.  
 
Some key findings have been obtained in these studies. They are highlighted as 
below.  
 
In the first part, this thesis finds that firm size is the most important factor in setting 
executive compensation. ROA is positively but not significantly related to executive 
compensation in all firms. However, gross margin is significantly and positively 
related to executive compensation. This finding shows that to some degree, firm 
performance influences compensation decisions; that said, short-term measures (e.g., 
gross margins) play a more important role than relatively long-term measures (e.g., 
ROA) in setting compensation. Corporate governance remains weak in listed Chinese 
companies. Independent directors are not effectively playing their monitoring role in 
all firms, and CEO duality remains prevalent, which not only influences executive 
compensation decisions but also causes higher compensation generally. Ownership 
structure has a significant impact on executive compensation. Consistent with 
substitute effect theory, the result shows a negative relation between management 
ownership and executive compensation, supporting the argument that management 
ownership has a substitutive effect on compensation thus the management may accept 
relatively lower cash compensation. This finding is consistent with some previous 
studies (e.g., Cordeiro and Veliyath, 2003; Hu et al., 2012) but not with other studies 
(e.g., Sanders, 2001a; Peng 2006; Zhang, 2010) whose findings support the agency 
theory and argue that management ownership helps managers influence compensation 
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decisions more effectively so that managers with higher ownership will receive higher 
compensation. However such relation is not significant in this research which may 
because management ownership in Chinese listed companies is not prevalent yet. 
According to this study and the findings of other authors (e.g., Ke and Qiu, 2009; 
Conyon and He, 2011; Zhou, 2013), ownership concentration is significantly and 
negatively related to executive compensation. Block holders in listed Chinese 
companies play an effective role in monitoring management and controlling executive 
cash compensation. Another important finding of the first part is the relation between 
SOE attribute and executive compensation. The thesis finds that SOE attribute 
(whether central or local) will increase the gap between an executive’s actual 
compensation and his or her market-determined compensation level. This finding 
supports the hypothesis that compensation regulation occurs in listed SOEs and drives 
executive compensation lower than the market level.  
 
In the second part of this thesis, the thesis investigated firms’ investment behavior. 
Consistent with agency theory, the thesis finds that ownership concentration is 
negatively related to unexpected investments. This result reflects how major 
shareholders play an effective role in controlling and monitoring management in 
listed Chinese companies. A firm’s business operational margin is also shown to have 
a positive influence on its investment level. This result is consistent with the financing 
constraint hypothesis, which holds that if a firm has a higher operational margin and 
thus more disposable funds, it is more likely to engage in additional investment if 
other conditions remain the same. As in Richardson’s (2006) research, this thesis 
finds that overinvestment is more likely to occur in firms with positive free cash flow. 
This result also supports the financing constraint hypothesis. Firms’ SOE attribute is 
significantly and positively related to their unexpected investments, thus indicating 
that with other conditions remaining the same, SOEs will invest more than non-SOEs. 
The thesis also finds that local SOEs engage in more unexpected investment than 
other firms.  
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This thesis also finds, in the second part of the thesis, that for all of the sampled 
companies, a firm’s investment opportunities, cash flow, sales revenue, amount of 
cash stock, and size are positively related to its annual investment increase, but its 
debt rate (lever) has a negative relation to its annual investment increase. The sign of 
the coefficient of interaction, Cashflow×Q, is negative and significant at the 1% level, 
which indicates that listed Chinese companies are generally overinvested. For all SOE 
samples, the abovementioned correlations remain the same, and the coefficient of 
QCFK remains negative and strongly significant at 1%. This result reveals that 
Chinese listed SOEs are generally overinvested. The thesis finds strong evidence in 
this study that local SOEs are overinvested, but the thesis does not find sufficient 
evidence to support the same conclusion for central SOEs.  
 
The correlation between compensation regulation and a firm’s inefficient investments 
is studied in the third part of this thesis. The thesis finds a significant and positive 
relation between the extent of compensation regulation and degree of a listed Chinese 
SOE’s overinvestment. For non-overinvested SOEs, executive compensation 
regulations will also increase a firm’s investments. A similar correlation between 
compensation and a firm’s investment behavior is found in both central and local 
SOEs. In general, this part’s findings support the argument that the regulation of 
executive compensation leads to overinvestment in Chinese listed SOEs. For all 
non-SOEs, this thesis finds that when firms are overinvested, the relation between the 
compensation gap and unexpected investments is negative; when firms are 
underinvested, the relation between the compensation gap and unexpected 
investments is positive. The different findings for SOEs and non-SOEs reveal that the 
agency problem caused by compensation regulation in SOEs is overinvestment, 
whereas the problem in non-SOEs is underinvestment. The implications of these 
findings are that when executives in SOEs find that their incomes are lower than the 
market level, they make overinvestments to serve their own interests. When 
executives in non-SOEs believe that their incomes are lower than the market level, 
they shirk to conserve their personal efforts.  
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In summary, this thesis’s findings support the hypothesis. First, there is compensation 
regulation in listed SOEs, which results in actual executive compensation that is lower 
than the market-determined level. Second, there is overinvestment in Chinese listed 
SOEs. Third, executive compensation regulations in Chinese listed SOEs lead to 
general overinvestment by these companies.  
           
5.2 Research Contributions  
This study contributes to the current literature related to compensation management 
and firms’ investment behaviors. This research also provides a good reference for 
business administration practitioners and authorities designing executive 
compensation schemes. 
 
The thesis introduces a new method to study the correlation between executive 
compensation and firm investment behaviors. In the study, the thesis first builds a 
quantitative model to describe the gap between actual executive compensation and 
market-determined compensation. Second, the thesis calculates the gap between the 
two as the measurement of the degree of compensation regulation. Third, the thesis 
obtains the difference between a firm's actual investment level and its normal 
investment level, which is the measurement of a firm's inefficient investment. Finally, 
this thesis checks the correlation between the two gaps mentioned above, finding a 
significant and positive correlation. This method contributes to the literature on 
corporate governance and firm investment. Although there have been some related 
studies on either executive compensation or firm investment, this is the first thesis to 
link executive compensation and firm investment from a compensation regulation 
perspective in the recent Chinese political and economic context. Furthermore, this 
thesis introduces a dynamic panel data model to calculate an executive's 
market-determined compensation level, an innovation that is novel in the literature.  
 
This thesis provides strong quantitative evidence that executive compensation in 
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Chinese listed SOEs is lower than market-determined levels because of government 
regulations. Many literatures argue that executive compensations in Chinese listed 
companies, especially Chinese listed state owned enterprises, are high because of poor 
corporate governance, government intervene or company ownership structure (e.g.: 
Shi,2010; Jiang,2008; Shen and Li,2010; Yang and Zhao,2012). Although these 
arguments reveal some problems in executive compensation of Chinese listed 
companies, they are not the key. Since unique ownership of Chinese public listed 
companies, especially listed SOEs, there are severe agency problems between 
executives of Chinese listed SOEs and SOEs’ administrative authorities in the 
government. Due to asymmetrical information, it is very difficult for government to 
judge executives’ behavior, meanwhile, although SOEs introduced independent 
directors, they are not real “independent” (e.g. Tang et al., 2005; Gao et al., 2006) to 
monitor executives including compensation setting. Thus to keep a “fair” 
compensation for executives in SOEs, government merely issued many “Pay ceiling 
order” and all kinds of regulations. This study, however, shows that underpayment is 
prevailing among Chinese listed companies, particularly listed SOEs. The study finds 
that almost half of executives in Chinese listed SOEs are underpaid when use all listed 
companies as the benchmark of market compensation level, this number is even 
higher when use all non-SOEs as the same benchmark. This finding is valuable. It 
clearly shows that although some executives are overpaid in SOEs, many more are 
underpaid. So scholars and administrative authorities should focus more on how to 
motivate executives in Chinese listed SOEs rather than merely regulate executives’ 
compensation to cater to public’s appeal of fairness and justice.  
 
 
This thesis also finds overinvestment among Chinese listed SOEs and a strong 
correlation between compensation regulation and such overinvestment. Furthermore, 
this thesis reveals that SOEs and private firms have different agency problems. If 
executive compensation is lower than the market level, SOEs’ resulting agency 
problems involve overinvestment, whereas the resulting agency problems of private 
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firms involve executive shirking when making investment decisions. Local SOEs are 
more likely to be overinvested than central SOEs. However, executives in local SOEs 
are more likely then executives in central SOEs to overinvest. The difference between 
local and central SOEs reveals that central SOEs may be subject to stricter 
government monitoring and management; thus, it is more difficult for central SOEs to 
overinvest, even if their executives wish to do so. The above findings are valuable to 
the academic literature. Only very few literatures studied relation between executive 
compensation and firm’s investment (e.g.: Chen and Sun, 2014; Xia and Yu,2012; 
Xin et al.,2007; Xu and Liu,2014). However in general previous literatures haven’t 
reached a well-accepted conclusion of relation between executive compensation and 
firm investment under Chinese political and economic context. This vagueness brings 
obstacles to innumerable previous researches and future studies as well. Almost all 
existing researches did not consider the impact from executive compensation when 
study firm’s investment behavior. This thesis aims to bring more knowledge to this 
filed by answering the relation between executive compensation and firm investment 
in a more quantitative and structural way. The thesis not only enriches the existing 
literatures about executive compensation and firm investment, it also provides strong 
empirical evidences to support agency theory in corporate finance field. Meanwhile, 
the thesis indicates that the investment models adopted by the previous literature are 
insufficient in that they ignore the influence of compensation incentives. Therefore, 
this study provides a new understanding of the investment behaviors of Chinese listed 
firms which will bring valuable hints to future researches in the field related to 
executive compensation and firm investment. 
 
This thesis contributes to both corporate governance practitioners and policy makers. 
Because China has a political and economic system different from those of developed 
Western economies, the challenges of corporate governance in Chinese 
firms—especially listed SOEs—are much different from those that have been 
discussed in the literature. Because SOEs are nominally owned by either the state or 
the people, however, there is no proper organization to represent the people. Instead, 
255 
 
SOEs are managed by SASAC, which is a department of the Chinese government. 
SASAC is not an SOE’s true owner, and therefore, SASAC officials do not have an 
adequate incentive to supervise SOE management. In such situations, the SOE’s 
day-to-day managers possess much more information than the government, and 
consequently, their inside information enables them to make managerial decisions that 
cater to their own interests. Absentee ownership is also a prominent problem in the 
corporate governance of Chinese SOEs.  
 
The implications of this thesis’s findings are important for corporate governance 
practitioners. First, it reminds SASAC that simply controlling executive compensation 
in SOEs, as the Chinese government is now doing, may be the wrong decision 
because compared to the market level, executive compensation in SOEs is already 
low. Second, to motivate SOE executives, policy makers may rely more on 
equity-based incentives. Perhaps a proper way to motivate executives in SOEs could 
be to keep their cash compensation constant while increasing their equity-based 
compensation as a share of total compensation. Third, because most listed SOEs are 
ultimately controlled by the state, the state is normally the single largest shareholder. 
This ownership structure not only causes relatively lower executive compensation but 
also distorts corporate governance by resulting in a low independent-director ratio, for 
example. One possible way to further implement SOE reforms would be to dilute the 
state’s ownership (Chen et al., 1998; Firth et al., 2006) such that boards of directors 
can truly take responsibility for shareholder interests. 
 
This thesis’s findings also provide valuable information for Chinese government 
policy makers. The thesis determines that compensation regulation has caused 
overinvestment in Chinese listed SOEs. This finding makes Chinese governmental 
policies on executive compensation extremely questionable. In recent years, the 
Chinese government has proactively controlled and regulated executive compensation 
in both central and local SOEs. The original purpose of these regulations was to 
improve SOE performance, lower costs, and eliminate unfairness because SOEs are 
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owned by the people and therefore executives should not receive compensation that is 
much higher than that of ordinary employees. However, this research finds that if 
authorities regulate executive compensation to below the market level, SOE 
executives will engage in overinvestment to offset the losses caused by those 
compensation regulations. Overinvestment normally involves negative-NPV projects, 
which devalue SOEs in the long term (e.g. Morgado and Pindado, 2003; Jiang, 2011; 
Du et al., 2011; Khieu et al., 2012). Because asymmetric information makes it very 
difficult to prevent SOE executives from overinvesting, a better way to motivate SOE 
executives is to offer them market-level compensation to mitigate overinvestment and 
increase the long-term value of the SOE. Another finding also provides policy makers 
with information to improve their monitoring of SOEs. This thesis shows that local 
SOEs are more likely than central SOEs to overinvest when executives are offered 
below-market compensation. In general, central SOEs are more closely monitored by 
the central government so that their executives cannot easily decide to overinvest. 
However, local SOEs are managed by local governments and conduct many economic 
and administrative tasks that are related to local government, including providing tax 
contributions and employment to the areas in which they are located. Moreover, 
because one key performance index of local government is GDP, the local 
government is motivated to encourage local SOEs to increase their size by investing 
in more negative-NPV projects. This thesis reminds policy makers to maintain a 
closer watch when monitoring local SOEs. Meanwhile, unlike what the Chinese 
government is currently doing to regulate executive compensation in SOEs, the thesis 
indicates that compensation regulations in Chinese listed SOEs bring severe side 
effects and will furtherly diminish state-owned assets. According to this thesis’s 
findings, the proper way to manage SOE executives is to offer them market-level 
compensation and improve corporate governance by introducing major outside 
stakeholders, for example. This implication is critical: it may influence China 
government to reconsider future reform actions in Chinese SOEs and will ultimately 
impact China’s political and economic ecology in a long term.   
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5.3 Research limitations and further research areas    
This thesis introduces a new method to study the correlation between executive 
compensation and investment in Chinese SOEs. Many of its findings have been 
obtained from the research, and these findings are valuable to both the academic 
literature and SOE policymakers.  
 
However, this research has some limitations. To measure a firm’s investment 
opportunities the thesis uses the firm’s average Tobin’s Q. However, only a firm’s 
marginal Q can reflect firm performance and operational characteristics (Hayashi, 
1982). Because Chinese stock is only reaching or approaching weak effectiveness 
(Wu, 1996; Lan et al., 2005), the stock prices of listed Chinese firms only reflect 
historical information. Therefore, as an index of a firm’s future investment 
opportunity based on stock price, average Q inevitably results in measurement errors. 
Although many scholars use average Q to measure a firm’s investment opportunities, 
marginal Q is the preferable choice in future research.  
 
In this study, the thesis only analyzed executive cash compensation because although 
equity-based compensation is increasing, it currently remains a small portion of total 
compensation. In the future, equity incentives will be an important part of the total 
compensation package, and researchers shall focus on them in later studies. Another 
possible improvement on this research would be to find a proxy for the entire market. 
Because of data constraints, this thesis uses all listed companies as a substitute for the 
entire market. The thesis also tried to use all private listed companies as a proxy. 
However, because listed companies have some similar features—especially under 
China’s current IPO policy—there may be potential bias as this thesis had used all 
listed companies as a proxy for the entire market. The best way to manage this issue 
would be to rely on data from a sufficient number of listed and privately held 
companies. Finally, further research can more closely study the diversity between 
central SOEs and local SOEs, which have different attributes in this study.  
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In addition, in future studies, researchers may focus on central SOEs because this 
thesis does not find a significant relation between compensation regulation and firm 
overinvestment for central SOEs. It is spontaneously to believe that there is also 
agency problem in central SOEs, but because central SOEs are monitored by the 
central government, it is difficult for these executives to overinvest. In contrast, local 
SOEs assume both economic and political responsibilities related to local government, 
including GDP growth and providing local job opportunities. Accordingly, the local 
government is more likely to tolerate overinvestment by local SOEs. This hypothesis 
should be verified, and it will be an interesting topic for future researches.  
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